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Conservative international thought in Victorian Britain is a prominent landmark in the 
landscape of international thought which has up to now gone unmapped. In 
illuminating this body of thought, the thesis addresses weaknesses present in three 
different historiographies. As the first detailed study of conservative international 
thought in Victorian Britain, the thesis rectifies a marked bias in Victorian intellectual 
history towards the study of liberal and radical thought. Furthermore, by analysing the 
political thought of major representatives of the conservative educated classes, this 
thesis provides context for the history of conservative high politics, thereby leading us 
to view these in a different light. Finally, this study, by providing a historically nuanced 
account of the evolution of major themes of international relations theory in mid-
Victorian Britain, functions as a corrective to the self-history of the academic field of 
International Relations. The thesis makes its argument by analysing conservative 
contributions in periodicals, pamphlets, and newspapers to British public debates on 
international affairs, from the Crimean War (1854-56) until the Eastern Question crisis 
of 1876-80. The general claim of this thesis is that there existed a distinctly conservative 
perspective on the international sphere. The core elements of this conservative 
perspective were the primacy of statesmen in setting foreign policy; of interests, military 
force, and stature in determining the course of international politics; and of order and 
equilibrium as its normative content. Conservative authors used this constellation of 
ideas in the major debates of the mid-Victorian era on international affairs, both as a 
means to make sense of events, and as a counterpoint to liberal narratives – with which 
Victorian international thought is all too often identified. In recovering the international 
political thought of Victorian conservatives, this thesis illuminates an important but 
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This thesis is a project to recover the international political thought of a wide variety of 
opinion-formers among Victorian conservatives. The scholarship in the history of 
political thought and in the history of international relations have respectively focused 
mainly on the early modern era and the 20th century. More recent studies which do 
treat Victorian international thought have mainly investigated liberals and radicals. This 
neglect of the conservative perspective on international affairs has persisted despite the 
vital importance of conservatism in Victorian political life.1 Conservative international 
thought in Victorian Britain is a prominent landmark in the landscape of international 
thought which has up to now gone unexplored and unmapped. 
 The general claim of this thesis is that there existed a distinctly conservative 
outlook on international relations in Victorian Britain. Conservative authors themselves 
explicitly presented their perspective on international relations as an alternative to the 
liberal narrative of progress through the spread of constitutional liberty and national 
self-determination. It is these latter principles, however, with which Victorian 
international thought is all too often identified. The core elements of the conservative 
perspective were the primacy of statesmen in setting foreign policy; of interests, military 
force, and stature in determining the course of international politics; and of order and 
equilibrium as its normative content. Conservative authors used this constellation of 
ideas in the major debates of the mid-Victorian era on international affairs, both as a 
means to make sense of events, and as a counterpoint to liberal invocations of the 
public and the national community; of justice and universal morality; and of the 
progress of civilisation.  
 The argument of this thesis is based on the analysis of conservative 
contributions to public debates on international affairs in mid-Victorian Britain, from 
around 1854 to around 1880. The exact character of international politics was a topic of 
major contemporary significance in mid-Victorian Britain. These decades saw a 
perpetual struggle between liberals and conservatives. The question at stake was, were 
British interests best served by effecting a general progress of civilisation, or by keeping 
Europe in order? These debates on international affairs were also intertwined with 
debates on major domestic issues, most notably on popular influence on government, 
economy of government, and the character of the British polity. Conservative thought 
                                                          
1 One of the two main political parties called itself “Conservative”, and lower-case conservatism was even 
more widespread. See Blake (1970: 93-94). 
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on international affairs is then also part of the story of how conservatives reacted 
intellectually to several major trends of the Victorian era, namely the increasing 
democratisation of politics, the rapid advance of technology, and the spread of national 
consciousness. Conservative commentators drew upon their theory of international 
relations in order to argue either against the affirmation of these trends or for Britain to 
take certain actions to cope with these changes.  
 
Method 
The thesis focuses on the nexus of three areas which have in particular been unjustly 
neglected in the literature: it studies Victorian international political thought, rather than 
the more extensively covered early modern and 20th century thought; it investigates the 
writings of opinion-formers among the conservative educated classes, rather than 
liberals and radicals or eminent conservative politicians; and it analyses their 
conceptualisations of the European international sphere, rather than focusing on 
empire. The paragraphs below explain how the thesis is demarcated along its various 
dimensions. 
 
The conservative dimension 
How does this thesis recover those works and arguments which were part of the 
conservative tradition of political thought? Firstly, the thesis approaches the conservative 
tradition through its social reality, its existence as a political movement, as opposed to 
through its theoretical structure.2 This thesis thus adopts the position that conservative 
international thought is the thought of conservatives on international affairs, with no a 
priori criteria regarding the substance of this thought.3 The thesis uses both self-
identification and party affiliation to identify conservative thinkers. This establishes a 
body of mainstream conservatives. The contextualist scholarship on Victorian liberal 
political thought generally recovers a sense of what liberal thought entailed through the 
identification of those concepts, beliefs, and commitments which were widely shared 
                                                          
2 This distinction is made by Geuss, when he argues that '”liberalism” refers both to a relatively abstract 
theoretical structure – a collection of characteristic arguments, ideals, values, concepts – and to a social 
reality, a political movement that is at least partly institutionalised in organised parties' (Geuss 2002: 322; 
see also Bell 2007c: 8). Put in the terms used by Bell (2014: 3-4), this is an explanatory and comprehensive 
rather than prescriptive account of conservative thought, using a contextual rather than stipulative or canonical 
approach. The study of canonical authors or politicians, while common in studies of conservatism, would 
be 'a defective foundation on which to build an analysis of a tradition', and especially of the conservative 
tradition, where the canonical figures are 'in many ways untypical of conservatives generally' (Bell 2014: 
5); (Pearson and Williams 1984: 72). 
3 This approach is also used by Sylvest, in his book on liberal internationalism (2009). 
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among ‘self-proclaimed liberals’.4 This thesis too adopts this approach, and the second 
move consequently entails identifying the political thought shared by the field of 
mainstream conservatives.  
 Analysis of the thought of self-identified conservatives makes clear that they 
held commitments which were also positionally conservative. The positional approach 
identifies conservatism through its taking of a particular position within societal debates 
on institutional change – one which aims to prevent wholesale changes to those 
institutions necessary to uphold the existing order, in reaction to calls for change by 
progressives or radicals.5 The conservative body of thought is consequently placed in 
the context of the conservatives’ imagined interlocutors. The thesis thereby recovers 
those arguments, notions, and perspectives which commentators presented as the 
conservative alternative to liberal and radical views. 
 The two methodological moves above already result in a substantive account of 
conservative thought. The third move expands the analysis beyond this body of 
mainstream conservative thought, by investigating to what extent the themes of 
conservative thought were drawn upon by Whigs and “hard-headed” liberals, who were 
more ambiguously related to Victorian conservatism.6 It thereby analyses what was 
distinctive about the thought of conservatives. Through employing these 
methodological moves, the thesis offers an account of Victorian conservative 
international political thought which is wide-ranging and inclusive, allowing for 
conservatism to manifest itself in different contexts and different vocabularies. 
 
The international dimension 
How does this thesis demarcate the international? Least problematically, international 
thought entails thought on inter-state relations. Another possible facet of international 
thought would be thought on transnational affairs – thought on trends or events which 
                                                          
4 Bell (2014: 7). See e.g. Bell and Sylvest (2007); Bellamy (1990); Burrow (1988); Fontana (1990); Sylvest 
(2009). 
5 This understanding of conservatism as “positional” is endorsed by several major scholars of 
conservatism. See Freeden (1996: 329-331); Huntington (1957: 455); Mannheim (1986: 83-84). In 
addition, a positional understanding of conservatism is compatible with the thought of contemporary 
conservatives on their role in society. For two important twentieth-century conservative thinkers, see 
Scruton (1980: 11-15, 19, 22) and Oakeshott (1962 [1991]: 407-410). For Victorian conservatives: On 
Peel, see Gash (1977: 83); Fontana (1990: 52). On Disraeli, see Blake (1998: 278-9); Jenkins (1996: 140); 
Parry (2007: 29-30). On Robert Cecil, Marquess of Salisbury, see Bentley (2001: 20, 27, 31); Cecil (1883); 
Pinto-Duchinsky (1967: 80); Stewart (1987: 98). On the 14th Earl of Derby, see Greenleaf (1983: 191-2); 
Hawkins (2007: 23-5, 59). On Churchill, see Quinault (1979: 143, 164). On Balfour, see Adams (2007: 60-
1). See also Greg (1883: 701); Kebbel (1883: 689); Lecky (1896: 210-1). 
6 See the chapter on "Liminal figures" and its outline below. 
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transcend the domestic sphere, but which do not revolve around the interaction 
between states. This is a valid area of investigation, but little commented upon by 
conservatives during the time period under investigation – inter-state relations loomed 
far larger for them. A more potentially problematic issue is the thought on empire. 
Edward Keene has argued that the nineteenth century saw two international orders: a 
European sovereign state system which was to secure toleration and stability, and an 
extra-European order which aimed to realise the progress of civilisation, in which 
actors’ sovereignty was divisible.7 Keene also notes how many international lawyers at 
the time considered empire as part of the sphere of constitutional rather than 
international law.8 Both points apply, to a certain extent, to Victorian conservatives. 
They indeed understood empire as a distinct sphere, not reducible to the logic and 
categories of either the domestic or international sphere, but incorporating elements of 
both (e.g. a formal, hierarchical relationship between Britain and the colonies, in 
contrast with the relationship between states, but at the same time the possibility of a 
more adversarial relationship between colonial and British governments than was ever 
assumed within the government structure of Britain). Recovering conservative political 
thought on empire and on European international relations are consequently two 
different scholarly endeavours.  
 This thesis concerns itself with thought on European international politics, 
because Europe was the facet of the global order which loomed largest in conservative 
thought. There were far more articles on European international politics in the 
conservative Quarterly Review and Blackwood's Magazine than on other international issues. 
Even when the focus of debates shifted towards colonial and imperial matters from the 
early eighties onward, commentators still generally framed these in the context of 
European politics. While the focus of scholarship in intellectual history on the political 
thought on empire is understandable considering present-day priorities and interests, for 
a representative history of Victorian international thought we do need to attend more to 
Victorian thought on Europe. Reflecting the emphasis and priorities of the subjects of 
this research project, the international thought studied is thus primarily thought on 
inter-state affairs in Europe and, briefly, North America. 
 
The Victorian conservative dimension 
The thesis makes its argument by analysing conservative contributions to public debates 
                                                          
7 Keene (2002); (2009: 119). 
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on international affairs. Public debate in Victorian Britain revolved around newspapers, 
periodicals, pamphlets, and Parliament.9 Of these, periodical articles best represent the 
general features of the intellectual landscape and most embed their arguments in a 
framework of political thought.10 Consequently, this thesis focuses primarily on 
conservative periodicals and, where warranted, newspapers and pamphlets.11 The thesis 
focuses on authors and articles from that subset of periodicals which were high-calibre, 
not merely aiming to entertain, which focused on current affairs and politics rather than 
literary criticism, and which had a conservative editorial slant.12 These venues were an 
outlet for the perspectives of a particular subset of conservative Victorian Britain – the 
educated, articulate, mostly metropolitan, upper middle class.13 The thesis consequently 
investigates the class of conservative educated commentators, rather than eminent 
conservative politicians.14 That said, the conservative authors in these periodicals often 
identified explicitly with the Conservative party and Conservative parliamentarians – 
                                                                                                                                                                    
8 Keene (2002: kindle loc. 1378). 
9 Collini (1991: 51-6); Gambles (1999: 10-11, 18); Houghton (1983: 10-13, 18). 
10 Newspaper articles played a role in shaping and representing public opinion, but are not a particularly 
suitable focus for a study of political thought, since, as Gambles notes, 'daily and weekly newspapers were 
chiefly concerned to 'report' news. … reviews and magazines and pamphlets provided the lengthy analysis 
which newspapers could not offer' (Gambles 1999: 18).  
In privileging periodicals and pamphlets over debates in Parliament, the thesis follows the approach used 
in much of the literature on Victorian political thought. See e.g. Bell (2007b); Burrow (1970); (1988); 
Collini (1991); Jones (2000); Varouxakis (2002). Furthermore, 1010 when Conservative politicians were in 
opposition, and their rhetorical position did not imply any actual policy commitments, their 1010 positions 
taken in Parliament were often motivated at least as much by what would gain them party-political 
advantage as by what they thought would be the best course of action for Britain. See e.g. the argument in 
Hicks (2007: 151-2, 160, 163). Finally, a case study of the Parliamentary debates on the Eastern Question 
crisis (1876-78) - when the Conservatives were in government - proved that while including Parliamentary 
debates would add significantly to the number of references, it would not substantially change the content 
or conclusions of the analysis. 
11 In particular, the Black Sea affair was of such an ephemeral nature (consisting mainly of a war-scare 
during two weeks in November 1870), that it made little impact in the periodicals. Consequently, the 
analysis of this debate mostly rests on the leaders of The Standard and The Globe, at the time the only two 
unambiguously conservative newspapers among the 'preponderantly Liberal … metropolitan press' (Koss 
1981: 198, see also 150, 183). 
12 See for these distinctions Collini (1991: 51-54); Gambles (1999: 10-11, 18); Houghton (1983: 10-13, 18). 
The two pre-eminent periodicals with an explicitly conservative editorial slant were the Quarterly Review 
and Blackwood's Magazine. The Saturday Review, Fraser's Magazine, Pall Mall Gazette, Macmillan's Magazine, and 
the National Review also at various times adopted a conservative editorial line. There also existed a class of 
periodicals specifically about foreign affairs. These last are not fruitful for the purposes of this thesis – 
they aimed to inform their readers regarding developments abroad, and their articles were consequently 
often written by foreigners. See the Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals for more information. 
13 See Collini (1991: 29); Houghton (1983: 7-8). These authors themselves, too, distinguished their 
conservatism, based in a reasoned reflection on experience and knowledge gained, from the popular 
conservatism of the masses, which they saw as based in passion and emotion, and consequently both too 
absolute in the moment and too changeable over time. See e.g. Cecil (1871: 272-3); Chesney (1871: 450-
3). 
14 The world-views current among the conservative educated classes, rather than those held by particular 
eminent politicians, is an aspect of conservatism which has received relatively little attention in 
scholarship on the subject. At the same time, it is the facet of conservatism most suitable for a study of 
conservative political thought. Green (2002: 3, 16) for instance also 'stress[ed] the importance of the 
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one author referred to the latter as 'our people' – and moreover assumed that their 
readers did so too.15 
 The conservatives studied in the dissertation were not exhaustive of the 
conservatism of the time.16 The use of “conservatives” in the text consequently refers to 
that slice of the conservative educated classes which is explored in this study. Moreover, 
while the body of the dissertation uses the terms “conservative” and “liberal”, this is 
done for the sake of readability – there is no wish to posit a stark liberal-conservative 
binary. The distinction between liberals and conservatives used does, however, mirror 
the divide which authors of the time perceived.  
 To understand conservative authors' perspectives on international relations, it is 
important to note what positions they were arguing against, what alternative 
perspectives they hoped their audience would not adopt. Conservatives saw themselves 
as participants in a debate and a policy-making process in which statesmen acted either 
from liberal and radical principles and advice, or from a conservative world-view. Most 
conservatives made little effort to distinguish between different strands of liberal 
thought and to address these separately. Figures such as Russell, Gladstone, and 
Cobden were treated as more or less interchangeable. Conservative commentators were 
concerned first of all with influencing Britain’s foreign policy. They consequently 
primarily addressed politicians, most notably Gladstone, rather than liberal and radical 
thinkers. The conservatives’ theory of international politics was set off not against 
detailed, actual liberal positions, but more against an amorphous collection of all the 
particularly disquieting elements which were part of the various progressive narratives 
present in contemporary British debate.17  
 This thesis aims to illuminate the articulation of conservative international 
                                                                                                                                                                    
'middlebrow' in Conservative thought'. 
15 (Gleig 1866: 641). The conservative authors studied include politicians, statesmen, and diplomats; 
scholars, editors, and writers; and members of the professions and military officers. The professions and 
military provided particularly prolific contributors. Politicians and statesmen generally published a limited 
number of articles, with Robert Cecil being a major exception. Finally, the writers and scholars, such as 
Laurence Oliphant, often wrote articles drawing on their specialised knowledge and took relatively 
idiosyncratic approaches to the subject matter. For the major contributors brief biographical details are 
given in a footnote the first time they are mentioned. 
16 For instance, these authors generally condemned invasion scares and jingoism as based on fervent 
emotion rather than reasoned consideration. See e.g. Cecil (1859: 29); Cowell (1878c: 386); Hamley 
(1878b: 244). On jingoism and popular support for the Conservative government in the late 1870s, see 
Jenkins (1996: 124-5); Parry (2007: 102-3). 
17 Conservatives indulged in no significant consideration of intermediate positions or possibilities. This 
view was too Manichean and not a correct reflection of the actual intellectual landscape of the time. For 
British liberals taking moderate positions of the kind ignored by conservative commentators, see e.g. 
Beales (1961: 93-97); Jones (2000: 73, 108-9); Parry (2006: 227-229, 278-81, 323-333); Shannon (1963, 
especially 207). 
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thought in Victorian Britain. It discusses liberal thought only as part of the context of 
conservative arguments, which were arranged against it. The discussions of liberal 
perspectives consequently reveal how conservatives characterised their interlocutors, 
but, as noted above, should not be taken as a representative account of liberal and 
radical Victorian international thought.18 This thesis situates conservative thought in the 
wider intellectual landscape of the time. The main chapters of the thesis also present the 
positions which conservatives imputed to their opponents. The final two chapters 
analyse both how conservatives coped with the radical principle of nationality and how 
conservative themes and tropes manifested themselves in the thought of Whigs and 
“hard-headed” liberals, groups liminal to Victorian conservatism. 
 
The political thought dimension 
Political thought contains both an ontology of the political reality and a normative 
framework which is applied to this reality. 'Ontology', Colin Hay states, determines the 
'categories of actors, mechanisms, or processes to which legitimate appeal can be made', 
and it entails the answers to questions such as 'what are the constituents of the polity' 
(or of the international sphere); 'what kinds of general principles govern its functioning'; 
'what drives political actors'; and more such.19 This thesis investigates which answers 
conservatives gave to these questions regarding the international sphere, and which 
categories of actors, mechanisms, and processes they discerned. Conservatives' 
normative commitments were deeply interwoven with their ontology. Where the 
ontology opened up space for normative commitments, the ethical implications of the 
ontological distinctions being made will be noted. Often, where conservatives' 
normative commitments were essentially an affirmation of the status quo, the 
prescriptive and descriptive elements of an argument could be all but indistinguishable. 
Among all the ontological and normative commitments made by conservatives, this 
thesis recovers those themes and tropes which recurred among different authors and 
different debates, which were used repeatedly to deal with a particular class of situation. 
For the purposes of this thesis, a unit of political thought is then a concept or a notion, 
deployed and given meaning in particular context(s).  
 
 
                                                          
18 For instructive accounts of liberal and radical thought which could profitably be read alongside this 
thesis, see e.g. Claeys (2010); Parry (2006); Sylvest (2009a); Taylor (1957); Varouxakis (2006b). 
19 Hay (2006: 78-81). 
13 
Subject matter 
The approach used in this thesis is based on existing perspectives within the field of the 
history of political thought. Skinner assumes 'that political life itself sets the main 
problems for the political theorist, causing a certain range of issues to appear 
problematic, and a corresponding range of questions to become the leading subjects of 
debate'.20 Certain perceived crises and problematic trends, as present in the political 
sphere, galvanise various thinkers into trying to cope with them, thereby giving rise to 
debate. The focus is here not on policy alternatives, but on the issue(s) which made 
policy necessary in the first place. Political theory helped determine what events and 
trends were perceived as crises and as problematic, while political theory was then also 
drawn upon and possibly modified in order to cope adequately with these crises and 
trends. Political thought evolved as a result of people reacting to trends or crises with 
which the existing theoretical framework could not deal satisfactorily. So it is 'the 
polemics and controversies of the day … [which] provide the first indication of what 
should be studied'.21 Focus should thus be on the main debates of a period; on the 
perceived crises and problematic trends which galvanised or were involved with these 
debates; and finally on the themes and tropes in political thought which these thinkers 
drew upon and reconfigured in order for them to be able to cope satisfactorily with 
these crises and trends. 
 This thesis covers the main debates on international affairs in Britain in the mid-
Victorian period, from 1854 to 1880. The episodes in European politics which elicited 
most comment from conservatives were the Crimean War (1854-56), the unification of 
Italy (1858-61), the unification of Germany, especially the Danish Duchies affair (1864) 
and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), and the Black Sea affair (1870-71) and Eastern 
Question crisis (1876-78).22 In addition, the US Civil War (1861-65) occasioned much 
debate in Britain, not least as a major event in international politics. The Conservative 
party was in opposition for most of these years; the Conservatives were in government 
only as a minority government in the early stages of the unification of Italy (1858-59) 
and, pre-occupied with Reform, between 1866 and 1868, and as a majority government 
during the Eastern Question crisis of 1874-80. 
 The thesis covers this timespan because there are strong reasons to include all 
                                                          
20 Skinner (1978: xi). See also Palonen (2005). 
21 Palonen (2005: 356). 
22 Parry (2006: 1) mentions that, for liberals, these same episodes were the mid-Victorian 'European 
events that had the most important political ramifications at home'. The main features of each episode are 
briefly discussed in a footnote when the affair is first treated substantially. 
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the years from 1854 to 1880. Most major events in international relations of the era fall 
in these decades: the great-power wars (Crimean, Franco-Austrian, Austro-Prussian, and 
Franco-Prussian), the unifications of Italy and Germany, the US civil war, and several 
manifestations of the Eastern Question. In addition, studying debates from the Crimean 
War until the Eastern Question crisis of the 1870s also shows the whole arc of how 
conservatives coped with the rise of the principle of nationality and demise of the 
Treaty of Vienna, one of the major themes running throughout their commentary.  
 At the same time, there is little reason for taking an even wider scope. In the 
earlier years of the Victorian period, domestic affairs were the focus of national debate. 
Even the 1848 revolutions were mostly discussed in the context of their putative 
implications for Britain’s domestic institutions.23 From the 1880s onward, empire 
became more prominent, both in various major imperial projects and in the issue of 




Most of the scholarship on Britain and mid-Victorian international relations concerns 
itself with the high politics of the time, focusing either on international diplomacy or on 
the domestic politics surrounding the setting of foreign policy in Britain.24 This thesis 
recovers from obscurity conservative Victorian thought on international affairs. In 
illuminating this body of thought, the thesis addresses weaknesses in three different 
historiographies, namely those of Victorian political thought, of Victorian conservatism, 
and of international relations theory.  
 Conservative positions played a prominent role in Victorian debates on Britain’s 
international affairs but have been underrepresented in established scholarship. The 
literature on Victorian international political thought has overwhelmingly focused on 
liberal and radical perspectives, conservatives having been overlooked.25 The existing 
                                                          
23 The only debate before this date which might have warranted inclusion was the Don Pacifico debate, 
which partly revolved around the duty of statesmen in international affairs; this was however first of all a 
debate between different strands of the liberal and radical family. 
24 See on the Crimean War: Baumgart (1981); Clayton (1971); Conacher (1987); Cunningham (1993); 
Hoard (1974); Lambert (1991); Martin (1924); Mosse (1963); Schroeder (1972); Seton-Watson (1937); 
Wilson (1987).  On the unification of Italy: Beales and Biagini (2002); Beales (1961) and Urban (1938); 
Hicks (2007); McIntire (1983); Read (1922); Taylor (1936); Temperley and Penson (1938). On the 
unification of Germany: Bourne (1970); Howard (1969); Millman (1965); Mosse (1958); Mulligan (2011); 
Raymond (1921); Sandiford (1975); Swartz (1985); Wilson (1987). On the Eastern Question crisis: Aldous 
(2006); Bourne (1970); Clayton (1971); Cunningham (1993); Medlicott (1963); Millman (1979); Rolo 
(1987); Seton-Watson (1972); Swartz (1985). 
25 See e.g. Bell (2007a); (2007b); (2010); Bell and Sylvest (2006); Claeys (2010); Harvie (1976); Kent (1978); 
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scholarship on the Victorian educated classes generally also focuses foremost on liberals 
and radicals; the main contextualist studies of the Victorian 'public moralists' and their 
milieu structure their work around the various strands of liberal and radical thought.26 
This thesis consequently first of all rectifies a marked bias in Victorian intellectual 
history towards the study of liberal and radical thought, and thereby contributes to a 
fuller historical appreciation of the broad range of ideological positions which made up 
the Victorian intellectual landscape. 
 Secondly, in its focus on commentary on European international relations, the 
thesis reflects the emphases which its subjects placed in their writings on international 
affairs. The usual focus of studies in the history of international political thought is on 
empire. This thesis asserts that, especially in mid-Victorian Britain, international thought 
was first of all thought on European (and for a time American) affairs.27 
 Thirdly, the project suggests an approach to the history of political thought 
different from that dominant in the field. Rather than focusing on individual thinkers, 
usually eminent philosophers, this study aims to recover the thought of general groups 
and movements in a particular society. Subjects are chosen not for their intrinsic, 
philosophical interest, but because they are historically representative, because insight 
into their work helps us to recover the ways in which their society understood the 
world.28 
 Studies of Victorian conservatism focus primarily on party politics and the roles 
played by prominent politicians in determining foreign policy. While insightful, these 
works generally do not probe deeply into the political thought and conceptual reasoning 
behind certain policy preferences.29 There is some research which touches on 
conservative thought regarding international affairs, but merely as part of a biographical 
effort,30 in the context of party-political history,31 or as a part of a more general study of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Mehta (1999); Parry (2006); Pitts (2005); Porter (1984); Rudman (1940); Schreuder (1978); Schroeder 
(1980); Semmel (1986); Shannon (1963); Sylvest (2009); Varouxakis (2002a); (2002b); (2006). A recent 
edited work on 'Victorian visions of global order', Bell (2007a), includes chapters on liberal and radical 
perspectives, but lacks one on conservative thought. See also Bell (2006: 295). 
26 The only conservatives generally included are those who overlap with progressives on policy or 
principle; Peelites in the early Victorian era and Maine, Dicey and other “disillusioned liberals” later on in 
the century. See e.g. Burrow (1970; 1988); Collini (1991); Collini, Winch, and Burrow (1983); Mandler 
(2000); (2006a) – who also considers Disraeli and Salisbury – and Stapleton (2000); (2001). 
27 The future of the settler colonies, debated throughout these decades, was generally framed as an intra-
British constitutional and political issue. See e.g. Bell (2007b). 
28 See also Bell (2014: 5); Keene (2005: 15-6). 
29 See e.g. Blake (1970); Hicks (2007); Jenkins (1996); Parry (2007); Southgate (1974); Steele (1999); 
Wilson (1987); see also Parry (1983: 470). 
30 Bentley (2001); Grenville (1964); Hawkins (2007); Hicks (2011); Knox (1998); Parry (2007); Smith 
(1972); Taylor (1975). 
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conservative politics and ideology.32 Contributing to the study of political ideologies, the 
thesis reveals how certain themes and tropes of the conservative intellectual heritage, 
such as a concern for stability and order and an emphasis on hierarchy and deference, 
manifested themselves in Victorian international thought. Moreover, looking at 
conservative thought and writings more generally illuminates events and positions in 
high politics, placing them in a different context and thereby leading us to interpret 
them in a different light.33 
 The history of international relations theory, finally, is overwhelmingly focused 
on the twentieth century from the First World War onward. Theorising on international 
relations before this time is primarily addressed within the scholarship on diplomatic 
history, and there only glancingly; my project helps to extend the history of theories of 
international relations back into the Victorian era.34 This study also functions as a 
corrective to the self-history of the academic field of International Relations (IR). The 
history of IR is all too often informed by an a-historical 'mythology of doctrines', in 
which the twentieth-century dialectic between the schools of realism and idealism is 
projected back onto earlier times and thinkers.35 This study, in contrast, provides a 
contextual account of the manifestation of several major themes of international 
relations theory in mid-Victorian Britain — most notably of the notion of the balance 
of power. The more historically nuanced scholarly literature on the concept highlights 
the nineteenth century as the time when the concept was fundamentally re-imagined 
(from ‘associational’ to ‘adversarial’), without there having been a detailed study of its 
use during the Victorian era.36  The thesis, in contrast, illuminates such conceptual 
evolution within one strand of political thought of the day, namely that of Victorian 
conservatives. 
 This thesis recovers the international political thought of Victorian 
conservatives in order to ensure that it has a representation in these historiographies 
which does justice to the vital importance of conservatism in Victorian political and 
intellectual life, to the salience of its positions on international affairs for Victorian 
                                                                                                                                                                    
31 Charmley (2003); Hicks (2007); (2011). 
32 Gambles (1999); Green (1995); Hilton (1988). In addition, this international political thought mainly 
concerns political economy. 
33 See the discussion of Hicks et al in chapter 4 for an example of such a reinterpretation. 
34 For two particularly worthwhile recent endeavours in this same vein see Koskenniemi (2001) and 
Sylvest (2009), treating respectively the history of international law and liberal international thought. See 
further e.g. Bourne (1970); Charmley (1999); Gulick (1955); Keene (2002); (2005); Lowe (1998); Ramsay 
(1925); Taylor (1954). 
35 For the concept of 'mythology of doctrines', see Skinner (2002: 59). 
36 See Little (2007: 52); Pollard (1923: 58); Schroeder (1989: 141). For the most sophisticated treatment of 
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conservatism, and to its participation in the evolution of international relations theory 
over the centuries. 
 
Outline 
This thesis is structured thematically, by the themes and tropes which it uncovers in the 
political thought of conservatives.37 The focus is upon those concepts, aims, 
assumptions, and rhetoric which conservatives used again and again when they engaged 
in debate or had to cope with crises. 
 The first four chapters identify in detail the distinctly conservative theories of 
international relations articulated in Victorian Britain. The fifth chapter relates and 
contrasts this conservative thought with one of the most prominent aspects of 
contemporary liberal and radical perspectives on the international sphere, the notion of 
nationality. The sixth and final chapter of the thesis compares the body of mainstream 
conservative thought with the thought of Whigs and of centrist, “hard-headed” liberals; 
people who thought of themselves as “liberal” but whose world-view and ideas came 
close to that of self-identified conservatives.  
 This thesis argues that conservative commentators perceived particular 
problems and trends in international affairs, including the demise of the Treaty of 
Vienna, the spread of nationalism and increase of popular influence on foreign policy, 
and, as a result of the liberals' foreign policy, the potential isolation of Britain among the 
great powers. The thesis furthermore argues that mainstream conservative 
commentators held a distinctive set of concepts and aspirations – such as the centrality 
of great power politics, the primacy of force and interests, and the value of stability and 
order – which informed their understanding of international relations. Taken together, 
these concepts and commitments amounted to a theory of international politics. Finally, 
the thesis shows how they drew upon a particular set of themes to deal with the 
problematic trends which they discerned: these included a stress on the importance on 
hierarchy, leadership, and deference; advocacy for an assertive, vigorous foreign policy 
backed by a well-prepared military; the rejection of the principle of nationality as a cause 
of disorder and conflict; and a focus on first the Treaty of Vienna and later the balance 
of power system to secure order and stability in Europe.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
early nineteenth-century international relations theory see Schroeder (1989); (1994a); (1994b); (2001). 
37 For a study framed by debates, see Parry (2006). For a study framed by problems and crises perceived 
by its subjects, see Green (1995). For studies framed by themes in thought, see Bell (2007a); Sylvest 
(2009); Varouxakis (2002). 
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 The first chapter briefly analyses conservatives’ basic ontology of international 
politics; the entities and actors of the international sphere which they discerned. This 
chapter addresses attitudes towards great powers and weaker states, and conservatives’ 
focus on statesmen as the actors of international politics. 
 The second chapter investigates what conservatives thought were the well-
springs of foreign policy; what drove political actors? This chapter addresses notions of 
ambition, glory, and prestige; the distinction between aggressive and moderate attitudes 
on the part of statesmen; reason and passion as drivers of foreign policy; the 
relationship of leadership and deference between statesmen and the general populace; 
the role of morality and self-interest in setting and judging foreign policy; and the rights 
and wrongs of annexation and of intervention. 
 The third chapter shows what conservatives thought were the dynamics of 
international politics. This chapter concerns the conservatives' understanding of the 
principles governing the functioning of the international sphere, its mechanisms and 
processes, and addresses notions of interests and competition, settlements and 
compromise; the roles of the potential and the actual use of force in international 
politics; the function of honour and an assertive diplomacy as a means to avoid war; 
and the prescriptions which followed regarding proper statesmanship. 
 The fourth chapter illuminates conservatives’ understanding of and 
commitment to international order. This chapter analyses conservative thought on what 
international order consisted in, why it was desirable, how it was threatened, and how it 
was to be secured. This chapter addresses conservatives’ worries about war and 
hegemony; theorising on the role of treaties in providing stability; the Treaty of Vienna 
and the foundations of the international diplomatic order; and the balance of power as 
the ordering principle of international relations. 
 The fifth chapter examines conservative thought on the concept of nationality. 
The principle of nationality was a theme central to the liberal international political 
thought of Victorian Britain. An investigation of conservative thought on the issue is 
consequently important for our correct apprehension of how conservative thought was 
distinctive with regards to one of the main ontological and normative commitments of 
Victorian liberal international thought. 
 The sixth and final chapter relates conservative thought to the international 
thought of groups and figures liminal to Victorian conservatism. The chapter 
investigates to what extent Whig and “hard-headed” liberal thinkers drew upon the 
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themes of conservative political thought in fashioning their arguments, to what extent 
they took conservative positions in the debates in which they involved themselves, and 
what aspects of their political thought compelled them to take these conservative 
positions. 
 The first part of this thesis consequently identifies and elaborates on the 
coherent set of concepts, preoccupations, and aspirations which formed the dominant 
interpretative framework for international affairs among conservatives. The final two 
chapters then offer a comparative perspective which refines our insight into the 
distinctive and characteristic elements of conservative thought on international relations 




I. The entities and actors of the international sphere 
 
The notion of great powers 
Conservatives focused all but exclusively on states and their statesmen when 
commenting on international affairs. They viewed states as the basic entities of the 
European international sphere and thought that international politics revolved around 
statesmen and the dynamic of their interactions. Conservatives made two distinctions 
which deeply influenced their perspective on international affairs. Firstly, they 
distinguished between “great powers” and other states38. Secondly, they distinguished 
between the country as a whole and the state in particular, between statesmen and the 
general population. 
 Conservatives used the notion of “great powers” to denote those powerful 
states which generally took account of each other's opinions and together determined 
the course of international affairs. A great power had voice; such a state was 'powerful 
enough to be respected by' the other great powers, to have its wishes taken into 
account.39 Great powers also had agency; a great power could influence events and 
together the great powers decided the course of international politics. As conservative 
commentators put it, once the great powers 'take the affair in hand and settle it', the 
smaller states 'can little influence’ the course of events; 'great powers … interfere with 
overpowering force, and settle the matter offhand in their own sense', determining the 
fate of 'their satellites the Minor States'.40  
 Both voice and agency followed from the strength of a state.41 The weaker 
states, unless directly involved in a particular issue, were, conservatives thought, mostly 
irrelevant to international relations. They lacked the power to assert themselves and 
would moreover generally be ignored by the great powers; even when 'friendly, … they 
are scarcely sources of strength'.42 As used in conservative commentary, the scope of 
the notion of “great powers” was flexible, primarily informed by the immediate 
                                                          
38 See e.g. Oliphant (1864a: 389); Patterson (1864a: 117). Keene (2013a); (2013b) argues that states were 
understood as great, middle, or small powers as much as as sovereign entities, with a concomittant focus 
on interests rather than rights, and that the former perspective was more prevalent in journalistic rather 
than juristic accounts of European politics. The British conservative commentary studied here conforms 
to this characterisation, as will become obvious over the course of the thesis. 
39 Burrows (1877: 538). See also Cowell (1876c: 448); Frere (1876: 491-2); Gleig (1866: 649); Patterson 
(1864b: 638, 648); Russell (1877: 211). 
40 Oliphant (1864b: 504) and Lever (1870b: 602) and Oliphant (1864b: 504) and Dasent (1870: 295). See 
also Cecil (1864a: 279-80). 
41 Cecil (1864b: 517). 
42 Gleig (1866: 639). 
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diplomatic context. In discussions of the Eastern Question from 1876-78, for instance, 
the phrase “the great powers” referred mainly to Britain, Russia, Germany, and 
Austria.43 Since France and Italy played no significant role in the affair, they were 
consequently not generally denoted by use of “the great powers” in this particular 
debate.44  
 Conservatives perceived the relationship between great powers and other states 
as one of hierarchy and inequality. They thought that other states could generally only 
hope to make an impact on international politics under the leadership of a great power 
(unless they happened to be guided by an exceptional statesman such as Cavour, as 
examined below) and that even their independent existence was precarious, secured not 
by their own power, but only on the sufferance of the great powers. For instance, 
conservative commentators assumed that the small German states could only influence 
international affairs by arranging themselves behind Prussia and its ambitions.45 Prussia 
was envisaged as the leader, 'invest[ed] … with the national executive power of 
Germany' and with the mass of German states deferring to its leadership.46 Similarly, 
conservatives argued that, if states needed to band together to oppose German 
aggression, such a coalition would only form and act effectively if given British 
leadership.47 In international politics, as in the domestic sphere, conservatives perceived 
followers and leaders, and only through showing deference to good leadership could the 
followers hope to make a difference and prosper. 
 The great powers were the strong states. This had a specific meaning for 
conservatives; they connected great power status to polity size, the stability of the 
society, and the strength of the military. The last aspect was easily the most important to 
conservatives. Rather than countries or peoples, international politics revolved around 
statesmen and the institutions at their disposal. A country’s territory, population, or 
prosperity did not translate directly into power. These fed into state strength only by 
influencing the resources available to the government.48 In discussing countries’ power, 
                                                          
43 Cowell (1877b: 258-9); (1877h: 613); (1878a: 100-1); (1878f: 773); Craik (1878b: 256); Hamley (1877c: 
250); Keppel (1878: 553, 556, 570). 
44 France did not involve itself in the issue, and Italy lacked the influence. During this debate, they only 
cropped up as fellow great powers in discussions of the influence of the general geo-politics of Europe 
on the policy of Austria or Germany. See for instance Cowell (1877h: 622); Frere (1876: 490-502). 
45 Hamley (1870c: 784); Wilson (1871a: 78, 90). See also the section on the unification of Germany in 
chapter 5. 
46 Wilson (1871b: 368); see also Dasent (1870: 293); Hamley (1870c: 784); Wilson (1871a: 73-4). 
47 See e.g. Gleig (1870a: 656); Hamley (1871c: 496); Wilson (1870: 391-2). This held for weaker states. 
When great powers cooperated there was no one leader -- and such cooperation was all the more 
unreliable because of it. See also chapter 3 for more detail. 
48 Cecil (1864a: 237, 239); Dasent (1870: 296); Oliphant (1864a: 389); Swayne (1867: 197); Wilson (1870: 
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conservatives consequently considered the military force it could project as the main 
variable.49  Similarly, conservatives thought that for a state to be able to engage 
assertively with international politics, it needed to have 'social cohesion' and a stable 
political system.50 A lack of such cohesion and stability, conservative commentators 
agreed in 1870-71, had undermined the vigour of France and caused her defeat in her 
war with Prussia. 'France failed in the present war', G.R. Gleig asserted, 'because … her 
entire social system … was rotten to the core'51. Great powers were consequently those 
states which could make themselves heard abroad through the confident projection of 
ample military force, resulting from a well-prepared and well-funded military, part of a 
stable and orderly domestic political sphere, in a sizable, populous, and prosperous 
country.  
 
The normative and causal centrality of great power politics 
Conservative commentators themselves had three main areas of concern when 
considering international politics, and they assumed that statesmen shared these 
preoccupations. These three focal points of international politics were the particular 
interests of one’s country; the diplomacy of great power politics; and the peace, order, 
and stability of the European sphere.52 These foci were more or less hierarchical. When 
encountering an issue in international politics, the statesmen of a great power, 
conservatives thought, would initially be concerned that the dispute did not spark any 
sort of armed conflict, with its inherent possibility of involving (further) great powers 
and spreading into a general war. However, if the dispute, as it developed, seemed likely 
to result in beneficial changes to the political order of Europe, then this promise would 
likely overshadow the statesman's dislike of states using force. If, finally, any particular 
interests of the great power in question became involved, then the statesman would 
                                                                                                                                                                    
384, 387); (1871b: 362). This perspective led conservatives into a perennial debate with liberals over 
military spending, in which conservatives argued that Britain’s prosperity was only a source of strength if 
some of it was spent on the army and navy. 
49 Cecil (1871: 256-7, 272-4, 284-5); Gleig (1866: 657); (1871: 130); Hamley, E.B. (1866: 247); (1871b: 
382); Lever (1871c: 174); Oliphant (1864b: 506). See chapter 3 for more detail. 
50 Cecil (1870: 550). See also Gleig (1870a: 641, 656); (1870b: 663); Hamley (1870c: 782-3); Lever (1871b: 
585); (1871d: 367); Wilson (1870: 374-5). 
51 Gleig (1870b: 657). See also Cecil (1871: 257-8); Hamley (1871c: 497); (1871b: 383). GR Gleig (1796–
1888) was a conservative author, appointed chaplain-general of the military in 1844. 
See also, on the impotence of Austrian policy as a result of the divisions in its political system, Cowell 
(1876c: 462); (1877h: 621); (1878j: 499-501); Craik (1878b: 260-1, 284); Frere (1876: 490-1, 501); Hamley 
(1877f: 634); (1878a: 111-2); Russell (1877: 211); Shand (1878: 751-2).  
52 See e.g. Cecil (1864a: 280); (1870: 543); Lever (1870b: 600-2); Oliphant (1865: 118); Patterson (1864a: 
110); Wilson (1870: 380). On Cecil, see also Grenville (1963: 6, 22). 
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focus on securing these, and might even be willing to use force themselves to do so.53 
Only a threat to the peace and order of Europe as a whole – the spectre of a general 
European war – could trump the importance of the particular interests of a country.  
 The conservative conceptualisation of the European international sphere as 
made up of great powers and smaller, weaker states was the general view taken in the 
Victorian era.54 The conservatives' ontology was distinctive not because they had a 
concept of great powers or even because they focused most of their attention on the 
great powers, but because for them this great power interaction all but summed up 
international politics. Order and stability could only be threatened by great powers 
going to war, and only a great power could seriously threaten Britain’s interests. 
Consequently, only the great powers and their relations held normative significance or 
causal relevance for conservative commentators.55  
 Liberals had a different, wider set of normative concerns, which drew attention 
away from the great powers and their politics and made the latter seem less causally and 
normatively significant. In general terms, they had a ‘progressive vision of an 
international society … developing in more peaceful and inclusive directions'.56 As a 
consequence, they suborned the politics of the great powers to their progressive vision. 
In the 'traditional simple British Liberal perspective', this vision replaced a world of 
great powers and their particular politics with 'a world divided between liberalism and 
autocracy'.57 Even when this divide became more muddled by the late 1860s, liberals 
continued to perceive international politics through the lens of the advancement or 
otherwise of their normative ideals. The liberals' normative commitments contained two 
strands; a Christian humanitarianism and a constitutional liberalism, with the latter 
supplemented with a qualified affirmation of national self-determination.58 As a 
consequence, liberal and radical commentators often included and sometimes gave 
pride of place to a wider set of actors beyond the great powers, such as the national 
movements and peoples of Italy and Germany, and the subject populations of the 
                                                          
53 A particular interest was, for instance, Britain's interest in the Baltic Sea being open for trade. See e.g. 
Derby quoted in Hicks (2007: 206); Malmesbury (1859c). 
54 See e.g. Varouxakis (2007). 
55 Dasent (1870: 294-6, 312); Gleig (1870a: 648-9, 651); Hamley (1870c: 782-3, 790); (1871c: 496); Lever 
(1870b: 600-2); Oliphant (1864a: 389, 369); (1865: 118); Patterson (1864a: 110); (1864b: 644-6); (1864c: 
253); Swayne (1867: 196-7); Wilson (1871a: 81-2); (1871b: 364). 
56 Sylvest (2009: 49). See also Gladstone (1879: 420-2). 
57 Parry (2006: 223; see also 214). 
58 Parry (2006: 4-5, 228, 230-1, 278, 327-8, 333-5). The qualification was that national communities should 
not 'separate from a larger liberal constitutional power. National uprisings were justifiable on 
constitutional grounds – against foreign or militarist oppression and in pursuit of the rule of law' (Parry 
2006: 21). 
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Ottoman Empire.59  
 Conservative commentators, in contrast, thought each of these of little 
significance. The travails of small states and subject peoples were of secondary 
importance, only needing to be taken into account when they factored into the politics 
of the great powers.60 This exclusive focus of conservatives on the great powers 
manifested itself in noted contrast to liberal perspectives during both the unification of 
Germany and during the Eastern Question crisis of the late 1870s, and was most 
striking in the debate on the unification of Italy. 
 For liberals, the course of events from 1864 until 1871 was one of the German 
'national cause', of the German nation achieving political unity, part of the broader telos 
of the international sphere.61 Events had both their impetus and their significance as a 
national, German project of unification. Conservatives, in contrast, thought that 
political integration was not inevitable and mostly driven by various forms of great 
power competition, first between Prussia and Austria, then between Prussia and 
France.62 They considered the unification significant, meanwhile, primarily in its effects 
on great power politics: it upset the balance of power and helped shatter the equilibrium 
of Europe.63 
 Liberals and radicals who were part of the agitation movement, galvanised by 
the Bulgarian Atrocities, framed the Eastern Question crisis of 1876-78 as being about 
the fate of the populations subject to the Ottoman Empire.64 The liberal agitation 
movement minimised 'the problem of the relations between the powers'.65 Conservative 
commentators, in contrast, presented the Eastern Question as being about the great 
powers and their interactions. 'The Eastern Question', Herbert Cowell stated, 'is far less 
one of adjusting the relations of the Porte to its subjects than of the international 
                                                          
59 Agency could also rest in more amorphous notions, such as Gladstone’s assumption of the progressive 
influence of 'the general judgement of civilised mankind'. Gladstone (1870: 593). 
60 Courthope (1880: 566-7); Cowell (1876b: 247; 1876c: 462; 1877h: 611); Hamley (1878b: 242-3); 
Northcote (1878: 357); Smith and Layard (1877: 288). 
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64 The Eastern Question crisis of 1876-78 was sparked by insurrections and atrocities in the Ottoman 
Empire's European provinces. As the crisis morphed into the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, attention 
shifted to Russian acts and aims, and the necessity for Britain to secure its interests in the context of a 
Russian victory. The armistice of San Stefano was widely condemned in Britain as unacceptable from this 
perspective, and the other great powers forced Russia to adjust its terms in the Congress of Berlin. 
65 Shannon (1963: 215). See also Gladstone (1879). See further Parry (2006: 228-231, 278); Shannon 
(1963: 212); Sylvest (2009: 38, 49-50). 
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rivalries of the surrounding Powers’.66 And Frere, in an introductory article, sketched 
the contemporary situation by giving an overview of the likely aims and intentions of 
the great powers and of the current attitudes among them, taking care to note how this 
political situation differed from the run-up to the Crimean War two decades earlier.67 As 
the issue was debated over the following years, conservative commentators maintained 
their focus on the great powers.68 Finally, in their reflections after the crisis had ended, 
they still only accorded the great powers any relevance. The fate of the subject 
populations, such an important concern for liberal and radical commentators, held no 
intrinsic interest.69 Subject peoples and small states were discussed only when and where 
they might lead the great powers into conflict.70 
 
Italian unification and the centrality of great power politics 
The unification of Italy was the one episode in these decades which was arguably least 
about great powers and interstate politics.71 Liberals and radicals attached great 
importance to these events because they involved the liberty and national unification of 
the Italian people.72 In this sense the unification of Italy became a touchstone for a 
whole generation of liberals in their perspective on international affairs.73 Conservative 
commentators, however, still explained the course of events and framed its significance 
in reference to great power politics. While the Italian peninsula was the locus of the 
events discussed in conservatives' articles and Italian unification their result, the affairs 
of Italy itself received but little attention from conservative commentators.  
 When considering the significance of developments on the Italian peninsula, 
                                                          
66 Cowell (1877b: 256-7); see also Courthope (1880: 566-7); Cowell (1876b: 245; 1876b: 247; 1878a: 101; 
1878j: 499-501); Northcote (1878: 359). Herbert Cowell was a barrister, born in 1836 or 1837 (Foster 
1885). 
67 Frere (1876: 490-6). See also Cowell (1876a: 82-7; 1876b: 245-7); Smith (1876: 580-3); Smith and 
Layard (1877: 277). 
68 See e.g. Cowell (1876a:88); (1877a: 122); (1877b: 256-7); (1877c: 371); (1877d: 512-6); (1878a: 100-1); 
Hamley (1877a: 750-1); Shand (1878: 744); Smith and Layard (1877: 277). 
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71 The unification of Italy here refers to a series of events from 1859 to 1861: the war between Austria on 
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annexations of central Italy by Piedmont, Savoy and Nice by France, and eventually southern Italy by 
Piedmont. Apart from Italian affairs themselves, debates in Britain revolved around the acts and 
intentions of France, the possibility of other great powers intervening, and the implications of Italian 
developments for the European order in general. 
72 See e.g. Gladstone (1860: 100). See further Beales (1961: 34); Parry (1996: 168); Urban (1938: 117-8, 
121-2). 
73 See e.g. Harvie (1976); Kent (1978). 
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conservatives consistently focused on the implications of these events for the great 
powers and their relations, and with that – primarily through the ascendancy of France 
– for the order and stability of Europe. Illustrating this preoccupation, an article by 
Robert Cecil on the Italian question was in fact titled 'France and Europe'.74 
 In the early stages of this episode in European affairs, stretching from the run-
up to the war to the armistice of Villa-Franca between France and Austria, 
conservatives understood the Italian issue as first a potential and then an actual conflict 
between France and Austria – Italy was merely the venue for their contest. The war was 
significant in that it would determine whether the hegemony over Italy was to be held 
by France or Austria.75 This was itself a matter of concern, not because of its effects on 
the Italian people, but because of its influence on the balance of power of Europe. 
Conservatives considered Austria to be an important stabilising force in Europe – 
holding its disparate empire together and checking both Russia and France – whose 
interests made it a natural ally to Britain, whereas they, like most Englishmen, viewed 
the France of Napoleon III with suspicion. As Tremenheere asserted, 'A predominating 
French influence in Italy … would be incompatible with the security of Germany, 
hazardous to the vast interests of England in the Mediterranean, and totally subversive 
of the balance of power'.76 The initial events in Italy conservatives thought significant in 
their detrimental adjustment of the balance of power – Austria lost a prosperous 
province and declined in power and stature, while France gained both paramount 
influence over the Italian peninsula and the prestige of victory over Austria.77 The 
second initial concern which conservatives had regarding the events in Italy pertained to 
peace and order in the European sphere in general. Conservatives feared that any war 
between great powers, started with however limited aims in mind, could easily come to 
involve other states and devolve into a general war.78 Indeed, the policy of Malmesbury 
and Derby, in power until June 1859, was aimed first at avoiding the incidence of war, 
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and when war had broken out, at preventing its further spread.79  
 In the aftermath of the peace of Villafranca, the future of the polities of first 
Central Italy and then Southern Italy was thrown into doubt. Eventually, they ended up 
being annexed to Piedmont, while Piedmont ceded Savoy and Nice to France. As these 
events unfolded and conservatives commented on the manoeuvring of Napoleon III 
and Cavour, the focus of their analyses remained on great power politics. With peace re-
established, conservative commentators reflected on the gains realised by Napoleon III 
and how these could enable him to tread a path of successive wars, conceived of as 
limited in scope, but which would nevertheless imperil the European order.80 Events in 
Italy were now considered significant primarily in how they constrained or facilitated 
the suspected projects of Napoleon III.81  
  Conservatives feared that in the future Italy would be 'a mere satellite of 
France'.82 The cession of Savoy and Nice, for instance, was significant – besides being 
proof that all talk of liberty had indeed, as conservatives had argued, been a fig-leaf for a 
project of French aggrandisement – in that through it France gained further military 
leverage over Italy.83 This conservative perspective on the significance of Italian affairs 
after Villa-Franca contrasted with that of the liberals, for whom Napoleon III receded 
in importance at this stage, as Piedmont came to be seen as an independent actor. 
Among conservatives, there was, at least until Italy was mostly unified by 1862, less of a 
sense that Piedmont could possibly be effectively independent of the will of Napoleon 
III.84 Conservatives consequently thought the events in Italy significant in their possible 
role in a Napoleonic project for the European sphere in general. 
 Conservatives again gave pride of place to great power politics in their 
explanations of how Italian events came about and why they developed as they did. 
They argued that Napoleon III’s diplomatic manoeuvring since the end of the Crimean 
War had set the stage for the events in Italy, primarily by convincing Russia of its 
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interest in a weakened Austria.85 Furthermore, conservatives argued that the unfolding of 
Italian events, as well as their initial possibility, was first of all determined by great 
power politics. They thought of the 1859 war as a Franco-Austrian affair, in which 
Piedmont had 'gained but little’ and was lucky not to have been ‘crushed and obliterated 
in the course of the frightful collision between two such powers as France and 
Austria'.86 Over the course of the subsequent annexations by France and Piedmont, 
conservatives still privileged the agency of the great powers. The annexation of Central 
Italy by Piedmont might be thought to have proven the agency of the latter, but even 
this course of events had become possible only, conservatives noted, because the 
respective influences of the great powers cancelled each other out, with Britain 
constraining the actions of France.87 Italy and its polities, peoples, or political situation – 
with the exception of Cavour, considered below – were not accorded agency in these 
accounts. Great powers and their politics were the causal force of international politics.  
 
Statesmen as actors in the context of great power politics 
Conservatives conceived of international politics as an affair between governments and 
their institutions, rather than between whole amorphous countries. When conservatives 
talked about international politics, they often used terms denoting countries, states, and 
statesmen as synonyms, or at least as different facets of one entity. They could for 
instance switch from using “Prussia” to “Bismarck” to “country” or “nation” without 
seemingly changing the referent.88 This should merely be understood, however, as a 
convenience of their writing about diplomacy. When they discussed explicitly how the 
entities of international politics came to act in their particular ways, for their particular 
ends, conservatives drew upon a conceptual scheme which juxtaposed 'Governments' 
and 'peoples', the 'popular mind' and the 'minds of persons of elevated political station', 
and considered statesmen as a distinct category of actors.89 Conservatives thought of 
statesmen and the institutions which they commanded as the agents of international 
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politics.90 The statesman's skill and quality was consequently an important factor in any 
country's rise or ruin.  
 Conservatives thought of statesmen as representing their countries and 
conducting the practice of international politics. Statesmen however did not have free 
reign to act as they would like. In setting foreign policy, statesmen ought to be guided, 
conservatives thought, by their own country’s interests, and they could be coerced by 
the desires of the general population.91 In conducting international politics, statesmen 
were moreover constrained by the circumstances of great power politics. 'We rate very 
highly', Robert Patterson opined, 'the influence of great men upon their times, but they 
cannot contend successfully against the circumstances of their age. In truth they never 
seek to do so. … they keep in harmony with the spirit of the hour'.92 Statesmen were 
embedded in a particular dynamic of great power politics. Only by acting within and 
appealing to this dynamic could statesmen have effective agency. Conservatives 
frequently criticised liberal statesmen exactly because the latter supposedly ignored this 
dynamic, this constraint on viable policy options.93  
 Despite these limits on their agency, statesmen took pride of place in 
conservative narratives of international affairs. Napoleon III dominated their attention 
during the years from the Crimean War until his fall in the Franco-Prussian War, while 
Bismarck featured prominently from the Danish Duchies affair on until the Eastern 
Question crisis of the 1870s, and onward. Conservatives also had a special respect for 
Cavour, as that rare influential statesman of a lesser power, and noted the lessons to be 
drawn from his achievements. 
 Conservative commentators presented Napoleon III as a master diplomatist, 
effectively manipulating great power politics in order to realise his own ends.94 He 
effectively appealed to the interests and aims of each of these fellow great powers, 
convincing them that they too would gain from his actions. As the Crimean War drew 
to an end, Napoleon III had, conservatives thought, co-opted the mediating Austria and 
decided on terms and timing of peace which furthered his interests, while side-lining 
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those of Britain.95 He then steered Europe towards confrontation in the Italian 
question.96 Having concluded the war with Austria on his terms, and again to the 
disadvantage of his ally, Napoleon III could meddle in Italian affairs at will.97 And over 
the course of the decade, Napoleon III had slowly dissolved the set of alliances which 
supported the Vienna settlement by convincing the relevant countries that their 
interests were in conflict.98 While conservatives worried about his aims and intentions, 
they could not help but respect Napoleon III’s statesmanship, the agency he aggregated 
for himself through his understanding and manipulation of the circumstances of great 
power politics. 
 Just as in the minds of conservative commentators Napoleon III had made the 
unification of Italy possible, it was Bismarck’s statesmanship through which the 
unification of Germany had been realised. Wilson was representative of the respect 
conservatives felt for Bismarck when he stated that the rise of Prussia and the 
unification of Germany were 'immense achievements' which were mainly 'due to that 
daring Minister's [Bismarck's] temper and character'.99 Again, it was his insight into the 
dynamics of great power politics and his effective appeals to the interests of other 
powers which conservatives singled out for praise. Commenting on Prussia’s war with 
Austria in 1866, Wilson complimented Bismarck on properly apprehending the state of 
affairs: ‘the situation, when it had become strained beyond pacific arbitrament, was at 
once seen and accepted, and the quarrel was fought out'.100 More generally, Bismarck 
was a ‘sound and far-seeing … statesman’ whose co-option of Russia into his schemes 
had made the events of European international politics from 1866 to 1878 possible: ‘to 
[their partnership] is traced the downfall of Austria and France, the unification of 
Germany, the eclipse of Europe, and the quiescence of Russia’.101 
 Considering their focus on both Napoleon and Bismarck, it comes as no 
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surprise that in reflecting on the Franco-Prussian war, conservatives tended to 
emphasise the decisive influence of the foresight and quality of decisions (or lack 
thereof) made by Bismarck and Napoleon III. Wilson conveyed the spirit of this 
perspective when he stated that Bismarck 'has held what may be termed joint command 
with the late Ruler of France over such tremendous issues for the weal or woe of two 
great nations'102. Cecil, for one, considered this an 'exceptional' event, but still presented 
it as a particularly clear instance of a more general rule: the quality of statesmanship was 
an important determinant of a country’s prospects.103 He consequently continued to 
reflect on how a country’s political system could be ordered so as to generate the best 
quality statesmen. This was also how conservatives explained the sudden spectacular 
downfall of Napoleon III, after having praised him for over a decade: he himself had 
exceptional ability, but his potential had been neutered by the deleterious influence of 
the French political system in which he had to operate.104  
 Conservatives thought that statesmen of weaker states, while holding little 
leverage in international diplomacy, could conceivably utilise their insight into the 
interests of the great powers to the advantage of their countries. In their analyses of 
Italian events, conservatives identified Cavour as exactly such an able statesman.105 
Cavour apprehended the trends and tendencies of great power politics and made them 
work to the advantage of his small, weaker polity. Charles Lever, for instance, argued in 
his retrospective account of 1863 that Italy would still be divided, if it had not been for 
a statesman of Cavour's exceptional abilities: 'Of all Italian statesmen Cavour was 
remarkable for his close and careful study of European politics. He saw that Italy's 
opportunity must be seized from some contingency in the condition of the Continent 
… some political necessity, which a war alone could resolve.'106 Only a statesman with 
insight into the nuances of the political realities of the time, his vision unimpaired by a 
lens of idealistic commitments, could hope to be somewhat of an autonomous actor 
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within great power politics.107  
 This chapter has argued that for conservatives it were the great powers and their 
politics which were causally and normatively significant, and it were statesmen who led 
and represented these great powers in international politics. The course of international 
affairs was the result of the interaction between the interests, intentions, and actions of 
the great powers. The strand of grand-picture determinism in the thought of 
conservatives was consequently interwoven with accounts of the influence of individual, 
particularly able actors. While conservatives considered the force of great-power 
circumstance considerable in determining the course of international affairs, they also 
considered it possible for sufficiently skilled and pragmatic political actors to work with 
these circumstances and further the interests of their country. Small countries such as 
the Italian states were usually, but not necessarily, at the mercy of forces beyond their 
control. Great powers could more easily assert themselves. Important here, though, was 
that they too had to deal with reality, with the de facto situation of great power politics. 
Even the great powers were at risk of being swept along by the current of circumstance, 
if their statesmen focused on their own idealistic concerns and failed to attend carefully 
to the shifting sands of international diplomacy. This, as discussed in detail in parts of 
the next two chapters, was exactly what conservative commentators repeatedly argued 
happened when liberal statesmen guided British policy: these liberals failed to act as 
proper statesmen and focus on great power politics. Britain’s influence in Europe 
suffered as a result. 
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II. The well-springs of foreign policy, or: what drives 
political actors? 
This chapter progresses from ontology to an analysis of what elements, in the minds of 
conservatives, shaped the agency of states. What different motivations were there to act, 
which ends could states choose to pursue, and what influenced their choice one way or 
another? Conservatives laid special emphasis in their commentary on the ways in which 
certain attitudes and influences led to conflict. Moreover, conservative and liberal 
commentators disagreed over the roles for self-interest and morality in international 
politics. In this chapter the entities of international politics – the country, people, state, 
and statesmen – are still considered in isolation; the next chapter analyses conservative 
thought on the dynamics of the interactions between states.  
 Conservatives drew upon a large set of concepts and dichotomies when 
discussing the aims and motivations of and influences on a state's foreign policy, such as 
ambition, aggrandisement, glory, aggression, interests, honour, reason, passion, and 
sentiment. These terms were ostensibly descriptive, but often carried a clear normative 
edge – reason, interests, and honour had a positive connotation; aggression, passion, 
and sentiment had a negative connotation; while the valuation of ambition and glory 
depended on further context. Generally, these terms and dichotomies were used by 
themselves, and were not explicitly presented as part of an integrated conceptual 
scheme. However, the concepts often fit together: reason and passion were connected 
to non-military and military glory, respectively; military glory implied an aggrandising 
attitude, and so on. Often, the mere invocation of one of these terms – reason, honour, 
or interests; passion or an aggressive attitude – was deemed sufficient by an author to 
indicate a policy or argument as correct or mistaken. 
 The first part of this chapter concerns conservative thought on states and 
statesmen in particular; the different kinds of ambition which they could have and the 
different attitudes which they could adopt. The second part treats reason and passion as 
motivations for and influences on foreign policy, and with that also the interplay 
between statesmen and the people in setting foreign policy. Finally, liberals argued for a 
central role for ethics as a motivation for and influence on foreign policy. The third part 





Motivations and attitudes 
Conservative commentators thought that ambition and the pursuit of glory were 
universal traits of countries, but that these could be pursued through internal 
achievement or external aggrandisement, corresponding to a moderate or aggressive 
attitude towards the international sphere. The possibility of one of the continental great 
powers adopting an aggressive attitude was a perennial concern of conservative 
commentators. 
 
Ambition and the military and peaceful path to glory 
In reflecting on the causes of particular conflicts in international affairs, conservative 
commentators often referred to the 'ambition of … States'.108 In ascribing ambition to a 
state conservatives implied not any particular policy aim, but a general state of mind 
among its statesmen. Ambitious statesmen worked to accrue 'glory' or 'prestige' for their 
country.109 Glory and prestige were about being recognised as a great country, with 
impressive achievements. Conservatives considered ambition a natural presence in a 
properly vigorous country. Since 'human ambition is an essential element in all human 
arts and affairs,’ Wilson argued in 1871 regarding the rise of Prussia, ‘to make Prussian 
ambition in itself a matter of accusation against Prussia is to make it a matter of 
accusation against her that she has any energy or spring at all'.110  
 While they considered the ambition to gain glory as natural and laudable, 
conservatives did discern different means through which a country could attain glory; 
glory could be pursued through domestic achievement or external aggrandisement. 
Achievements in non-military areas were those of 'government, commerce, the arts, 
[and] philosophy' — notably including extra-European empire.111 Common to the non-
military paths to glory was that prestige was gained through 'the favourable opinion of 
Europe', whereas military glory rested on the forcible recognition of superior military 
skill.112 Conservatives disapproved of statesmen who sought glory for their country 
through the latter means, by 'stun[ning] mankind by the manifestation of physical and 
material strength'.113 Conservatives did not think that vigorous patriotic values and 
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impressive military skill were a bad thing – quite the opposite.114 It was only consciously 
choosing to go to war as a means of gaining glory – rather than, say, fighting a 
successful defensive war – which conservatives condemned.115  
 Liberals generally valued liberty and prosperity, and thought of glory as 
following from the possession and nurturing of these general characteristics of a polity. 
Conservatives disagreed; while ‘prosperity and liberty … are just reasons for expressing 
content’, a country ‘must produce greater results than that before it entitles them to the 
respect of others’.116 Conservatives thought that prestige was based the exceptional 
accomplishments of a country and its people, whether in the pursuits of peace or war. 
 Cecil used this understanding of prestige to explain the widely assumed French 
penchant for military glory. British liberals such as Mill and Senior linked this tendency 
to the French national character, moulded 'by Napoleon's corrupting influences'.117 
Cecil's argument was different. He hypothesised that the people of a country generally 
desired to replicate most glorious moments of a country's past.118 Under Napoleon I, 
France had revelled in 'the consciousness of warlike superiority over every other nation 
on earth … and relished it too greedily, to forget it in one generation'.119 The French 
desire for glory through military conquest consequently followed from the people’s 
desire to replicate the particular pinnacle of French glory, the career of Napoleon I. 
 For conservatives, what sort of ambition was dominant in a country was 
consequently not linked to any national character, but contingent and changeable. 
Indeed, this malleability caused significant anxiety among conservative commentators as 
the Franco-Prussian war drew to a close. Germany had always had its prestige, through 
excelling in the pursuits of culture. Conservatives feared, however, that now, after a 
heady taste of the glory accruing to their decisive victory over France, the Germans 
might become enamoured of military glory and persist in its pursuit.120 Conservative 
commentators wondered anxiously as to the path 'which Prussian ambition will take in 
the future'.121 Would the Prussian statesmen, after their military success, continue on 
this course of conquest? Or would they take a moderate course, reject aggressive war, 
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and 'settle down to the pursuits of peace'?122  
 
The role of military glory in international politics 
While conservatives thought of military prestige as genuine glory, they observed that the 
desire for military glory lay at the root of many of the conflicts of international relations. 
The characterisation of Russia’s policy towards the Ottoman Empire in these terms 
might not be surprising, and, in common with other Victorians, the imputation of a 
desire for military glory held pride of place in conservatives’ understanding of the 
French attitude to Europe.123 More tellingly, conservatives also identified such a desire 
for glory as the motivation behind the unifications of Italy and Germany. 
 Conservative commentators argued that the unification of Italy under Piedmont 
was propelled not by the stated aim to liberate Italy and relieve the suffering of its 
peoples, but by Piedmont’s ambition to gain glory through the absorption of the other 
Italian states. Conservatives initially painted Piedmont as almost delusionally aggressive. 
They stated that Piedmont's desire for territorial expansion was so strong that this 
'unprincipled ambition' threatened to overwhelm its prudence – it desired 
aggrandisement to the point that it was willing 'in reckless venture' to involve Napoleon 
III, thereby running the all too real risk of the loss, to France, of its autonomy and 
independence.124 As the unification of Italy unfolded, conservatives presented the 
course of events as the result of the 'ambitious projects [and] restless intrigues' of 
Cavour and Napoleon III.125 Eventually, Cavour gained control of the other polities of 
Italy by outwitting and out-scheming both Napoleon III and the other statesmen of 
Italy. The notion of 'national independence', Lever argued, was a sham: merely 
meaningless rhetoric through which Cavour had manipulated the revolutionary 
movement for his own ends – for the glory of Piedmont through its hegemony over the 
rest of Italy.126  
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 Conservatives similarly considered the cause of German unification to lie in a 
Prussian desire for aggrandisement. They emphasised that Bismarck did not 'care one 
straw for German unity', but was interested instead in the 'ascendancy of Prussia in 
Germany'.127 'The events between 1863 and 1870 must be looked upon', Cecil asserted, 
'as one transaction – as successive acts of the great drama of Prussian 
aggrandisement'.128 And conservatives thought that the motivation of the small states, 
too, lay not in an intrinsic desire for national unification. Unity was merely a necessary 
means to glory. Only by 'confiding to the charge of Prussia its ambitions … its 
diplomacy … its glory, its external force and aggrandisement' could the small German 
states hope to realise any of their ambitions.129 The desire for glory lay at the basis of 
most crises in international relations. 
 
The attitudes of statesmen 
Conservatives discerned two different attitudes which statesmen could take regarding 
the European sphere, aggressive and moderate, as reflected in the choice to pursue 
glory either through military or through non-military means. Statesmen would ordinarily 
hold an attitude of 'moderation' and have a 'pacific disposition'.130 Moderation meant 
that, whereas the aggressive attitude implied aiming at military hegemony and absolute 
dominance, the moderate attitude recognised the independence of other states and 
accepted the necessity of settlements and a degree of compromise regarding a state’s 
interests – which would still be vigorously asserted.131 A pacific disposition, meanwhile, 
meant that statesmen would be concerned to avoid the 'horrors of war'.132 They would 
aim 'to have as few enemies as possible, and to maintain universal peace … [and] the 
tranquillity of the world'.133 If they did enter into war, any conflicts would be limited, 
fought over particular interests, not for the glory of victory itself or for wholesale 
dominance over the other country. When taking a moderate, pacific attitude, statesmen 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(1863d: 451-4). 
127 Swayne (1867: 197) and Wilson (1871a: 78). See also Cecil (1864a: 252-3); Dasent (1870: 294, 297); 
Oliphant (1864a: 394, 396); (1864b: 503); (1865: 122); Patterson (1864a: 130); (1864b: 641); Wilson 
(1871a: 81-82). 
128 Cecil (1870: 545). 
129 Wilson (1871a: 90); see also Hamley (1870c: 784). 
130 For 'moderation', Cecil (1864a: 239), Dasent (1870: 313), and Oliphant (1864b: 511); see also Cecil 
(1870: 540, 542); Dasent (1870: 327). For 'pacific disposition', Cecil (1864a: 238); see also Cecil (1870: 
543); Gleig (1870b: 662, 664); (1871: 119); Hamley (1871a: 240); (1871c: 504); Lever (1870c: 509); 
Patterson (1864a: 132); Wilson (1871b: 369-70, 373). 
131 See e.g.  Cecil (1864a: 239); Oliphant (1864b: 518). For further analysis of conservative thought on 
interests and their interaction in international politics, see chapter III. 
132 Dasent (1870: 301); see also e.g. Hamley (1871c: 503-4). 
133 Oliphant (1864a: 383); see also e.g. Hamley (1871a: 240). 
38 
would consequently attempt to calibrate the conflicting interests of the great powers so 
they could avoid getting embroiled in military conflict.134  
 A moderate attitude still implied, however, an active involvement of the country 
in international politics in pursuit of its own interests. Conservatives used the notions of 
moderation and a pacific disposition as an explicit contrast to an attitude of outright 
aggression; they were not meant to convey the likelihood or desirability of a self-
effacing, isolationist, or pacifist attitude. A concern over the country’s interests, great 
power politics, or general order and stability could still lead a moderate statesman to 
decide on the use of force. 
 Conservatives also emphasised that the moderate attitude was at basis still a self-
interested one — there was no general European interest to which each particular 
country was expected to defer.135 While peace was generally in the interests of most 
countries, peace and stability as such were, for conservatives, not quite ends in 
themselves, but only to be pursued to the extent that they furthered the rightful ends of 
international politics, the interests and honour of one's country.136 For instance, 
conservatives argued that Britain had many commercial interests, which meant that in 
general the British cause was served by tranquillity and order in Europe.137 Tranquillity 
depended on equilibrium among the great powers, so, conservatives concluded, British 
statesmen should involve themselves in European affairs with the aim to 'preserve the 
European balance of power'.138  
 During the Franco-Prussian war, for instance, conservative commentators 
linked a moderate, self-interested policy course with a focus on peace and order.139 
Several conservatives noted that Britain had selfish reasons for her 'attitude of proud 
neutrality' combined with an 'unmixed condemnation of the war' between France and 
Prussia.140 Britain took this position of 'mock philanthropy' because war inconvenienced 
'her peaceful schemes' and 'her vision of prosperity'.141 Near the end of the war, too, 
W.G. Hamley argued that Britain had plenty of selfish reasons to become more 
assertive in Europe – this was needed to defend her own interests – but that because 
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British assertiveness would also induce Germany to refrain from continuing on a path 
of conquest, it would also be in the common interest of Europe.142 The moderate 
British course of action was both self-interested and beneficial to Europe. It contrasted, 
conservatives argued, with the self-aggrandising policies adopted at the time by Russia 
and Italy, who furthered their interests by taking advantage of the turmoil to 
respectively abandon treaty obligations and annex territories.143 
 
The aggressive attitude 
While conservatives considered a moderate attitude to be the default disposition of 
statesmen, they paid far more attention to its troubling alternative. Conservatives often 
discussed the possibility of statesmen starting out on a path of aggrandisement, making 
their country an 'aggressive Power'.144 An aggressive state, conservatives thought, was 
concerned with military glory, territorial expansion, and possibly even hegemony over 
Europe. Such a state would bring conflict and instability to its neighbourhood, which 
was how conservative commentators for instance viewed Piedmont’s ‘intrigue’ in the 
Italian peninsula in 1859-61.145 If the state in question were powerful enough, such a 
course of territorial aggrandisement could then blossom into a project to gain 
hegemony over Europe, as conservatives feared Russia desired during the Crimean War 
and France desired in the late 1850s and early 1860s. In all its different manifestations, 
the aggressive attitude, as characterised by conservatives, implied first of all a view of 
war as not only a viable, but even the preferred means of foreign policy, and, through 
its connection to military glory, as an end in itself.  
 Conservatives were sensitive to any indication of an aggressive attitude held by 
statesmen of a great power. If any of the great powers turned aggressive the focus of 
international politics would shift from the realisation or loss of particular interests and 
the limited conflicts over them, to the mere exercise of 'war, or the preparation of war' 
and possibly putting at stake even 'the independence of the other European powers'.146 
Moreover, the disputes over territory and hegemony which an aggressive state created 
were, Cecil noted, not 'likely to be appeased by compromise. It is that perpetual form of 
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quarrel which, in its nature, is irreconcilable, and which must always exist between those 
who wish to conquer and those who desire not to be conquered'.147 The ordinary 
politics of interests and compromise were replaced by a violent, general struggle over 
territory, independence, and the European order itself. 
 In fielding the notion of an aggressive power embarking on a course of 
systematic aggrandisement, conservatives consciously referred to a long established 
narrative on the possibility of extra-ordinary aggression, of attempts to overturn the 
European order. In this situation, a king or country desired ultimate glory in hegemony 
over Europe and tried to gain this end through the military defeat of the other states.148 
This narrative recalled the various claims to universal monarchy of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century, which had culminated, in the minds of these conservatives, in the 
first Napoleon's attempts to become emperor of Europe.149 
 This spectre of Napoleon’s quest for universal dominion and of the ‘Great War’ 
which had been necessary to end his career was a pervasive presence in the thought of 
conservative commentators on international affairs. When they thought a great power 
was possibly adopting an aggressive attitude, they presented this as a chance that 'the 
world is to see a repetition of the Napoleonic conquests', plunging Europe into large-
scale war with widespread suffering and disruption.150 Any evidence of an aggressive 
attitude among the great powers ought consequently, conservatives argued, to galvanise 
Britain into forming a coalition to constrain the potential aggressor.  
 Over the course of mid-Victorian international affairs, conservatives invoked 
these concerns frequently. They presented even the American North in a narrative in 
which ‘what they called their ‘manifest destiny’ was territorial aggrandisement’ and ‘the 
dream of universal dominion’, if over the North American continent rather than over 
Europe.151 Conservative commentators portrayed the Crimean War primarily as an 
intervention necessary to prevent Russian hegemony over certainly Eastern Europe, and 
possibly the whole continent.152 The Black Sea affair of 1870-71 was then a 
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confirmation of this perennial Russian policy of aggrandisement.153 By the Eastern 
Question crisis of 1876-78, the main focus of conservatives had shifted to the threat to 
the route to India, but they continued to invoke the possibility of Russian hegemony in 
their calls for an assertive British policy.154 
 In the intervening decades, they had focused on the France of Napoleon III as 
likely involved in a grand project aiming at universal dominion over Europe. 
Conservatives, like most Britons, saw Napoleon III as involved in Italian affairs with 
the aims to gain military glory, dominion over the peninsula, and immediate territorial 
aggrandisement. This conclusion they reiterated again and again: from the run-up to the 
war to the peace of Villa-Franca,155 with the cession of Savoy and Nice,156 when 
Garibaldi marched on Rome,157 right through to commentaries on the state of affairs in 
Italy after unification.158 Conservative commentators moreover argued that Napoleon 
III's involvement in Italian affairs ought to be understood as merely one part of a 
grander course of aggressive ambition and territorial aggrandisement, which had started 
with the Crimean war and was projected into the future, culminating in a bid for French 
hegemony over the continent. Patterson developed this argument most extensively: in a 
series of articles and a book he argued that Napoleon III 'aims to attain for her [France] 
the position of despotic arbiter in the affairs of Europe'.159  
 By the time this possibility had been forestalled by Prussia’s victory over France 
in 1870, conservatives were already preoccupied with speculation and worry over 
whether the new imperial Germany would continue on its decade-long course of 
aggression. For these conservative commentators, the ends which Prussia pursued 
during the Danish Duchies affair only made sense if they had the long-term ambition to 
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establish an empire through aggression: 'unless some ambitious motive were at the 
bottom’, Cecil concluded, ‘the whole transaction would be one of the mysteries of 
history'.160 During the Danish Duchies affair conservative commentators were 
disapproving of this ambition, but not particularly concerned. This attitude changed 
markedly after the events of Sadowa and the Franco-Prussian war. Bismarck had 
fashioned Prussia into the leader of a German empire, which was clearly a great power. 
The attitude taken by the statesmen of this new Power, conservatives thought, would be 
of crucial importance for the future of the European sphere and the likelihood of large-
scale war.161 The possibility of a fellow great power adopting an aggressive attitude was a 
major preoccupation of conservative commentators, a lens which coloured their 
perception of any particular issue in international politics.  
 Parry argues that in considering liberal commentary on international politics, the 
historian does not need to bother much with Victorian attitudes towards particular 
nationalities and cultures. Because 'the collective recoil was against the same thing: an 
ideologically alien regime with expansionist, threatening intentions. At times when 
politicians presented Russia, France or Austria as a threat to Britain, the similarities in 
the presentation of each outweighed the differences; the emphasis was on general 
stereotypes of bureau and barrack at odds with English liberty.'162 Conservatives cared 
not about the ideology of foreign regimes, but also evinced such a ‘collective recoil ... 
against the same thing’. Their worries were not autocracy and militarism, but rather 
statesmen taking an aggressive attitude, pursuing military glory, or even embarking on a 
bid for hegemony over Europe.  
 
Ambition, glory, and the attitude of British Liberals 
There was one set of statesmen whose attitude to international affairs conservatives did 
not characterise through this framework of aggression and moderation — these were 
the British liberal and radical politicians. Conservatives presented theirs as aberrant 
attitudes. Liberals and radicals, they complained, either lacked ambition, not desiring 
glory for Britain and favouring isolationism, or they had the wrong ambition, thinking 
that the realisation of certain ethical ideals would bring glory to Britain. Conservatives 
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argued that both attitudes resulted in a problematic foreign policy. 
 Conservatives thought that statesmen ought to be ambitious for their country. 
They consequently criticised liberals and radicals such as Cobden who, conservatives 
complained, were only concerned with commerce and penny-pinching. This irked 
conservatives, for whom the glory of Britain was of as great importance as its 
prosperity. Lever argued, for instance, that there was an ambition for glory in which 
'men's thoughts soared to something above a balance sheet, and dreamed that a nation 
was a greater thing than a counting house'.163 Only men's ambition, Lever continued, 
would 'drive them from the pursuits of material profit to speculative projects and daring 
achievements'.164 In the case of Britain this glory was expressed above all in its empire. 
A proper consideration of the importance of glory would consequently, conservatives 
asserted, lead to a foreign policy where concerns over economy would not be allowed to 
impact the vigour and security of the empire.165 Cobden and people like him, however, 
favoured isolationism: Britain focusing on its prosperity and leaving continental politics 
alone. Conservatives strongly disapproved. They argued that isolationism was short-
sighted and pernicious, because it relinquished British influence on the three ends of 
international politics: safeguarding Britain’s interests, maintaining a secure diplomatic 
position among the great powers, and preserving the general stability and order of 
Europe. Not only would Cobdenite isolationism thus imperil the glory and security of 
Britain, it would, conservatives thought, even come to undermine the basis for the very 
prosperity which the Cobdenites valued, as Britain’s interests would no longer be given 
due account in international politics. 
 Liberals also made the distinction between glory from peaceful pursuits and 
from military victory, but, unlike conservatives, generally rejected military glory as 
hollow, as undeserving of genuine respect. Instead, liberals discerned a different source 
of glory for a country in international affairs. They thought that a country would gain 
glory for itself by disinterestedly realising certain overarching, generally affirmed ethical 
ideals in its foreign policy, such as Christian humanitarianism, constitutional liberty and, 
in certain contexts, national self-determination. For most liberals, Britain’s prestige 
rested on its leadership in facilitating the spread of these liberal values across the 
continent.166 Conservative commentators rejected this notion of glory. They thought 
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that liberal values held little purchase among continental statesmen. In practice they 
were merely a veneer of legitimation for a de facto course of territorial aggrandisement; 
they were 'a mask assumed to serve a purpose … [of] war and conquest'.167 
Conservatives saw liberals as being taken in by these spurious appeals to their values 
and thereby encouraging aggression and disorder on the continent. In the case of 
France and Piedmont, for instance, liberals and radicals had consequently condoned or 
applauded, as a result of their fixation on supposedly universal moral principles, what 
was in fact, in the eyes of conservatives, a course of aggression and territorial 
aggrandisement on the continent. 
 
Reason, passion, and the roles of statesmen and the people 
As they debated international affairs and British foreign policy, conservatives tried to 
establish a sense that there were two different realms from which to perceive and to act 
by conflating two sets of terms in their analysis. Conservatives indicated a realm of 
reason, pragmatism, and practical knowledge, which they opposed to a realm of 
sentiment, ideals, and theoretical abstractions.168 Conservatives generally associated the 
moderate attitude towards international politics with a state of affairs where reason was 
the foundation of foreign policy. Conversely, they thought that military ambition and an 
aggressive attitude were generally a departure from reason and often informed by 
passion and sentiment. They also equated a foreign policy based in reason with a foreign 
policy aimed at, firstly, realising the 'interests' of the country and, secondly, maintaining 
the stature and 'honour' of the state.169 They furthermore made a distinction between 
statesmen as bearers of reason and the general populace as creatures of passion and 
sentiment. Statesmen were the agents of international politics, but, given the 
possibilities of pandering and demagoguery, both reason and emotion influenced the 
flow of international politics.  
 
Reason in foreign policy: interests, honour, and war 
Although conservative commentators strongly emphasised that 'purpose' in foreign 
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policy rested on 'interests', they rarely went into any detail on the characteristics of 
interests.170 In general terms, though, a foreign policy identified by conservatives as in 
pursuit of a country’s interests could pertain to the country's security, prosperity, or 
great power status. Concern for particular interests segued into concern for the position 
of Britain in the scheme of great power politics, which were then both set against a 
backdrop of general order and stability in Europe.171 
 Conservatives connected a foreign policy based in reason with the pursuit of 
interests which were for every country 'peculiar to itself'.172 They assumed that this 
pursuit, when reasoned, happened in a spirit of compromise and (coerced) settlement, 
rather than in a spirit of intractable enmity and absolute gain or loss.173 Conservatives 
sustained this narrative of limited interests even during the Crimean War, the one 
European war in which Britain was involved during the Victorian era.174 They rejected 
the liberal perception of a grand struggle between progressive liberal trends and 
autocratic reaction.175 Conservatives asserted that the Tsar ought to be viewed not as a 
bugbear intent on the destruction of European liberties, but merely as a rational 
statesman trying to act in the best interests of his country – with no particular blame for 
the war happening.176 Conservatives did perceive a Russian threat to the balance of 
power, if it were to gain a dominant position in Central Europe. But this was the old 
general threat to the independence of states, not the more particular, newly perceived 
threat to the liberal, constitutional nature of their self-government.177 The conflict, 
conservatives asserted, should be seen as one between states with different interests, not 
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as a grand struggle of the forces of progress in Europe against those of reaction.178 
 Conservatives were wary of predicating a war on such general, emotive terms. 
These would involve far more expansive military operations, which implied both a 
direct cost in money and lives, and the ever abhorred likelihood of the conflict evolving 
into a general European war. 'War', Swayne stated, 'is not a subject of love or hate, any 
more than the cholera' raging in the British and French camps.179 The war was not, they 
implied, based on a general antagonism between Britain and Russia. Consequently, the 
war aims ought to be limited too; the goal was to achieve the coercion of Russia, for it 
to concede on this particular issue – Britain was not to aim for a comprehensive defeat 
of Russia.180 Conservatives consequently thought that the destruction of Russia's Black 
Sea fleet and its military port at Sevastopol were rightly the main focus of the British 
and French war effort.181  
 This conservative approach to resolving the conflict and securing the balance of 
power contrasted instructively with Palmerston’s preferred method of containing 
Russia. Palmerston rejected the constrained scope for the conflict advocated by 
conservatives, and hoped to limit Russia's ability to act as a major European power. 
This, he thought, could be achieved through a transformation of the map of Europe 
along somewhat national lines – to the extent that such a reconfiguration would 
inconvenience Russia. He imagined fomenting nationalist insurrections resulting in a 
newly independent state of Poland and a Sweden enlarged with Russian territories, and 
considered that Italy might as well be made independent while he was 'redrawing the 
map of Europe'.182 
 Conservative thought on this matter was consequently distinct, even from the 
vision of a person who also valued the importance of force and the balance of power in 
international affairs, in that conservatives conceptualised the war as a strictly 
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constrained conflict. Even with Britain caught up in war, conservative commentators 
maintained their call for what they saw as a reasoned rather than emotive foreign policy, 
arguing for only those limited means and ends necessary to assuage the particular 
concerns which had drawn Britain into the conflict.  
 Conservatives thought that statesmen who based their foreign policy in reason 
would be concerned not only with the interests of the country, but also with honour, or 
stature.183 Stature was about being effective in foreign policy. For conservatives, stature 
was the reputation which a state had for standing up for itself, for defending its 
interests.184 For liberals, stature lay in the recognition by other states of the moral weight 
of Britain, of its ability to realise liberal values in international politics.185 
 From the conservatives’ perspective, an honourable country would take a 
reasoned position regarding its interests and could be counted upon to stick by this 
position, even when matters would come to a head. Stature and honour were thus 
associated by conservatives with vigour and resoluteness, and a foreign policy based in 
reason and foresight. Anyone who cared about their country would surely, 
conservatives assumed, want these qualities to be ascribed to its behaviour in the 
international sphere. Conservatives consequently criticised the foreign policy of liberal 
statesmen, who seemed ever too vacillating and irresolute, and increasingly concerned 
merely with the commercial implications of any action or inaction.186 Liberal statesmen, 
these conservatives argued, did not care about the honour of Britain, did not care 
whether Britons could think of themselves as being a robust presence in international 
affairs, a great power actively securing its interests. 
 Conservatives repeatedly invoked the honour of Britain as a primary concern 
for its foreign policy. Near the end of the Crimean War, they identified British honour 
as one of the reasons in favour of continuing the war; if the conflict were extended 
another year, Britain would surely gain some significant victories without French aid, in 
the Baltic or the Caucasus, and could thus firmly re-establish her stature among the 
states of Europe.187 During the Danish Duchies affair, conservatives argued that the 
mismatch between 'Lord Russell's fierce notes and pacific measures' had damaged the 
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stature of Britain among states.188 During the American Civil War the various disputes 
between Britain and the North did not, for conservatives, revolve around abstract issues 
such as international law; rather, 'the national honour was at stake'.189 Conservatives 
asserted that any compliance with Northern demands be presented as the forbearance 
of a superior power, not the timidity of a retiring state.190 Conveying this impression was 
essential to maintaining the stature of Britain as a first-rate power, 'proud in its 
independence, sensitive for its honour, and able and willing to hold its own against all 
comers'.191 Finally, conservative commentators reacted violently to Russia's abrogation 
of Black Sea neutrality in 1870 because they again thought that Britain's honour was in 
peril.192 For liberals, the Black Sea affair revolved around the role and proper workings 
of treaties in international affairs.193 Conservative commentators engaged somewhat 
with this liberal debate, but their focus was elsewhere.194 'As the question is now put to 
us', The Standard declared, 'it is a far more vital one than that of our interests in the East; 
it is the question of our honour – of our existence as a great Power'.195  
 While conservatives considered moderation and compromise to be important 
elements of a rational foreign policy, they also affirmed that war was still a possible 
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course of action, even if as a means of last resort. Fundamentally, rational actors took a 
peaceful stance: most countries 'in their calm, unimpassioned periods, admit, the sin and 
inexpediency of wars'.196 At the same time, discussing the possible travails of reasonable 
England, Hamley noted 'that it may not rest with us whether we quarrel or no'.197 
Firstly, other nations could threaten certain interests which Britain would not want to 
concede.198 Swayne considered, for instance, the independence of Belgium as an interest 
of Britain which she could not compromise.199 And during the Eastern Question crisis 
of 1876-78, the route to India was posited by conservative commentators as similarly 
hallowed.200 Secondly, Britain could go to war to prevent its honour being impugned to 
too great an extent.201 During the Danish Duchies affair, Cecil argued that Russell's 
statements promising support to Denmark had involved Britain’s honour sufficiently 
that Britain could not afford to stand idly by, but ought to assist Denmark in the war.202  
 Even territorial change coerced through warfare could still be a part of a foreign 
policy based in reason, if it were a means to secure interests or stability, rather than 
fuelled by a desire for territorial aggrandisement. Conservative commentators for 
instance lauded the British and French peace terms at the end of the Crimean war, 
which included territorial cessions on the part of Russia, as a model of moderate foreign 
policy — all the demands were made not with the aggrandisement of France or England 
in mind, but merely with securing the future peace and order of Europe.203  
 The unreasonableness of war as a means in international politics lay not in any 
inherent immorality, according to conservatives, but in the attendant costs, so unlikely 
to be worth the glory gained. Conservatives conceded that when the disparity in power 
between states was large enough, even taking an aggressive attitude and making a bid 
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for military glory could seem reasonable. If another state all but 'offered itself, by its 
helpless protestation', reason would enact little restraint on the desire for military 
glory.204 Conservatives alluded to this point especially in their frequent arguments for a 
well-funded and well-prepared British military.  
 
Reason, ideals, and delusions in critiques of liberal British statesmen 
Conservatives generally associated passion with the people and reason with statesmen. 
They made an exception, however, for the liberal and radical statesmen of Britain. 
These, conservatives thought, often abandoned reason in favour of their abstract ideals 
and sentiments, with the most pernicious results. Cecil was representative of 
conservative opinion when he argued that statesmanship ought to be about pragmatism 
and particular interests, rather than the liberals’ preferred ideals, imagination, and a 
“cause”.205 Conservative commentators furthermore noted that some liberals and 
radicals were so invested in certain preconceptions or 'fictions', regarding for instance 
the venality of aristocratic diplomats or peace following from an increase in commerce, 
that they no longer even considered the possibility of their assumptions being 
mistaken.206 Conservatives argued that liberals let their ideals and sentiments distract 
them from the political realities: their 'visions … however noble as sentiments, are false 
when taken as the basis of practical conclusions'.207 Any foreign policy informed by 
ideals or sentiment would no longer work in the interests of the country, being either 
diverted to a wholly different end or unable to discern the effective means of securing 
them.  
 Conservatives pressed this point especially forcefully in the debates surrounding 
Italian unification, where they decried the 'hysteric sighs over the past, and visionary 
aspirations for the future' which were animating the liberal boosters of Italy.208 They 
accused liberals of three major misunderstandings regarding the character of the Italian 
Question and Britain’s proper role in it. 
 Laurence Oliphant firstly argued that the abstract end of freedom was all but 
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meaningless. Some forms of freedom could be valueless, such as 'the freedom of the 
United States, in which a man is free to use his revolver'. With British freedom being 
such a particularly worthwhile instantiation of the concept, Oliphant observed, 'the 
notion of freedom in Italy kindles a fire of sympathetic enthusiasm amongst us, because 
we have a very faint notion of what Italian freedom is going to be like, and we have 
fallen in love with the abstraction'. Endorsing freedom as an abstract concept, to be 
implemented everywhere, was, Oliphant asserted, a misguided project based on a 
'delusion'.209 
 Conservative commentators further argued that the means which liberals 
imagined would realise this end of freedom, the Italian sentiment of nationality, had in 
reality a negligible causal force. The liberal Matthew Arnold explicitly argued for the 
force of Italian nationality, based as it was in a shared history of glorious Rome.210 
Swayne gently suggested that the appeal of the Roman classical heritage to educated 
Britons had resulted among them in an imagined vista of Italy 'far brighter and more 
glorious than reality'.211 Most conservatives were less tactful, with for instance Atkinson 
writing that the 'nationality of Italy, we have seen, is but the baseless phantom of 
political romance. ... we deem Italian nationality, unity, or indeed, political 
independence, to be among those wild chimeras and alluring phantoms', those 'words 
… of delusion' and that 'visionary vapouring', characteristic of demagogues rather than 
statesmen.212 
 Thirdly, conservatives complained that liberals placed a vague set of ethical 
ideals – Italian independence and nationality – before the actual interests of Britain. 
Rather than working to realise an Italian nation-state, based on their sentimental ideals, 
liberal statesmen ought to work to realise the interests of Britain, as understood through 
a reasoned assessment of the implications of the Italian issue for Britain's international 
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position.213  
 By the time of Gladstone’s first administration of 1868-74, he had become, in 
the writings of conservative commentators, the personification of the liberals’ tendency 
towards adopting ideals and delusions as the basis of their perspective on international 
affairs. Hamley stressed the liberals’ divorce from reason and reality in direct reaction to 
Gladstone’s article of October 1870, which spoke of the ‘idea of Public Right’ and ‘the 
general judgment of civilised mankind’.214 Conservatives had long indicted Cobden and 
the peace party, with its isolationist attitude, for basing their position on a 
misunderstanding of the international realm, ‘wrapt up in dreams of millennial peace, 
and in theories which maintain that the nations have grown too wise to go to war any 
more’.215 Hamley now similarly argued, with Gladstone in mind, that ‘a statesman who 
professes to believe, and who would make us believe, that such a state [of general peace] 
has been attained, and that, relying on this fact, we need take no measure for our own 
protection, is wholly unfit to govern.'216 The liberal statesman such as Gladstone, 
Hamley asserted, did not judge 'by the hard logic of facts', but would rather 'give 
himself up to his hallucination' with 'utter abandonment'.217  
 Conservatives argued that an effective foreign policy needed to be founded in 
reason and in a realistic apprehension of the facts of international politics. They then 
complained that the British liberals, being wrapped up in their world of ideals, lacked 
exactly this grounding in reality. 
 
Passions and the people: the substance of popular influence on foreign policy 
The passions were, in the minds of conservatives, closely linked to the people, as 
opposed to statesmen. Conservatives characterised the masses as generally driven by 
passion and sentiment.218 The people would prefer a policy which acted on their 
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immediate desires, little concerned with the (possibly violent) means needed to realise 
these preferences, with insight into the geopolitical situation, or with the longer-term 
interests of the country. Cecil was representative of conservative opinion when he 
remarked throughout one of his articles on 'the exquisite obtuseness which generally 
distinguishes violent outbursts of public feeling'.219  
 When caught up in some passion, 'the mob, the middle classes, … [parliament] 
itself’ would demand the absolute realisation of their imagined ends, and reject any 
compromise or settlement, being 'too impatient of any powers confronting its will – 
however legitimately existing – to come to any terms of compromise with them'.220 In 
this way passion – and the people – influenced foreign policy predominantly as a major 
cause of conflict.221 Military victory and its accompanying one-sided terms of peace 
would often, conservatives thought, be the only way to realise the absolute aims 
demanded by passion. It was consequently when passion dominated reason, 
conservatives warned, that war came to be seen as an attractive course of action and 
states adopted an aggressive attitude.222  
  This increased likelihood of war was all the more galling to conservatives, 
because the passions sparking conflict had little time for interests or stature, the proper 
concerns of foreign policy. Commenting on the Franco-Prussian war, Hamley asserted 
that all the 'blood and tears and ruin' were not worth settling such a 'contemptible 
quarrel' – any war from passion 'was wholly unnecessary, and therefore criminal'.223 
Conservatives discerned four interrelated passions which influenced foreign policy and 
agitated for aggression. 
 Firstly, while they approved of the ambition to make one's country great and 
respected in Europe, conservatives discerned the dangerous influence of passion if this 
ambition shifted into the zero-sum desire to be the single greatest country of Europe, in 
a martial vein; to be the preponderant state in Europe with the most patriotic strength, 
valour, and martial skill.224 Ambition was in that case infused with aggression — pride 
and 'unbridled arrogance' were 'feelings which, without tangible ground of quarrel, 
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could impel two powerful and prosperous nations to deadly combat'.225 The Franco-
Prussian war, several conservatives observed, was motivated by such passion. The war 
did not revolve around interests, but around '[t]hat fatal question, “which of us is 
greater?”'.226  
 The second passion which conservatives thought led countries to war was a 'lust 
for territory' and 'love of foreign conquest'.227 This was a passion not merely for martial 
superiority and military victory, but for the increase of territory and for the annexation 
of neighbouring polities.228 This passion, Patterson argued, informed German policy 
during the Danish Duchies affair; 'they desire to wrench Holstein from Denmark … 
[and have it] united to the territories of the Confederation'.229 Similarly, both France and 
Prussia, conservatives noted, longed to possess the territory on the east and west bank 
of the Rhine, respectively. These simmering, conflicting desires shaped a context in 
which neither side would much mind a war, since it implied an opportunity to gain this 
territory.230 The lust for territory could range from such a limited desire for the conquest 
of a particular territory, to an 'insatiable appetite of territorial aggrandisement' as 'the 
prime motive and ruling passion' of a state.231  
 A third spur to war which conservatives identified was the passion for revenge, 
the desire to redress past defeats.232 This sentiment was related to both of the former 
passions, in that the history which had sparked a passion for revenge would also have 
made the countries feel strongly about their relative greatness and would likely have left 
both sides 'coveting … each other's territory'.233 Foreign policy informed by this passion 
would conceive of a hostile country as an eternal antagonist, whereas a statesman 
influenced by reason would 'remember that, though his adversary were now his enemy, 
the day might come when he might wish for him as his friend'.234 The Napoleonic wars 
were an important source of this desire for revenge. Hamley for instance posited that 
the Franco-Prussian war was 'the product of the wars waged in the beginning of the 
century.'235 Moreover, the cycle of vengeful wars would likely continue. With French 
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commentators already declaring that the siege of Paris 'inaugurates a terrible era of 
bloody revenge', Hamley concluded that 'this war … is likely also to be the parent of 
wars for many a year’.236 
 Fourthly and finally, several conservative commentators discerned the 
dangerous influence of the concept of nationality. Conservatives, if they considered the 
notion at all, mainly spoke of nationality as a sentiment.237 This sentiment of nationality 
was often entwined with the other passions, providing a fertile ground for them to 
grow. People caught up in the sentiment of nationality, conservatives noted, were also 
likely to want their state to be the most powerful of Europe, as imagined evidence that 
their nation was the greatest of all.238 The sentiment of nationality often entailed a lust 
for territory, since it implied the desire to arraign all the people of the nationality under 
a single polity.239 In a similar vein, the sentiment of nationality could provide a great 
impetus to the passion for revenge, especially if a past defeat had resulted in the loss of 
any “national” territory.240 Any conquests suggested by the sentiment of nationality 
would moreover be presented as righteous rectification rather than naked aggression.  
 The problematic influence of the passions on the course of international politics 
was compounded, conservatives observed, by the trend of increasing popular influence 
on the foreign policy of states. As the general populace had gained and governments 
and courts had, relatively speaking, lost influence over foreign policy, the chance of 
major wars occurring, conservatives thought, had increased. The prominence of the 
people meant the prominence of passions, not least the sentiment of nationality, in 
setting the course of a state’s foreign policy.241 
 
The roles of statesmen and the people in setting foreign policy 
Conservatives thought that the foreign policy of a state was the result, in its domestic 
influences, of the interplay of reason and passion. The preponderance of the passions 
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over reasoned judgement among the people led to the quality of a foreign policy 
decreasing as the influence of the masses increased – a foreign policy which was more 
violent, more about the uncompromising pursuit of imagined, absolute ideals or of 
military glory and territorial gain. Conservatives contrasted the above with the 
statesman's policy of a reasoned pursuit of the country's interests, with ample possibility 
for compromise. The people needed, in their own interest, to defer to statesmen, who 
were to use their superior judgement to identify the country’s long-term interests and 
decide on its actions. Liberals, in contrast, did not necessarily consider popular influence 
on statesmen a problem, both because passions could be substantively good and 
because people could be more reasonable — more peace- and liberty-loving — than 
statesmen desiring glory and aggrandisement.242 
 Conservative commentators had decided ideas on what made for a good 
statesman. They emphasised the statesman’s task to safeguard the foreign policy of the 
state from the influence of popular passion through the exercise of leadership and 
reasoned judgement. Wise men, E.B. Hamley asserted, 'view with contempt, regret, or 
compassion the ordinary expression of popular opinion'.243 The actual foreign policy of 
a state was then strongly influenced by how well a statesman could deal with the masses 
and their passions. Conservatives here discerned three different possibilities. 
 Firstly, the people could be properly disciplined and deferential to their rulers. 
In this case, they would accept the judgement of statesmen on the policy course to be 
followed, and the people's desires and sentiments would exercise little influence on the 
foreign policy enacted by a state. Secondly, the masses could be led by passion, but the 
skilful demagogue could then manage to control and canalise the expression of these 
passions for his own ends. Foreign policy would now likely revolve around the 
preoccupations of the demagogue, rather than the interests of the country. Thirdly, 
statesmen could feel obliged to pander to the desires and sentiments of the masses, in 
order to secure their tenure. In this situation statesmen still decided on the details of the 
foreign policy, but its general aim now became the gratification of the passions of the 
people, rather than the realisation of the interests of the ruler or country.  
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Their proper roles: leadership and deference 
Conservatives perceived, in various fields, a natural hierarchy between leaders and 
followers, a 'principle of submission to an established authority'.244 Conservatives saw 
leaders and followers as not merely two different expressions of the same encompassing 
entity, such as a “national community”, but as qualitatively different, with different 
motivations, different ends, and different roles to play. While leaders had agency, 
followers had an essentially passive role to play – they were to be guided by the leaders, 
and good results were only possible if the others’ lead was accepted. Assuming such 
deference, conservatives thought outcomes were then, especially over the longer term, 
mostly a function of the quality of leadership.245 Conservatives perceived this need for 
hierarchy, leadership, and deference most strongly, regarding international affairs, in the 
policy-setting process of a state.  
 Conservatives argued that, in setting foreign policy, both the general populace 
and Parliament were to recognise the authority and to defer to the leadership and 
judgement of statesmen.246 Statesmen, in their turn, had a positive responsibility to 
exercise leadership and to make judgements on behalf of their country. 'To one who 
undertakes to guide public opinion', Gleig asserted, 'character is everything. … his 
power of forming judgements for himself, and constraining others to be guided by 
them; that is the criterion by which statesmen are mainly tried'.247 Statesmen were to 
make their judgements based on reason and a realistic assessment of the state of affairs. 
In particular, conservatives noted, statesmen were not to act based on flights of fancy 
and they were not to be carried away by passion, as the general population often was.248 
It could consequently be the statesman's duty to act against the immediate wishes of the 
people and parliament, 'the floating opinion of the hour', in order to secure 'consistency 
of policy' in the long-term interests of the country, 'carefully thought out … and 
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unflaggingly maintained'.249 
 Conservative thought here differed markedly from the thought of many liberals, 
even though Gladstone, for instance, also emphasised leadership by statesmen and 
discipline on the part of the people. Gladstone however related discipline to a rejection 
of self or class interest, which the people would achieve if given the responsibility to 
make their own judgements, through political participation in an extended franchise.250 
Conservatives attached an almost opposite meaning to discipline. People, in their view, 
were to demur from making their own judgements, and were rather to defer to the 
judgements made by their leaders. The deference of the people towards the government 
was for conservatives an essential element of any vigorous state.251 Oliphant for instance 
praised the lack of 'revolutionary character' among the people of Holstein, and noted 
'the extraordinary respect for constituted authority which the Holsteiners have 
shown'.252 The political system of a state mattered mostly in whether it fostered or 
inhibited such deference. 
 The judgement of statesmen should be deferred to, argued conservatives, 
because statesmen were capable of 'better judgement' than the mass of people or even 
Parliament.253 Their judgement was better firstly because statesmen, in the minds of 
conservatives, were persons of a higher quality than the general populace; they were 
wiser, 'more forbearing', and they drew upon their 'sense of the logic of the situation', 
rather than upon 'angry passion' or 'parliamentary rhetoric'.254 Secondly, a statesman's 
better judgement rested on his 'superior knowledge' concerning the affairs he was to 
judge.255 'Of all the things John Bull pays for', Lever lamented, 'there is not one of which 
he knows less, or takes a fainter interest in, than Diplomacy', while Oliphant 
complained that 'a foreign policy which should be sufficiently profound to achieve the 
object desired can scarcely ever be adopted, because it would not be understood by the 
nation'.256 An effective policy would be based on a foresight and preparation which 
could only result from a reasoned, realistic consideration of all the details of the 
diplomatic and military situation. And given this demand for insider knowledge and 
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secret planning, '[the Ministry] alone', Elwin noted, 'are in a position to estimate 
thoroughly the situation of affairs' and formulate the optimal foreign policy.257 Cecil 
similarly observed that the manoeuvring of international politics 'is a matter of delicacy, 
on which the outside world can arrive at no safe opinion'.258  
 Conservatives did envision certain rights and a role for Parliament and the 
people in setting foreign policy. Firstly, they had the right to be led by their statesmen 
from reason.259 Conservatives consequently condemned radicals and Gladstonian 
liberals, for letting themselves be led by their sentiments and ideals, thus betraying this 
trust. Secondly, the people and Parliament had the right to 'be satisfactorily informed of 
the position of affairs' and of 'the general character of the [government's] policy', with 
the important constraint, however, that if statesmen indicated a need for secrecy, then 
both parliamentarians and the public were to defer to this judgement.260 This second 
right existed so there could be an informed, reasoned public debate on foreign affairs, in 
Parliament and among the educated classes.261 Here then lay the role which 
conservatives envisaged for Parliament and the public; they could be a source of 'calm 
earnest council' for statesmen 'as to what course should have been followed'.262 Public 
debate thus functioned to aid statesmen in their decisions. The final judgement on the 
proper course of action was still the statesman's to make.263 Unsurprisingly, 
conservatives argued this point particularly strenuously during the Eastern Question 
crisis of the late 1870s, as the foreign policy of Disraeli’s Conservative government 
came under fierce liberal and radical criticism.264 
 
Aberration I: statesmen pandering to the people 
The ominous alternative to proper leadership and deference was that the people would 
no longer defer to the judgement of the statesmen. Rather, the public would expect 
statesmen to follow its preferences and passions. Every statesman but the occasional 
exceptional one would now fear for the security of his position. The statesman would 
consequently '[make] himself the instrument of the known passions of his subjects' in 
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order to secure their fleeting support.265 A popularly elected parliament merely added 
another dimension to this insecurity.266 As a consequence of this pandering to both 
parliament and the people, foreign policy would be based on emotion and ignorance, 
rather than on reason and reliable knowledge. When statesmen felt the need to pander 
to the people, 'every great measure of national policy will be valued in their scales, not 
by its probable influence on the future honour or welfare of the nation, but by its 
immediate purchasing power in the market of votes'.267 Policy decided upon on this 
basis would inevitably lead to disaster, to 'the reckoning that awaits all, nations or men, 
who prefer to indulge in the pleasing illusions of the present rather than bear the pain 
and discipline of foresight'.268  
 While democracy was an obvious source of such popular pressure, 
conservatives did not think that this problem was fundamentally linked to a particular 
political structure. During the Eastern Question crisis of 1876-78, for instance, 
conservative commentators noted the deleterious influence of the public in Turkey, 
Britain, Austria, and even autocratic Russia: 'tottering between a ruinous war and a more 
ruinous revolution, the Czar may prefer present danger to future destruction'.269 
Statesmen themselves, conservatives thought, were generally moderate, reasonable 
people. It was mainly the spectre of domestic disorder and the influence of popular 
passions which would force states into war with each other. 
 
Aberration II: demagogues inflaming the passions of the people 
Another problem noted by conservatives, besides that of a wilful public, was that of 
statesmen who did not follow their prescribed role. To some extent this was already the 
case when statesmen pandered, but this was the result of a prior misstep by the general 
populace; conservatives both thought it unrealistic to expect the average statesman to 
imperil their position, and argued that a non-deferential public would lead to statesmen 
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of inferior quality becoming established in the first place.270 Rather than the general 
populace merely losing its sense of deference, though, statesmen themselves could also 
willingly diverge from their proper role.  
 Demagogues, in the conservative understanding, were politicians who 'cultivated 
and … disseminated' a certain convenient sentiment among the people, fanned the 
flames of a particular passion to which they then pandered.271 While demagoguery could 
initially seem like a boon to even the wise statesman, it was a foolish course of action, 
argued conservatives; the passions awakened and encouraged would be sure to force the 
statesman's hand in the future, when the sentiment would no longer be lined up nicely 
with the preferred policy. Several conservative commentators speculated that such a fate 
might befall Bismarck. Bismarck had had to co-opt the German liberal and national 
movement and had done so very effectively, but his policy could become constrained 
by these inflamed passions in the future: 'His rare skill has enabled him to summon a 
mighty spirit to his aid; but he shares the common fate of such magicians,’ Cecil noted 
rather prematurely in 1870, ‘and finds that his spells are too weak to restrain the power 
he has raised'.272 The archetype of the demagogue abroad, however, was Napoleon III, 
and his manipulation of the French public.  
 Conservatives discerned a tendency among French politicians, both republican 
and imperial, to react to adversity by 'rousing political passions'.273 Indeed, France's 
history of revolutions and upheaval had led it to a point where, conservatives believed, 
the populace lacked deference to such an extent that only demagogues could establish 
themselves as statesmen.274 Given this context, they respected the ability of Napoleon 
III, as a skilful demagogue who successfully appealed to the people’s existing passions, 
while ameliorating their more mistaken desires, such as the desire for excessive 
concessions from Russia during the Crimean War.275 Over the course of the 1860s, 
however, Napoleon III failed to sustain his high-wire act. Conservatives painted 
Napoleon III as a victim of his insecurity of tenure and his resulting need to pander to 
the people and to judge his officials based on their loyalty rather than quality.276 In going 
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to war, conservatives argued, Napoleon III was 'indulging a notoriously universal and 
inveterate mania of his subjects', rather than acting 'to satisfy his own ambition'.277 The 
Franco-Prussian war, in particular, was 'a war undertaken at the bidding of the 
people'.278  
 In contrast to liberal commentators, conservatives thought that the type of 
regime, even whether republic or empire, did not matter much for the character and 
quality of a state’s foreign policy.279 Much more important was the character of the 
relationship between the statesmen and the people. France had fallen because even 
Napoleon III could not over the long term sustain a sensible foreign policy while yoked 
to a public which did not defer to his judgement, but rather demanded the gratification 
of its passions. 
 A second manifestation of demagoguery concerned the possibility that 
statesmen did act as leaders “imposing” their judgement on the masses, but that they 
made judgements based on delusions rather than a reasoned, realistic assessment of the 
world. Conservatives invoked this spectre of delusional statesmen primarily when 
criticising British liberal statesmen. Gladstone and politicians like him, conservatives 
complained, based their decisions not on 'experience' but on 'appeals … [to] ridiculous' 
ideas.280 Usually 'visionaries' such as the ‘preachers of the party of peace’ were fairly 
harmless, remarked Hamley in 1870, but they became a problem when such a person 
'has been, by unhappy accident, exalted to a position from whence his words come with 
authority'.281 Hamley was not so much concerned with the doctrine of the peace party 
being espoused in general public debate; rather, the problem appeared when a statesman 
asserted these delusions: '[t]he main evil is, that our countrymen are invited by a high 
authority to accept this phantasm and believe it true'.282 Demagoguery on the part of 
British liberals reached its apogee, conservatives thought, in the ‘most pernicious’ extra-
Parliamentary agitation movement during the Eastern Question crisis of 1876-78. 
Conservatives widely condemned Gladstone for ‘exciting popular passion’ through his 
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'appeals to prejudice and passion … [in] inflammatory speeches and pamphlets'.283 
When discussing and setting foreign policy, they argued, statesmen had the 
responsibility of ensuring that the world-view and policies which they induced the 
people to accept were based in a pragmatic apprehension of the facts of international 
politics.  
 
The failure of British statesmanship 
Conservatives perceived a lack of military preparedness as an endemic weakness of 
Britain’s foreign policy in general, and of liberal statesmanship in particular. This trope 
was part of conservatives’ arguments during the debate on British performance in the 
Crimean War, and would keep manifesting itself throughout these decades.  
 Conservative commentators emphasised that only when the statesmen were 
firmly in control would a foreign and a military policy be a sensible one.284 The Crimean 
War had been such a shambles from beginning to end, they implied, because the 
politicians in power had failed to act like proper statesmen. Initially Whig and Peelite 
statesmen were too reticent, only taking action when forced by popular passion.285 
Palmerston, in contrast, was too pandering, promising the public spectacular victories 
where the war would, if fought according to best military practice, be a dull affair. 
Where Palmerston ought to teach the public patience, he merely fanned their desire for 
instantaneous glory.286 
 Most importantly, Whig and Peelite statesmen had for years wilfully foisted a 
delusion on the masses. The short-sighted public demanded strict economy in peace-
time spending on the military. Whigs and Peelites pandered to the commercial class by 
claiming that there was no need for military preparedness and its accompanying costs; 
the prosperity and technological advancement of Britain sufficed to make it a powerful, 
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secure country. These delusions of the commercial class had been rudely disproven, 
conservative commentators argued, by the troubling events of the Crimean War, where 
a backwards Russia had not rarely outperformed the British military.287 
 The bad preparation of Britain's military had caused concern during the first 
two years of the conflict, but near the end of the war conservatives were happy to 
conclude that Britain now had a fine army and navy, ready if called upon to engage in a 
major war.288 Their worry was now whether the government and people of Britain 
would actually commit themselves to sustain this preparedness, even if it cost money 
and there seemed to be no immediate threat of war.289 Conservatives conceptualised this 
choice as a coming struggle between a reawakened proper patriotism associated with 
gentlemen and the landed classes on the one hand, and on the other hand the false 
patriotism and penny-pinching spirit of economy associated with the Cobdenites and 
Peelites, the urban commercial classes, and the short-sighted policy focus of what they 
considered an overly democratic political system.290  
 A better quality foreign policy would follow from a higher quality statesman. In 
the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war conservatives argued that Prussia’s impressive 
performance had proven that a strong and independent executive achieved excellent 
results.291 Conservatives noted significant structural deficiencies in Britain’s political 
system, but, true to form, advocated that only minor measures be taken. The main 
lesson which conservatives drew from the success of Prussia’s strong executive was that 
Britain should not end up with the other extreme, a military wholly enmeshed in 
Parliament and subject to the vicissitudes of popular and party politics.292 Cecil called 
upon the leaders of both political parties to exercise leadership in order to mitigate the 
effects of these developments, by exempting some crucial areas of policy, including the 
funding of the military, from the direct, constant interference by Parliament.293 Only 
with such relative immunity from the short-sighted shifts of popular politics would 'the 
fixed principles of action and the decisive policy … indispensable to success' again 
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become attainable in the government of Britain.294  
 At this time, Hamley also disparaged Gladstone’s policy of “cheap 
government”, associated especially with cuts to the army. Cheap government, Hamley 
argued, was promised by 'a clique of specious talkers, but incapable statesmen'.295 Britain 
could have economy, certainly, but not cheap government; a military properly prepared 
for war could not come cheap. And why, wondered Hamley, make a problem out of 
this? It was after all just 'money – of which we have plenty'.296 Britain's empire and 
stature in the world were easily worth some of its ample wealth. 
 A proper political system, in the minds of conservatives, was one which 
insulated statesmen from the influence of popular passions and Parliamentary meddling. 
Political institutions and public debate ought to foster the authority of statesmen and 
aid them in basing their foreign policy on their own reasoned judgement, in the best 
interest of the country as a whole. 
 
The roles of morality and self-interest 
Conservatives envisaged no prominent role for ethics in shaping foreign policy. They 
discussed morality primarily in the context of arguments against the positions taken by 
Gladstonian liberals, who in contrast did envisage a central role for ethics in shaping 
foreign policy. Liberals shared 'the general belief that it [Britain] had a clear mission to 
guide the world to higher civilisation'.297 In its most general sense, this meant to liberals 
the spread of constitutional liberty on the British model and a qualified support for the 
independence and self-determination of oppressed nationalities.298 Conservatives 
thought that such ethics ought to feature neither in setting foreign policy nor in making 
sense of international affairs. One particular moral precept did play a role, however. 
Conservatives felt strongly that statesmen had the duty, the moral obligation to their 
fellow countrymen, to act in the best interest of their country. In fact, conservatives 
involved this moral precept in their arguments against liberal calls for an ethically 
informed foreign policy. 
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The duty of statesmen: morality and self-interest in setting foreign policy 
The question of what aims and ends a state ought to have in mind when faced with an 
issue in international politics, conservatives applied not to countries as a whole or even 
to states, but rather to statesmen. These statesmen, after all, had agency. They were to 
make the judgements and decisions which would form the country's foreign policy. 
Ethical standards for a country's foreign policy were in fact, for conservatives, ethical 
standards for the country's statesmen.  
 This was a crucial distinction since, as a consequence, conservatives could locate 
moral significance in the relationship between statesmen and the country, and argue that 
morality demanded a foreign policy based on the interests of the country. Liberals, in 
contrast, focused on the relationship between the country and the European 
community or humanity at large. Liberals and radicals had a 'strongly anthropomorphic 
view of the state as a moral agent'.299 Concern over the nation's 'moral well-being' was 
to inform policy-making and the community of nations was bound by the same morality 
which bound individuals in the domestic sphere.300 Gladstone in particular assumed the 
existence of a universal morality.301 Britain had to do right by its peers and if possible 
elevate the moral tone of the neighbourhood. Good statesmen would act in line with 
this universally valid normative vision, that is to say would act to spread constitutional 
liberty.302  
 Conservatives, for whom the country was not a single national community and 
thus not as easily individualised, wholeheartedly rejected the normative sense of the 
domestic analogy. 'What we do object to’, Hamley asserted in 1863, ‘is the silly doctrine 
… the off-spring of maudlin or hypocritical virtue, that the relations of nations should 
be governed by the same sentiment and morality as the relations of individuals. Such is 
not the case, never was, and never will be’.303 Craik and Smith argued more extensively, 
in 1877, that 'there is a very imperfect analogy between national and individual 
morality'.304 Indeed, whereas morality commended self-sacrifice in individuals, it 
positively condemned self-sacrifice in a state's foreign policy. Self-sacrifice was allowed, 
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'so long as we are yielding what is ours, and ours only, to yield'.305 An individual could 
sacrifice his or her own interests, but a state could not do so. Foreign policy was 
determined by statesmen, 'however popular may be the constitution of a particular 
State', and were they to sacrifice the interests of their fellow citizens, 'they would, it is 
not too much to say, be guilty of a criminal breach of trust'.306 In the understanding of 
conservative commentators, there was no unitary national community which could 
decide on a course of action; the nation was merely an aggregate of individuals and 
classes, not an entity of its own, and the statesmen had been given the interests of their 
countrymen in trust.307 
  Conservative commentators’ stress on the duty of statesmen towards their 
fellow citizens allowed them to argue that any desire on the part of statesmen to act on 
their personal ethical ideals for the European realm was a violation of the moral 
standard by which a statesman's actions were to be judged. Statesmen, argued 
conservatives, had the duty to pursue the particular ‘honour and interests' of their 
country.308  
 As a consequence, conservatives were consistently critical of what they saw as 
the tendency of liberal statesmen to abandon their duty in favour of the pursuit of their 
own ethical ideals. As Oliphant admonished the liberals during the crisis which led to 
the unification of Italy, 'the only duty of a British statesman is to watch over the 
interests of his country. The freedom which should be dearest to him should be British 
freedom. The only liberties for which he should feel active sympathy should be the 
liberties of his compatriots'.309 Cecil, arguing almost two decades later against 
Gladstone’s Christian humanitarianism as a basis for foreign policy, asserted ‘that the 
first business of the English Government is, as honest trustees, to consider English 
interests, and that if they swerve out of their personal feelings or wishes one iota from 
the straight line, they are guilty of breaking a trust which is reposed in them’.310  
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Perceiving international politics through a moral lens 
Conservatives were critical about what they saw as the tendency of liberals to warp the 
complex realities of international diplomacy into an abstract, morally informed 
interpretative framework – one which, they argued, did not work at all in explaining the 
de facto course of international politics, and the alignments of great powers and their 
interests by which it was produced.  
 Morality, conservatives asserted, had not gained any novel purchase on 
international politics. Passion and other destructive emotions were rather the persisting 
influences on a state's foreign policy, steering it away from the course prescribed by 
reason. Lever observed that 'men's passions of jealousy, malice, vanity, and rivalry are 
not less dominant in the age we live in than two thousand years ago', while Cecil argued 
that the Franco-Prussian war had shown that 'the highest education, the most advanced 
civilisation, do not stifle the original passions of the noble savage'.311 The precepts of 
ethics had no influence on the course of international politics. 
 There was, conservatives thought, no absolute right and wrong in international 
politics. Since there existed no universal ethics by which claims and aspirations could be 
considered, disputes over interests were for conservatives a matter for settlement rather 
than for judgement.312 Patterson stated that 'every Government has objects and interests 
peculiar to itself, and as long as it pursues these objects in a legitimate fashion there can 
be no ground for censure'.313 Statesmen could not be faulted for acting in the best 
interest of their country, even if other countries’ interests consequently suffered.314 
Neither should one side slyly introduce an overarching morality, Oliphant admonished, 
by second-guessing another country's statesmen: 'they are likely to be better judges than 
we are of what is best for their own interest'.315 Even in the case of war, he argued, there 
was no call for third parties to apply strict moral categories, placing one side in the right 
or wrong. Rather, Britain was just to stay neutral if the war involved none of her 
interests, 'while, in the event of a war in which neutrality is impossible, a skilful 
diplomacy should always place us on the strongest side'.316  
 Conservatives even assigned merely a minor role to morality when what was at 
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stake in a dispute were not interests, as usual, but rather the very independence of a 
state. In this context conservatives did speak of 'international rights' of states.317 These 
rights were not, however, based in any moral standard, for instance regarding the self-
government of peoples.318 This right of states meant that the practice of their rule was 
established and was recognised as such by the other states. States were not bound 
strongly by an objective morality, but merely weakly by their own previous promises 
and commitments.319 While conservatives might have considered the initial attack on the 
independence of a polity as a wrong, they also exhibited a strong sense that once any 
conquest was in fact accomplished, there was not much of a case left. Success and 
failure were more relevant than right and wrong. Lever noted, regarding the ‘offence’ of 
the Italian annexation of the Papal States, that 'all Ministries like the fait accompli, 
whatever it be'.320   
 Conservatives consequently asserted that international diplomacy should start 
from the established facts on the ground. Any other approach was too likely to find the 
statesman working at an oblique angle to reality, ignoring the forces actually shaping 
events in favour of focusing on the imagined, ideal state of affairs.321 Conservatives thus 
had no sense of a grand ethical framework underlying international affairs. Liberals did 
generally perceive international affairs through a moral lens. They placed both the 
Crimean War and the unification of Italy in the broader context of the struggle between 
liberalism and autocracy in Europe, often closely connected the American civil war to 
the issue of slavery, saw the Franco-Prussian war as a conflict between different morally 
charged values, and in 1876-78 apprehended the Eastern Question through a Christian 
humanitarianism.322 For conservatives these episodes were instead about the particular 
great power politics involved - and if they perceived any grand narrative during the 
1850s and 1860s, then it was not one of a struggle between liberty and autocracy, but 
one of the France of Napoleon III overturning the existing European order. 
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 Unlike liberals, conservative commentators did not cast the Crimean War as part 
of a struggle between progressive liberal trends and autocratic reaction.323 Liberals’ and 
conservatives’ different lenses led to different views on the utility of the Concert of 
Europe in arriving at peace terms. Using the Concert primarily meant involving Austria. 
As a consequence, for Whigs and Peelites the Concert was fundamentally flawed, 'too 
much the tool of autocratic Europe'.324 Through the liberals’ moral lens, Austria was like 
Russia an autocratic power, and in that sense as much of an enemy.325 Through the 
conservatives’ lens of great power politics, the war was about a Russian threat to the 
balance of power, in which case Austria was a likely ally. Conservatives consequently 
still considered the Concert as a worthwhile foreign policy tool. 
 When considering Italian affairs in 1859-61, conservatives rejected the liberal 
perspective of a moral framework suffusing international affairs. Liberals generally 
assumed that the position which European powers took regarding Italian affairs was 
determined by their involvement in the grand struggle between liberty and autocracy.326 
Conservative commentators instead assumed that states would consider their interests 
and the great power politics of Europe in determining their stance. Conservatives 
concluded that Russia would welcome the developments in Italy, as they weakened 
Austria and would make her more likely to agree to the spoliation of the Ottoman 
Empire, while Prussia would oppose them, as they weakened the position of the 
Germanic states vis-a-vis France. Liberals, in contrast, assumed that both Russia and 
Prussia, together with Austria and the Pope, might form 'a formidable conspiracy' 
against the Italian cause, since it involved the progress of liberty and the retreat of 
autocratic rule.327 
 This difference of perspective was expressed most vehemently regarding the 
role of France. Liberals debated amongst themselves whether Napoleon III had 
involved himself in Italian events with aggrandising or with idealistic aims – in order to 
expand French influence and territory, or in order to bring glory to France by furthering 
the cause of Italian liberty.328 Liberal statesmen and commentators may have been 'not 
too confident of Napoleon's integrity', but unlike conservatives they considered 
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France’s positive influence a possibility in the first place.329 Among liberals, the notion 
that a restraining alliance between Britain and France would wean the latter off its 
aggressive attitude and be a force for progress in Europe was popular.330 Conservatives, 
in contrast, were adamant that the changing great power politics of Europe necessitated 
the formation of a general coalition against France, to prevent the European order 
unravelling and the instigation of another general war. Conservatives were annoyed and 
exasperated that liberals considered the aims and results of French policy even a matter 
for reflection and uncertainty.331  
 Conservative commentators thought that liberals let themselves be deceived by 
their ideological commitments and by Napoleon III's appeals to their values. The 
Liberal government's policy, they thought, compounded one delusion with another: first 
came the idea that Britain ought to prioritise a vague set of ethical ideals, including the 
sentiment of nationality; this then combined with the notion that Cavour and Napoleon 
III could possibly be acting in order to further those ideals, rather than for their own 
gain – an outlandish notion, conservatives thought, but one which liberals wanted to 
believe, since they valued their ideals so much.332 Conservatives latched on to the 
cession and annexation of Savoy and Nice as a particularly crass example of French 
concern with territorial gain, with no thought given to popular will.333 Liberals indeed 
quickly lost any trust they might have placed in Napoleon III as a force for progress. 
Still, their value commitments kept them far from reacting to events as conservatives 
wished. Russell, for instance, valued Italian independence more than he feared 
Napoleon III's intentions, arguing that 'if we can save Italy from dependence … it shall 
not break my heart if we do a favour to Napoleon at the same time'.334  
 During the American Civil War, conservative commentators tried to win their 
audience over in favour of British recognition of the South. In order to do so, they 
argued against perceiving the issue through legal or moral principles. Rather than start 
from an abstract right or wrong, conservatives intimated, the discussion ought to be 
based on the de facto state of affairs. By rejecting the relevance of legal and moral issues, 
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conservatives tried to sidestep the arguments surrounding the legality of secession under 
the constitution of the Union — events had clearly overtaken them.335 More 
importantly, they hoped to weaken the adverse influence of the institution of slavery on 
British sympathy for the South. They asserted that the basis of the conflict lay in the 
conflicting economic interests of North and South. The issue of slavery had merely 
been co-opted into this more fundamental divide.336 The South's case for independence, 
conservatives argued, should consequently be judged on the basis of the Union’s 
skewed political system and the consequent set of specific, legitimate Southern 
grievances – such as the tariff on foreign manufactures – rather than on the issue of 
slavery and its abolition — a general ethical principle only tangentially related to the 
matter at hand.337  
 Moreover, by privileging the de facto state of affairs, conservatives hoped to 
compel British recognition of what they saw as the fait accompli of Southern 
independence. Regardless of whether the South had the right to secede, conservatives 
were confident that when the South did manage to establish its independence from the 
North, other states would recognise it: 'if the Confederate States are successful in 
establishing their independence … [they] will be admitted into the family of nations'.338 
Conservatives presented a conflict between moral or legal theory and state practice, 
between de jure arguments and the de facto situation, as a reason to discard the theory, 
rather than to adjust the practice.  
 Anticipating a reluctance on the part of liberal statesmen to recognise the South 
because of its institution of slavery, conservatives asserted that actual independence 
should be the only criterion for recognition. Here the conservatives appealed to liberals’ 
previous exhortations for British recognition of the independence of secessionist 
governments or even plain insurrections, from South America, Belgium, and Greece to 
Naples, long before these had established a government over their territories as 
comprehensive as that of the South.339 
 So, what made for de facto independence? Independence, conservatives thought, 
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consisted of establishing an effective government over a certain territory and having the 
ability to prevent the conquest of this territory by other states.340 By late 1862, after the 
South had repulsed several Northern invasions of Virginia, conservative commentators 
became impatient with the Liberal government (and with Derby down-playing the issue 
in Parliament) and argued that recognition was overdue.341 Patterson was representative 
of conservative opinion, arguing that the South had repeatedly 'rolled back the tide of 
invasion', and should, despite the continuing warfare, be recognised as an independent 
state.342  
 During the Eastern Question crisis of 1876-78, conservatives again argued that 
the affair ought not to be perceived through the liberals' moral lens, in this case of 
Christian humanitarianism. Rather, conservatives thought, a framework of great power 
politics and Russian aggressive expansionism worked to explain the course and 
character of events.343 Conservative commentators argued that Russia's policy was only 
ostensibly based on a humanitarian aim to save Christian Slavs from the oppression of 
Muslim Turks. This they considered merely a veneer – 'it seems hardly conceivable that 
this pretension should by some men ... be accepted as representing a fact' – in reality the 
Russian cabinet was purely concerned with Russia’s territorial aggrandisement.344 Three 
facts, conservatives argued, made this evident: the history of the Russian empire, one of 
steady territorial expansion;345 the efforts of the Russians to incite disturbances in the 
European provinces, eliciting Turkish mistreatment in the first place;346 and Russia's 
invasion of the Caucasus, an area wholly unrelated to its stated humanitarian 
concerns.347 At the same time, conservatives thought, the other great powers would not 
particularly care about Russian behaviour towards Turkey unless Russia seemed poised 
to make large gains, thereby threatening their established interests – only their interests, 
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not certain moral notions, would lead the great powers to act to contain Russia.348  
 Conservatives thought that liberals’ ethical commitments led them into a 
myopic view of international affairs. Liberals certainly also worried about aggressive 
states, not least Napoleon III’s France, but for them aggression was one concern 
possibly counterbalanced by the progress which a particular conflict might make 
possible. France’s victory over Austria made the unification of Italy possible, the 
North’s victory over the South abolition, Prussia’s victory over France the unification of 
Germany, and Russia’s invasion of the Ottoman Empire might be a boon to its 
Christian subject populations. Conservative commentators complained that this 
concern over progress of various sorts distracted liberals from the real concerns of 
international politics, British interests and the possibility of any conflict escalating into 
widespread war across Europe. 
 Finally, the limited role for morality in conservative commentary on 
international affairs is illustrated particularly well by the contrast between liberal and 
conservative judgements on the peace terms of the Franco-Prussian war. Both liberal 
and conservative commentators overwhelmingly argued against the German annexation 
of Alsace and Lorraine, but where liberals invoked the putative immorality of such an 
annexation, conservative commentators argued for its irrationality.  
 In the British commentary on the Franco-Prussian war, the peace terms which 
Prussia demanded from France were a major topic of debate. Most conservative 
commentators, like their liberal counterparts, focused on the Prussian demand for 
Alsace and Lorraine. Conservatives thought the annexations significant primarily 
because it promised future war and disorder in Europe.349 With this in mind, they 
asserted that Prussia's demand for territory was ill-advised and short-sighted, while 
stopping short of declaring Prussia's demand for territory immoral or illegitimate. In 
this they contrasted sharply with liberals, who thought the significance of any transfer 
of territory lay primarily in whether it corresponded to the imperatives of ethics. 
Gladstone stated that annexation was only 'justified ... [if] the population be willing 
parties to the severance'.350 Since the people of Alsace and Lorraine had no wish to join 
Germany, the demands of Prussia, Gladstone thought, were 'repulsive to the sense of 
modern civilisation'.351 Gladstone assumed that the terms of peace were subject to the 
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same ethical considerations as all of international politics. Indeed, it was Britain's role to 
consider, based on its insight into this universal ethics, whether it could 'accept the 
present reported position either of the one party or the other'.352 Conservatives rejected 
this moralising liberal perspective. No party external to the conflict was to involve itself 
and declare right or wrong; 'are we, the neutrals, the men who did nothing but sell 
powder and ball to the combatants', Lever asked rhetorically, 'are we to step in now and 
dictate the terms the conqueror should exact?'353  
 Conservatives recognised that victory in war, especially a defensive war, implied 
a right to territorial gain; there were 'precedents ... for treating cessions of territory as 
the natural prize of a successful campaign'.354 Unlike liberals, they did not think that 
there was a moral argument to be made against annexation. They instead presented the 
German demand as a practical mistake. Annexation was not a military necessity and 
consequently harmed the stature of Prussia, since it indicated a lack of moderation 
among its statesmen. Moreover, these people, given their French national sentiment, 
would be disloyal subjects. Finally, the French themselves would desire revenge for their 
loss of territory and soon instigate another war.355 Annexation would on balance weaken 
the German state, rather than strengthen it, and commit it to the horrors of war in the 
future – it was, conservatives asserted, not the rational path to take. 
 
The rights and wrongs of intervention in international politics 
Together with many other mid-Victorian commentators on international affairs, 
conservatives discussed the ethics of intervention, of involving oneself in the dispute of 
others. The category of intervention already implied a situation somewhat different 
from the usual. A great power could involve itself in any issue which significantly 
touched upon its interests. Intervention was then when a great power involved itself, 
through coercion and the possible use of force, in an existing dispute which did not 
directly impinge on its interests. When did a state have a right to do so, when even the 
duty, and when was it prohibited from doing so? These were major, contested issues in 
mid-Victorian debates on international relations.  
 Conservatives approached these questions by first of all taking a step back and 
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reaffirming the centrality of interests to any decisions on foreign policy. 'The question 
of intervention or non-intervention', Patterson remarked concerning the Polish 
question, 'despite all the prate we have had of late years about the “principle of non-
intervention” … is simply one of self-interest. If a State have an interest in intervening, 
and thinks itself sufficiently powerful to intervene with success, it will intervene. If it 
have no adequate interest in the matter, or if it lack the power to intervene with success, 
it will not intervene'.356 A “principle” would not stop states from interfering when they 
wanted to, while sympathy and sentiment would, or at least should, not lead a state to 
intervene without it having both interests involved and the applicable force to succeed.  
 Conservatives argued that there was no prescriptive role for ethics or morality 
regarding intervention. Britain, Patterson argued, was 'not bound to intervene in the 
Polish question otherwise than by diplomacy. … there is no international obligation 
upon us to do more'.357 The proscription of intervention was a more ambiguous matter. 
While conservatives did not affirm a clear proscription, they did recognise situations 
where states had no adequate reason to interfere, no reason to coerce other parties into 
a particular mutual arrangement. In the context of the Franco-Prussian war, Lever 
argued that neutral states had no business 'dictating the terms the conqueror should 
exact' after a war.358 In the debates surrounding the unification of Italy, Oliphant 
asserted that ‘the only occasions upon which we should interfere in European quarrels 
are when our own interests are either directly or indirectly affected'.359 Indeed, it was 
exactly because British interests were involved to a major extent in the Eastern 
Question that Britain could reasonably intervene forcefully to secure its influence.360 
Neither was there a sense that one could interfere in aid of a suffering nationality. Even 
if the German population of Denmark was being oppressed, Cecil argued in 1864, 'the 
title of Germany to interfere is not very obvious'.361   
 Conservatives were thus generally against intervention. They had two reasons 
for their disapproval. Firstly, they thought intervention would lead to an unsustainable 
settlement, with the issue soon causing disorder and instability in international affairs 
yet again. The force of the intervening state was needed to tip the scales, but this state 
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lacked an enduring interest in the issue at hand (which was what characterised the 
episode as one of intervention rather than international politics as usual). This lack of an 
enduring interest meant that the force would not remain present to sustain the 
settlement; the accord would soon unravel.362 This conservative perspective was even 
confirmed by the one case in which they did argue for clear intervention, in the 
American civil war. Conservatives here made sure to argue, as examined directly below, 
why the usual constraint on worthwhile intervention did not apply. Secondly, 
conservatives rejected liberal claims, as made in the debates on Italian unification and 
the Eastern Question crisis, that intervention would bolster the cause of progress. 
Conservatives here argued that the interventions contemplated or condoned would do 
little to achieve their imagined ends, while doing significant harm to the fabric of order 
and stability in Europe. 
 One of the main topics of debate among conservative commentators during the 
American civil war was whether, or rather when, Britain ought to recognise the South as 
an independent state. Recognition of the South’s independence meant more, to 
conservatives, than merely a formal statement of moral support — they assumed that 
recognition implied forceful intervention. Derby for instance argued in late 1862 and 
early 1863, as enthusiasm in the cabinet for British involvement was at its height, that 
recognition ‘means nothing unless the Powers who join in it are ready to support by 
force of arms the claims of the State which they recognise’.363 
 A decision on recognition would consequently follow from a decision on the 
worth of forceful British intervention. Conservative opinion on the most apt course of 
action for Britain changed from an affirmation of neutrality at first, to advocacy of 
intervention in favour of the South by late 1862, and subsided only by 1865 into 
resignation at the South's defeat.364 The barrier to war with the North was eroded 
among conservatives by perceived harm to British interests – in the North's blockade of 
Southern cotton exports – and to Britain’s stature among nations – in the North’s 
insolent behaviour in its various disputes with Britain. Furthermore, conservatives came 
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to regard the war itself as something of a travesty. The purpose of war was to make a 
settlement possible.365 The US civil war, conservatives argued, no longer served this 
purpose, which made intervention reasonable. 
 The conservatives' argument here had two strands. Firstly, after the South had 
repulsed several Northern invasions of Virginia, the war had fulfilled its function in 
amply proving the ability and the willingness of the South to govern itself and to secure 
its independence. As per the raison d'etre of war, the North should have realised this and 
granted the South its independence. The war was still dragging on, conservatives 
implied, only because the North was delusional, blinded by its passion for revenge and 
for the prestige of unity into thinking it could preserve the Union.366 External 
intervention would then consist of making the North see sense, in affirming to it an 
already existing reality, and would not be the external imposition of a settlement without 
a basis in the relative power of the parties involved – the situation to be avoided.  
 Secondly, conservatives had a strong sense that war ought to be limited. War 
was an affair between governments, and their purpose-built institutions, armies. As the 
civil war dragged on, the “total war” waged by the North strongly offended the 
sensibilities of conservatives, indeed of British observers in general.367 Conservative 
commentators were very vocal on this point, speaking for instance of ‘savagery’, ‘a war 
of extermination’, and the North’s aim ‘to burn, destroy, and devastate’.368 External 
intervention was, conservatives argued, not only in the British interest, nor only an act 
to hasten the inevitable, but it 'would render an important service to civilisation, 
humanity, and mankind at large', in putting a halt to the North's vile way of warfare, and 
seeing that it be not rewarded for such behaviour.369  
 In combining their observations of the South’s de facto independence and the 
horrors of the North’s delusional “total war”, conservatives could argue for this 
particular intervention to cut the war short, while still affirming their general 
conceptualisation of war as a means to arrive at a durable settlement and their 
consequent rejection of intervention as undermining this purpose. 
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 If conservatives thought that any kind of intervention usually had little to 
recommend itself, they were particularly disapproving of intervention for moral reasons. 
Such interventions created conflict and disorder where none needed exist. 
Conservatives argued this point most forcefully during the crisis which led to the 
unification of Italy, and it would recur in the debates on the Eastern Question crisis of 
1876-78. In the latter, conservatives argued that any intervention in the Ottoman 
Empire’s European provinces would result in all the suffering attendant to war, without 
it delivering the positive ends imagined; 'experience has shown that interference from 
without aggravates the disorder, and is seldom able to apply a remedy' and 'we doubt … 
whether armed intervention, be it executed with the purest intentions and the most 
irresistible force, be a fitting remedy for evils such as exist in Turkey'.370 
 Conservatives rejected the interventions involved in the unification of Italy, for 
two different reasons. Firstly, compared to liberals, conservatives perceived less of a 
gain from allowing Italian events and interventions, which went against the Vienna 
settlement, to come to fruition. Secondly, and most importantly, conservatives had a far 
stronger sense than liberals that these interventions, and their being condoned and 
approved, would have a major deleterious effect on the order and stability of Europe.  
 Liberals desired the removal of Austria and its influence from Italy in order to 
make the spread of constitutional liberty possible. They preferred for Austria to be shut 
out of Italy through the revision of the existing treaties which allowed for the Austrian 
presence, rather than their abrogation – but this was a mere preference. If respect for 
the treaty system became an obstacle to the realisation of their ideals, then liberals such 
as Gladstone and Palmerston were willing to allow the treaties’ abrogation through 
war.371 This willingness on the part of liberals to justify infringements on the treaty 
system only increased as the affair progressed. Liberal statesmen worked actively to 
avoid a European Congress which might decide to restore reactionary rule to central 
Italy.372 They valued giving Piedmont a free hand in Italy – given the likelihood of 
Piedmont extending its constitutional government – over upholding the existing 
diplomatic order. 
 Compared to liberals, conservatives perceived less of a gain from condoning 
interventions against established treaty rights. Liberals valued and increasingly 
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conceptually intertwined the ends of administrative and legal reform, liberty, national 
independence, and national unification.373 Conservatives, in contrast, rejected the value 
of national unity.374 They thought that national independence would not ensure better 
government.375 And they argued that neither liberty nor better administration and the 
rule of law had been realised for the peoples of Southern Italy.376 
 More important than their scepticism regarding any positive effects of 
intervention was that conservatives, with their focus on great power politics and state 
aggression, had a far stronger sense than liberals that Italian events had a major 
deleterious effect on the stability and order of Europe. Compared to liberals, 
conservatives had a different understanding of what external intervention consisted of 
in the context of Italy. In determining which acts counted as the intervention of one 
state in the internal affairs of another, conservatives based themselves on the de facto 
polities of Italy, rather than the imagined Italian nationality and its associated territory.377 
As a consequence, where liberals considered the interactions between the different 
Italian actors part of the internal development of the Italian nation, and argued that 
these domestic processes should be guarded from interference by external, foreign 
actors such as France or Austria, conservatives considered the Italian polities as 
sovereign actors in their own right, with no special dispensation on interference 
between them merely because they shared a language or geographical location, in the 
Italian peninsula.378 
 Consequently, where liberals could posit themselves as the defenders of the 
liberty and free will of peoples against the desires for external intervention held by the 
autocratic states of Europe, conservatives understood this liberal position as one of the 
enthusiastic affirmation of ‘the right of one independent State to interfere and foment 
insurrection in the dominion of another’, when that intervention was predicated on a 
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claim to be acting for the correct ideals – a people oppressed, a nationality without a 
state, or one with a state not of the proper extent.379 They worried about the 
implications which the use of these justifications would have for the future of 
international politics. Once idealistic excuses for aggrandising interventions were 
accepted, these excuses, in the guise of oppressed peoples and nationalities unable to 
flourish, would everywhere be found. Who, after all, was to be the effective judge of 
whether there was an idealistic cause to act upon? 'Who is to decide', Patterson asked, 
'what “civilization” is, or when and how it ought to be made to prevail?'380  
 Whereas liberals assumed that European public opinion – in the abstracted and 
truncated sense of those commentators who assented to the liberal set of overarching 
ethics – would judge whether a case for intervention was to be made, conservatives 
were too sceptical of the efficacy of both words alone and non-state actors in general to 
consider European public opinion as a significant influence on a state's policy. No, 
conservatives argued, it was far too easy for less naive, more aggressively ambitious 
actors in international affairs than the British liberals to adopt these same principles as a 
scheme of justification, twist the meaning of these to suit their interests, and set off on a 
course of conquest.381 This was the role in which Patterson cast the principle of 
nationality in his discussion of Napoleon III's foreign policy. The principle of 
nationality was merely an excuse, a convenient framework of justification, which 
Napoleon III could use in order to dismantle the Vienna settlement and with it the 
existing order of Europe.382 The affirmation of external intervention under the banner 
of the principles of nationality and the sovereignty of peoples merely provided a facile 
excuse for the aggression of any states with a penchant for aggrandisement. An increase 
in conflict and the spread of disorder and instability would consequently be the result.383  
 The divide between liberals and conservatives consequently extended beyond 
their notion of wherein consisted external intervention, to the reasons they had for 
considering such intervention problematic in the first place. Liberals considered external 
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intervention undesirable because of its domestic effects in the recipient country; 
because it stopped the people from exercising their will, from deciding on the character 
of their government. For Mill, for instance, external intervention was wrong because it 
prejudiced the self-determination of peoples. One instance of this effect would be a 
people who, as a nation, were restrained by a backwards empire from establishing a 
nation-state. In this way, liberals considered external intervention as a tool especially of 
the reactionary, absolutist powers, used to retard the progress towards constitutional 
polities and the realisation of the principle of nationality which would occur if a people 
were left to decide on their future independent of foreign interference. Consequently, 
once external intervention was established, there was only a prudential, and no longer a 
moral, barrier to intervention by other states aimed at redressing this state of 
intervention – such as intervention in Italy in order to shut Austria out from its 
affairs.384  
 This contrasts with the position taken by conservatives. For conservatives, 
external intervention was a wrong not so much because of its effect on the country 
intervened in, but because of its effect on the international sphere. The Italian 
intervention broke down the settlement arrived at in Vienna, diminished respect for 
treaties, and most of all provided novel justifications for forceful meddling in the affairs 
of other states. In general, intervention where no interests were at stake would lead to 
an unsustainable settlement between the main countries involved and merely set the 
stage for future conflict. Intervention for moral reasons in particular conservatives 
considered even worse. The intervention itself would likely be of little positive value, 
while it would delegitimise the established order of Europe and provide facile 
justifications for the aggressive policies of ambitious statesmen. Cecil explicitly asserted 
that any “moral” intervention aimed at a change in government, regardless of whether 
the change desired was progressive or reactionary, had ill effects on the European order, 
by making domestic issues such as regime type a topic of international politics and 
thereby setting a precedent for future disorder.385  
 
Conclusion 
Conservatives thought that states could take a moderate or aggressive attitude in their 
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international relations. A state with a moderate attitude would seek to avoid war when 
possible and work to foster stability and order. An aggressive attitude, in contrast, 
meant that war was seen as a desirable means to gain glory and aggrandisement. 
Conservative commentators connected the moderate attitude with a foreign policy 
based in reason and aimed at safeguarding a state’s interests and honour, while they 
associated aggression with various passions: for military glory, for territory, and for 
revenge, all possibly fostered further by a sentiment of nationality. Conservatives 
moreover thought of reason as the realm of statesmen, with the passions connected to 
the people; consequently, they emphasised the importance of a public properly 
deferential to the judgement of its statesmen and warned of the dangers of politicians 
pandering to the passions and desires of the people. The duty of statesmen was to act in 
the interests of the country. Both pandering and following one’s own ethical vision, 
conservatives asserted, amounted to a betrayal of this duty. They further argued that 
perceiving international affairs through a moral lens — apprehending events by whether 
they furthered one’s ideals — led to a warped understanding of the causal influences at 
play — of the intentions and acts of other states — and to a mistaken set of priorities, 
placing the interests and position of Britain in peril. Conservatives particularly 
disapproved of intervention to further some ideal. This would merely foment conflict, 
they asserted, while generally not realising the ends sought — even if conservative 
commentators recognised these ideals as valid aspirations in the first place. Most of all, 
asserting the legitimacy of intervention for certain moral ends gave a carte blanche to 
states pursuing a policy of martial glory and territorial aggrandisement, if only they paid 
lip service to liberal ideals. That, conservatives concluded, was no way to keep 






III. The dynamics of international politics 
This chapter analyses conservative thought on the interactions between states. It first 
argues that for conservatives the primacy of interests and force fundamentally shaped 
the dynamics of international relations. The chapter then shows how other important 
facets of their thought followed from this foundation, and ends with an analysis of two 
major conservative criticisms of British liberal statesmanship, which were based in this 
understanding of the workings of international relations. In a sense, this chapter 
analyses conservatives' micro-view of international relations, what conservatives 
thought about individual issues in international politics and how they were resolved, as 
contrasted to the next chapter's macro-view, of the European order in general, and how 
it was threatened and sustained. 
 
The primacy of interests 
Conservatives assumed that interests were the central concern of international politics. 
Each country had interests of its own, and conservatives considered it to be perfectly 
natural that different states pursued their own interests and that these clashed: 'a great 
nation has, or ought to have, its matured national policy – and any other nation may 
object to that policy, and may condemn it as dangerous to its own interests'.386 When 
countries’ interests were in conflict statesmen would need to interact and somehow 
resolve the dispute, through diplomacy or the use of force. Statesmen consequently 
occupied themselves not with realising ethical ideals or with measures of relative power, 
but interacted with each other on the basis of their differing or converging interests.387  
 This lack of a role for ideology or morality led conservatives to view particular 
affairs differently from their liberal interlocutors. They concluded that Russia, contrary 
to those liberal analyses based on regime type, would welcome the developments of 
1859-60 in Italy, as these weakened Austria and would make her more likely to agree to 
the spoliation of the Ottoman Empire.388 Regarding the Eastern Question itself, 
conservatives assumed that it, in its various manifestations over these decades, always 
revolved around the differing interests of the great powers involved. During the 1876-
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78 crisis, conservative commentators emphasised that the great powers' cabinets cared 
only about territory and the 'trusteeship of the Bosphorus’.389 No states were moved by 
a concern over the internal policy of the Ottoman Empire towards its subject peoples.390 
In the Black Sea affair of November 1870 British interests, as well as British honour, 
demanded a forceful response to Russia’s abrogation of the neutrality of the Black 
Sea.391 Finally, the Crimean War revolved not around liberty and autocracy, but was 
fuelled by Russian aggrandisement and Britain and France’s concern over their position 
in Europe. A Russian hegemony over Eastern Europe, which would be the result of its 
acquisition of the Ottoman territories, would seriously constrain the influence of Britain 
and France in Europe.392  
 While interests were the focus of international affairs, these could be defined 
broadly. In general terms, foreign policies identified by conservatives as in pursuit of a 
country’s interests could pertain to the country's security, prosperity, or great power 
status.393 As well as dealing with any existing disputes over particular interests, statesmen 
needed to tend to their country’s position in the field of great power politics.394 A state 
had a good position, conservatives thought, if other states felt obliged to attend to its 
wishes and take its intentions into account. As part and parcel of this concern with great 
power politics, statesmen would aim to sustain a general balance of power in Europe to 
prevent any one state gaining a position of hegemony.395 This concern with the relative 
positions of great powers in the international sphere led conservatives to regard most 
European affairs as relevant to Britain. If other great powers were involved, then 
chances were that certain outcomes of the issue would affect Britain's position in 
Europe. Since most of international politics involved great powers, and not many 
directly involved Britain's particular interests, the de facto concerns of international 
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politics, for conservatives, were sometimes particular interests, but more often great 
power politics and the spectre of general war and disorder.396 
 The Danish Duchies affair was an example of how concern over particular 
interests could shade into concern over great power politics. Cecil, for instance, hoped 
to compel Britain's involvement in the affair by arguing that Britain's future ability to 
secure its commercial interests would be impaired if it allowed Kiel to fall into the 
hands of Prussia or Russia.397 In the same context, Oliphant argued that the creation of 
a Scandinavian empire would be 'in the interest of England', since it would function as 
'a counterpoise to Russia', ensuring that the latter could not close the shipping lanes of 
the Baltic to trade.398 Near the end of the Crimean War, similar considerations of great 
power politics had tempted conservative commentators to argue for a continuation of 
the conflict. They noted, among other points, that a military campaign in the Baltic 
would enable Britain to destroy Russia's Baltic fleet, thereby obviating the dangerous 
possibility of a future naval alliance between Russia and France, and making Britain for 
the foreseeable future utterly secure in its control of the seas.399 A campaign in the 
Caucasus, meanwhile, would help to check Russia's incremental expansion into Asia – 
which constituted a threat to British India.400 Conservative commentators were allured 
by the advantages they thought Britain could gain in its position among the great 
powers.401 
 The conservatives' understanding of the rightful concerns of international 
politics contrasted with that of the liberals. For Gladstone and liberals like him, a 
country’s focus on self-interest, honour, and relative position were the hallmarks of 
continental policy and un-English.402 Moreover, conflict between countries was the 
result of a misguided selfishness, a lack of insight into the overarching ethics informing 
the European sphere. Conservatives, in contrast, thought that Britain participated in 
international politics on the same terms as the other great powers, part of exactly the 
same dynamic of international relations and with exactly the same concerns over its 
interests and its position among the great powers.  
                                                          
396 See e.g. Oliphant's article 'The European Situation' (1865). See also Swayne (1867: 196); Wilson (1870: 
380). Conservatives' worry about the possibility of widespread war and disorder is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
397 Cecil (1864a: 284). 
398 Oliphant (1864a: 389); see also (1864b: 506). 
399 Elwin (1854: 295-6); C. Hamley (1855c: 428); Patterson (1856a: 617); (1856b: 734). 
400 Elwin (1854: 295-6); E.B. (Hamley (1856a: 240-1); Patterson (1856a: 617); Oliphant (1856: 485). 
401 Dasent (1870: 294-6, 312); Gleig (1870a: 648-9, 651); Hamley (1864b: 506); (1870c: 782-3, 790); 
(1871c: 496); Lever (1870b: 600-2); Oliphant (1864a: 389, 369); (1865: 118); Patterson (1864a: 110); 
(1864b: 644-6); (1864c: 253); Swayne (1867: 196-7); Wilson (1871a: 81-2); (1871b: 364). 
87 
 Conservatives argued that Britain’s influence followed not from its moral 
authority, but from its position in the field of great power politics. Remonstrations 
regarding morality and ethics, conservatives thought, were only 'too apt to be set aside 
by the human passions and immediate interests concerned'.403 Statesmen in particular, 
Hamley noted, 'openly disavow a higher law than that of expediency … appeal to high 
feeling is in vain'.404 Sentiment about the Poles, Patterson for instance remarked 
regarding the Polish Question, would not determine the outcome of the affair. An 
independent Poland as a possible counterweight to Russia, a natural ally to France, and 
a likely rival to Prussia – these were the strategic concerns which would guide the 
decisions of statesmen.405 Hamley was an especially fierce critic of the position taken by 
liberals. He noted that Gladstone's characterisation of the European sphere 'sees them 
[the countries of Europe] as bound together by ties of affection, of common interest, of 
similar habits and breeding, of like associations'.406 According to Hamley, 'this is the 
very opposite of fact'; all states had differing interests which led to disputes, some of 
which turned violent.407 International politics was adversarial rather than associational, 
and Britain could not keep aloof from Continental political manoeuvring. 
 Conservatives additionally argued that countries which did act to effect peace in 
Europe or in otherwise ostensibly ethical ways did not do so from any ethical 
imperative, but because such a policy was in their interest. Patterson, commenting on 
the diplomatic manoeuvring by great powers over Poland, argued that 'by proposing a 
scheme which ostensibly aims at the pacification of Europe, he [Napoleon III] prepares 
a justification for the warlike policy which he may ultimately adopt'; Lever and Hamley 
argued that Britain's high-handed neutrality in the Franco-Prussian war was 'mock 
philanthropy' barely obscuring its self-interest in staying out of the war; and Cecil, 
discussing the Danish Duchies affair, argued that the 'ostensible ground of her 
[Germany's] interference', namely 'good government for Holstein', was merely an 
excuse for territorial aggrandisement.408 States did occasionally act for laudable ends, but 
only because these happened also to be in their interest. 
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The resolution of conflicts over interests: settlements and compromise 
Conservatives thought that disputes over interests were resolved through settlements. A 
settlement was a mutual understanding between states regarding the extent to which 
their conflicting interests would be honoured. States, Lever explained, would 'discuss 
some question of international difficulty, and arrive at some mode of solution 
sufficiently palatable to be acceded to by all'.409 Through a settlement, a dispute would 
be resolved for the moment, the issue removed from the day to day attentions of 
statesmen. A particular settlement was thus an element of the order of Europe.410  
 Particular issues in international affairs were characterised by a breakdown of 
the existing settlement of relative interests between the states involved. International 
politics was about adjusting the realisation of these interests into a new settlement, 
either through diplomacy or through the use of force. Conservatives thought 
international politics was adversarial, in that these relations revolved around disputes 
over incommensurable interests and their differential realisation in settlements. But they 
did not advocate a zero-sum view of international politics, such as, say, where only mere 
power relations were relevant and one side’s gain was another’s loss, with constant 
fluidity. Conservatives recognised states’ different ability and willingness to secure their 
interests and consequently affirmed the need for compromise and settlement. In these 
established settlements, in the great powers’ mutual recognition of their interests, lay the 
possibility of stability and order in Europe. 
 For statesmen to arrive at a settlement, conservatives thought, they would need 
to be somewhat pragmatic in their aims. The absolutes of ethical ideals and popular 
passions, of 'imagination' and 'intolerance', would merely lead states 'to the pitch of 
internecine conflict'.411 A ‘compromise alone could settle a dispute'.412 Cowell observed 
regarding the Eastern Question in 1878 that Britain 'cannot hope to have [its] own way 
entirely'; it should insist only on those matters 'vitally necessary to secure our interests' 
and otherwise 'be contented to acquiesce in considerable changes'.413 Conservatives 
consequently asserted, with their liberal interlocutors in mind, that a reasonable 
statesman would aim not for a supposedly just resolution, based on an abstract notion 
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of right and wrong, but would pursue only a settlement between the parties, which each 
somewhat compromising its interests.414 
 States could reach a settlement either through diplomacy or through the use of 
force. Both means involved gaining a sense of relative strength and commitment, and 
adjusting to what seemed inevitable. Diplomacy was preferable, but if both sides held 
very different estimations of their strength, it would likely come to war.415 As Patterson 
remarked, 'after a severe war such rough compromises become possible', which before 
no statesman would have considered.416 Diplomacy was consequently not a venue for 
arbitration based on arguments of right and wrong under international or universal 
moral laws. Diplomacy was an opportunity for states to gain knowledge of each other’s 
aims and intentions and to compromise and reach consensus on a dispute.417 It resulted 
in a temporary, but ideally durable settlement of the dispute; not in a permanent 
settlement, as there could be no basis for a permanent judgement.418 Conservatives 
considered diplomacy and war not as different realms, but rather as existing on a 
continuum, obeying the same underlying dynamics.  
 For a settlement to endure, it needed to reflect the interests and concerns of 
every state powerful and assertive enough to influence the outcome of the dispute.419 
Conservatives consequently argued that the great powers’ general interest in any 
European affair and their strength compelled their involvement in most settlements. 
Patterson for instance asserted, regarding the Danish Duchies affair, that 'the Schleswig 
question is a European one which cannot be settled by the present belligerents alone … 
[the exclusion of the other great powers] ought never to have been allowed'.420 
 Conservatives understood for instance the Eastern Question as such a 
settlement of interests between the great powers which was adjusted at every point of 
crisis. At the time of the Black Sea affair (1870), the established settlement consisted of 
the Paris Treaty of 1856, which had concluded the Crimean war. However, Russia had 
rejected the clauses which barred its navy from the Black Sea, thereby compromising 
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the other great powers' interests and resulting in a breakdown of the settlement.421 
When the modus vivendi had been disturbed, the great powers would aim to arrive at a 
new understanding amongst one another, either through diplomacy or the use of force. 
In the case of Russia and the Black Sea clause, the Paris Treaty of 1856 was peacefully 
modified in the Conference of London in 1871, thereby confirming the adjusted 
understanding between the great powers and establishing a revised settlement.422 By the 
start of the 1876-78 Eastern Question crisis the established settlement was consequently 
the Paris Treaty of 1856, as modified in the Conference of London in 1871.423 Russia, 
however, acted on its ever-present desire to conquer parts of the Ottoman Empire, an 
endeavour which, if successful, would further Russian interests at the expense of those 
of the other great powers, thus upsetting the modus vivendi.424 After the Russian-Turkish 
war had started, conservative commentators again recognised that the established 
settlement would have to be modified in order to make all the great powers willing to 
agree to it again.425 This perspective corresponded well to the general conservative 
stance towards institutional change: a general aim to preserve existing institutions, 
reforming them only when, due to changed circumstances, this was necessary for the 
institution to carry out its original role — in the context of settlements in international 
affairs, of fostering stability and keeping the peace. 
 
The primacy of force 
The potential use of force and its role in international politics 
Conservatives assumed that international relations always involved the implicit 
possibility of the use of force. International politics was mainly about settling disputes, 
in cases where the interests of different states clashed. In resolving these disputes, the 
actual and potential use of force played a central role. Diplomacy and force formed the 
duality through which conservatives understood action in international politics.426 A 
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dispute could at one point in time be settled through negotiations, which might fail and 
lead to military conflict, after which the issue could be 'reclaimed from the arbitrament 
of war' through a discussion of the terms for peace over an armistice.427 But in this 
understanding, conservatives considered the use of military force, and especially the 
consciousness of its possibility, as more fundamental than diplomacy. Indeed, they saw 
successful diplomacy as resting wholly on the latent possibility of the use of force. 
 This assumption by conservatives that a state’s diplomatic influence on other 
states was in the end a function of its military power came to the fore in their 
commentary on Russia’s role in Europe during the Crimean War. Conservative 
commentators were alarmed by the prospect of Russian territorial aggrandisement, 
because Russia would then be in a position of such overwhelming power with regards 
to the states of central Europe – and its influence on them would consequently be so 
vast – that these states would all but lose their independence. Conversely, near the end 
of the Crimean War conservatives noted that Russia had been weakened. Since, they 
assumed, 'her enormous influence is, as it were, a paper-circulation issued on the faith 
of her vast military strength', they were satisfied that Russia would soon lose influence 
among its neighbours.428  
 Most fundamentally, conservatives asserted that other states would only respect 
a state's interests and refrain from compromising these if they believed that the state 
would, in extremis, use force to stop them.429 For instance, Gleig complained in 1870 that 
'our neighbours, … seeing how powerless we are to act, have ceased to pay more heed 
than suits their own convenience to our wishes when we express them'.430 A state's 
influence in international politics depended on other states perceiving it as willing and 
able to use force to gain its ends.431  
 This assumption recurred again and again in conservatives’ analyses. Northcote 
stated in 1877 that to be successful, diplomats needed to be able to deploy 'the menace 
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of coercive measures if necessary', 'to back up their remonstrances'.432 Contemplating 
British involvement in the American civil war, conservative commentators assumed that 
the North would take no cognisance of mere words, and Britain would have to act, to 
destroy the Northern blockade at least, for any deviation from neutrality and non-
involvement to be meaningful.433 Several years later Cecil remarked, regarding the 
Germans’ self-serving interpretations of the treaties involved in the Danish Duchies 
affair, that 'if the case had not a Federal army at its back, it would not bear a moment's 
argument'.434 Dasent observed in 1870 that 'words … [were] rather ridiculous than 
effectual if they are not accompanied by corresponding action'.435 And The Globe 
consequently felt comfortable asserting that 'England has not the usual weight she 
ought to have, because she has not the physical force necessary to back it'.436 For 
conservatives, words of whatever character had potency only because they indicated 
plausible acts, and all acts in the end boiled down to the potential use of military 
force.437  
 Since influence abroad only followed from a state's power, it then did not follow 
from any more nebulous authority. Conservatives rejected in particular the alternative 
liberal notion, identified with Gladstone's attitude to international politics, that ‘moral 
influence’ – 'that cheap sort of advice and scolding' – could be an effective tool of 
foreign policy.438 They were quick to assert the futility of mere moral support or 
denunciation, given without the willingness to bolster this verbal approbation or 
disapproval with the application of force. Patterson remarked in 1855 that 'with Russia, 
as with all States, her moral power is based on her physical. Strike a body-blow at the 
latter, and the former will collapse'.439 During the crisis which led to the unification of 
Italy, Atkinson argued that 'an appeal to national sympathies may win hearts, but cannot 
gain battles. … stumbling against the first hard fact, imagination trips and falls, and the 
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fairy fabric melts into thin air'.440 Not only was this moral verbiage useless, the 
preoccupation with conveying their moral judgements and sympathies also led liberal 
statesmen to neglect the sphere of positive action – they 'were', Hardman admonished 
in 1859, 'great in sympathy and promises, but lamentably slack in performance'.441  
 For conservatives a successful diplomacy depended on military power and a 
recognised willingness to deploy that power to secure the interests at stake.442 The only 
means of dispute arbitration in international relations was the potential or actual use of 
force. Hamley well reflected conservative opinion when he remarked that 'the good old 
plan, that they will take who have the power, and they may keep who can, was never 
more practically effective than now'.443 Cecil pithily remarked regarding the plight of 
Denmark: 'There was no help for it. The weak must yield.'444  Wilson argued that the 
disputes of 1866 and 1870 had descended into war because Austria and France did not 
want to concede to Prussia a superior position without the proof that Prussia could 
back its claims by force, the proof of war.445 Extending his use of this principle, Wilson 
argued also that Prussia would not have taken any of the three major steps of its ascent 
– the Danish, Austrian, and French wars – if Britain had shown credible intent to use 
force against Prussia, instead of merely remonstrating while all but ruling out action to 
back up these words.446   
 Finally, in the debates on the Eastern Question from 1876-80, conservative 
commentators argued repeatedly that success through negotiations was dependent on 
having a recognised willingness and ability to deploy military force in order to secure 
one’s interests.447 In the initial stages of the Eastern Question, the focus of the British 
debates was on Ottoman governance of its European provinces. The Constantinople 
Conference was intended to settle this matter, but the decisions made by the great 
powers were rejected by Turkey. Conservative commentators argued that the 
Conference failed in this respect because, except for Russia, the great powers were 
unwilling to back their demands for reform with the threat of military intervention – the 
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decisions were 'only to be enforced by moral persuasion'.448 Turkey could consequently 
feel comfortable in rejecting the great powers' demands. 
 After the war and the armistice of San Stefano, conservative commentators’ 
attention shifted to the diplomacy among the great powers, and particularly to the need 
to extract concessions from Russia. At this point Cowell argued that 'if this country is to 
exercise its just influence upon the final settlement, it must show itself to be ready and 
prepared for the alternative of war'.449 In particular, Parliament ought to approve a bill 
of credit for possible military action, so that the government could make a credible 
threat to use military force.450 If Britain and the other great powers in concert were to 
threaten Russia with war, 'she would yield to our reasonable demands' – diplomacy 
worked when it was backed by the threat of force.451 
 Conservatives conceived of the instruments of diplomacy as a means to prevent 
war, to avoid the actual use of force. Force was the only standard by which disputes over 
interests could be resolved, but diplomacy could function as a simulacrum of actual war. 
Through a course of negotiations, statesmen could convey to each other their ability 
and willingness to use force in order to secure the interests under dispute. This 
hypothesised struggle would then suggest to them a compromise, based on the likely 
results of a real conflict, thereby obviating the need for the actual use of force. 
Conservatives stressed the importance of negotiations, settlements, and respect for 
treaties especially because they considered these essential for mitigating the practical 
implications of the centrality of the use of force to international politics. 
 And despite military force being central to their creation, conservatives 
considered the resulting settlements as a source of stability.452 The balance reflected in a 
settlement was not one of military power pure and simple, but of realised interests, as 
adjusted for relative power. Power differences — short of a situation of hegemony — 
were no impediment to stability and peace. Their destabilising implications were 
neutralised as they were translated into differentially realised interests, which were then 
codified in a settlement. 
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War, the actual use of force, and its role in international politics 
When considering the actual rather than potential use of force, conservative 
commentary emphasised the destruction and suffering which war caused. War, 
conservatives stated, should never be encouraged or entered lightly; a 'policy of peace' 
was generally one of 'wisdom', given 'the horrors of war'.453 Only when crucial interests 
were involved would the gains of war possibly be worth the costs.454 
 The inadvisability of recourse to war held especially, conservatives emphasised, 
for the use of force in pursuit of some higher ideal, rather than interests or stature: 
'nothing is more unprincipled than wars of principle', Wilson stated in 1871, 'if 
principles are to be judged by actions'.455 In the context of the Eastern Question crisis 
of 1876-78, conservatives argued, of Russia’s supposedly humanitarian war to end 
Turkish rule over the European provinces, that 'it may be truly said that the remedy has 
been infinitely worse than the disease'.456 Due to the suffering inherently involved, war 
was seldom a proper means to right a perceived wrong.  
 Conservatives evinced no sense of progress limiting the incidence or the horrors 
of war. If anything, they thought, technological advances only made war more 
contagious and more destructive – 'increased knowledge had shown how to multiply 
destruction and intensify ruin'.457 Conservatives particularly abhorred the suffering 
involved in the American civil war.458 The Franco-Prussian war led them to the 
conclusion that modern warfare happened quickly — but was also more intense.459 If 
anything, war was now potentially even more destructive, as illustrated by Hamley with 
some pathos: 'in two months a smiling and fruitful country might be pillaged and 
trampled into a desert, and made to flow with tears and blood'.460 
 Conservative commentators also asserted that the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-
78 had disproven the conceit that war had become increasingly rare in frequency and 
constrained in operation. Progress was supposed to have led to fewer wars, but the 
opposite seemed to have happened: 'in extending their communications, nations have 
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also extended their interests. Every state in Europe is more or less interested in 
everything that can befall any other European state'.461 Everyone now took sides in 
every conflict, so conflicts would spread and spiral out of control more easily. 
Conservatives consequently regarded alleged pacifists such as Cobden as 'mere 
dreamers' with a 'complacent estimation of [Europe]'.462 There was, based on 'recent 
experiences', concluded Burrows in 1877, 'no reason to believe that … the causes of 
war and disturbance will ever cease to operate'.463 
 While conservatives emphasised the suffering inherent in war, they did not 
morally condemn the use of force in international affairs. War was to be regretted, but it 
was not the case that justice demanded, say, returning to the status quo ante. A military 
victory could even confer rights and claims on a country. Cowell noted with equanimity 
'the redistribution of territory, which is sure to follow in the wake of a considerable 
war'.464  
 Moreover, conservatives thought that the actual use of force had a distinct and 
important role in international politics. Only military conflict could settle those disputes 
over interests which proved intractable for diplomacy, even if it also involved a much 
higher cost.465 As the war unfolded, at one point the demands of one country would line 
up with what another was willing to concede – both likely subject to change as the war 
progressed – and a settlement would finally be possible.466 Wilson complimented 
Bismarck on properly apprehending this dynamic, stating that 'it may be regarded as due 
to that daring Minister's temper and character that the situation, when it had become 
strained beyond pacific arbitrament, was at once seen and accepted, and the quarrel was 
fought out'.467 
 Gladstone also thought that through war 'the views of the respective parties 
would be brought, by the force of circumstances, within measurable distance'.468 Two 
important differences, however, were that for Gladstone, this did not make war a 
worthwhile means of dispute settlement – this convergence of views was a neutral 
characteristic of war, rather than its main function. Secondly, for Gladstone, 
convergence was not an amoral process, but took place against a backdrop of objective 
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ethics – there were right and wrong places for perspectives to converge.469 
 Conservatives thought that statesmen could reasonably choose to go to war, if 
only as a means of last resort.470 They considered threats to a great power’s crucial 
interests or stature as sufficient reason to use force, reflected in the general assumption 
that a war would spread as other states' interests became involved.471 Conservative 
commentators characterised the Crimean War as such: unfortunate but necessary. At 
stake in the Crimean War, conservatives argued, was the ability of Russia to make a bid 
for hegemony over Europe.472 This threat to the balance of power justified, even 
compelled, Britain and France to confront Russia with military force. War, Swayne 
stated, 'is a necessity inseparable from our earthly condition. As such, we must accept it 
as men, and be ready, at all times, to bear our part in it manfully'.473  
 Conservatives thus thought of war as a means to a particular end. War was a 
particular modulation in international politics, rather than an existential struggle: the 
stakes of a conflict were not absolute. 'Should war come, it will be closed by 
compromises', Patterson declared in 1864.474 Neither the basic character of a conflict 
nor its moral import changed when a dispute was resolved through war rather than 
diplomacy – through the actual use of force rather than its veiled insinuation. The 
settlement agreed on in ending a war, conservatives considered as valid as those arrived 
at through diplomacy. A war, however, which would not in fact lead to a resolution of 
the dispute at hand had no redeeming value whatsoever – regardless of any noble ideals 
entertained by one side or the other.475 
 
The necessity of having a military well-prepared for war 
Conservative commentators stressed the importance of Britain having a military which 
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was well-prepared for war. The quality of Britain’s military was an issue which 
galvanised conservative commentators, not least the significant minority who were 
military officers themselves. Only if Britain were to invest the money and energy 
necessary for a well-functioning military would it be secure, at peace, and enjoy the 
influence proper for one of the great powers of Europe. The Standard for instance felt 
comfortable asserting, during the Black Sea affair of 1870-71, that 'a weak army means a 
timid and undignified policy in foreign affairs'.476 
 Here, conservatives argued, the policy preferences of liberals and radicals had a 
pernicious effect. The latter enthusiastically fostered the prosperity of Britain, but, 
instead of spending some of this wealth on the military, liberals favoured a policy of so-
called economy, which involved cutting funding to the military until its existence as an 
effective force was all but destroyed. Mere prosperity was no source of strength, 
however; '[the] power of England is nothing better than a name', Elwin warned, 'unless 
it is brought to bear upon the scene of action'.477 In this way, conservatives argued, one 
of the basic tenets of liberal government worked to sap the strength of Britain and to 
undermine its influence in international affairs.478 As Gleig asserted, 'an army we must 
have, and are quite ready to pay for it'.479 
 The necessity of military preparedness was the main lesson which conservative 
commentators drew from the Crimean War and the Franco-Prussian war. In the debates 
on both events conservative commentators argued that a military well-prepared for war 
was necessary for security, international influence, and peacefulness in Britain’s foreign 
affairs.480 
 To be secure, conservatives argued, Britain needed a well-funded army, as well 
as navy. Its isolation from the continent gave Britain some respite — given the Channel 
and its navy, Britain needed its army to be merely adequate, rather than fully the equal 
of the Continental powers, for the country to be safe.481  Britain could no longer wait, 
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however, until war had started to prepare for hostilities. Military preparedness went 
against British custom, but had become necessary due to the changed character of war. 
The development of technologies, in particular those relating to transport – railroads 
and steamships – and communications – the telegraph – had made war a speedier 
affair.482 Any initial advantage was likely to translate into eventual victory.483 This, 
conservatives argued, made being prepared for conflict essential to the safety of any 
country. With 'the progress of mechanical science', noted Cecil, 'a nation must not only 
be strong – it must be ready’, or in Hamley’s phrase, ‘must hold itself in every respect 
prepared for war'.484  
 Home defence, however, was not the only role which conservatives envisaged 
for the military. An army capable of sustaining a campaign abroad was necessary, they 
argued, for a state to be considered a great power.485 Cecil despaired 'of how low the 
influence of England has fallen … [with] an army which is too weak to fight any 
civilised nation except under the wing of a military ally'.486 Conservatives considered an 
army of equal quality, if not necessarily quantity, to the other great powers a necessity 
for Britain’s wishes and actions to be acknowledged by other states: 'we must be able,' 
Cecil argued, 'in case of need, to operate upon the Continent with armies having some 
proportion to those with which modern warfare is carried on'.487  
 Thirdly, conservatives argued that a prepared military was a requirement for 
peaceful foreign relations. Possessing the means to go to war, they thought, was the best 
means to avoid having to go to war. They admitted that, in the Crimean War, Britain 
had been able to preserve the balance of power in the end; but it had had to engage in 
costly warfare to do so, because Russia had had the impression that Britain was not able 
and willing to stop her. 'The reputation for military power', Beresford Hope stated, 'is a 
security for peace'.488  
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 If Britain lacked a prepared military, it would be burdened with a frazzled 
diplomacy which tried to keep one potential crisis after another from spinning out of 
control, as various states tested the resilience of a Britain which seemed ill-prepared for 
conflict. If Britain funded a well-prepared military, then it would be respected and there 
would consequently be a stability and order to her foreign policy. If other states 
perceived that Britain could quickly best them in a conflict, they would take far more 
care not to provoke her in the first place.489 The way to assure peace was not just to 
'refrain from molesting others; it is necessary also that we possess the means of 
preventing them from molesting us'.490 '[To] be ready for war’, Hamley concluded, ‘is 
often the best means of averting it'.491  
 Conservatives remarked that this contrasted with the perspective held by 
Gladstone and other liberals, who thought the exact opposite. As Hamley characterised 
their thoughts: 'Wars and quarrels, they said, arise … above all, from the knowledge that 
we possess the means of going to war.'492 Gladstone indeed wrote that 'military 
preparations [were] not made without the intent of turning them to account'.493 For him, 
a well-prepared military, rather than ensuring peace and enabling an effective foreign 
policy, was merely a spur to war. Lever, representative of the conservative reaction to 
this line of reasoning, asserted that it was 'ridiculous … to claim our immunity from 
danger on the score of our inability to resist it'.494  
 
Cooperation among great powers 
Conservatives thought cooperation between states played a central role in European 
politics, in two related ways. Firstly, during the 1850s and 1860s they argued that a 
coalition of states was needed to uphold the Treaty of Vienna and its settlement of 
Europe, which they saw as in danger of unravelling.495 Secondly, and more generally, 
they stressed that states needed to establish alliances and coalitions in order to achieve 
their objectives in international politics. For conservatives cooperation between states 
was intimately connected to the primacy of interests and of force.  
 The primacy of force was the main reason for states to cooperate. Being in the 
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right – for whatever sense of right – did not lead to acquiescence and to one's position 
winning the day; having a second great power at one's side, and with that the potential 
to bring to bear overwhelming force, was what led to the other party in a dispute to 
adopt one's perspective on affairs. Moreover, cooperating states could assert their 
interests in disputes over which they would otherwise have had no influence. A concert 
of all great powers or all minus one was one particularly potent form of cooperation, 
sure to dictate the terms of a settlement.496 The utility of allies cropped up throughout 
conservatives’ analysis of the events surrounding, for instance, the unification of Italy.497 
Britain, conservatives thought, ought not to need allies to have influence abroad, 
sometimes inevitably did require them, and could always make use of them, in war and 
in diplomatic entreaty.498 
 States cooperated not because of similar ideological preferences, or because they 
shared a same character of government, but because they had compatible interests in 
the affair.499 For instance, the 'military alliance' between Austria and Prussia in 1864 was 
based purely on self-interest, Oliphant argued, where the allies did 'not from any 
tenderer feeling than an instinct of self-preservation … join in a cordial embrace'.500 
States could also engage in reciprocal cooperation, over time. One state would support 
the other state's policy regarding a dispute in return for similar support from the other 
state later on.501  
 Such alliances were still circumscribed affairs, though. This was no solid bond 
of mutual defence and aid. Allies temporarily traded favours, allowing them each to 
secure an interest of theirs, but when their mutual usefulness was gone, then so was the 
alliance. For example, in 1859 Cecil reminded his readers that the established alliance 
between Prussia and Britain could only be preserved if Britain made itself of use to 
Prussia: 'if we do not help our allies, our allies will not help us'.502 The viability of 
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alliances also depended on which issues were current in international politics. France 
and Russia might have had some sort of an alliance before the Polish question, 
Patterson argued in 1864, but this understanding would have dissolved into enmity the 
moment the Eastern Question inevitably resurfaced.503 
 Alliances demanded skill and attention from diplomats and statesmen. Because 
the trade of favours was reciprocal, happened over time rather than in a moment, 
statesmen needed to inspire a degree of trust among their counterparts. Conservatives 
consequently argued that skilled statesmen could have great influence on the course of 
international politics, as they sabotaged the relations between other states while 
managing to gain the confidence of potential allies.504 In 1859, during the crisis around 
the unification of Italy, Cecil put forward Napoleon III as such a statesman, thanks to 
the French Emperor’s having managed to wreck the alliances between Britain and the 
continental powers which sustained the Vienna settlement, while himself fashioning 
alliances of convenience for each of his initiatives, sustained only as long as he gained 
advantage from them.505 
 Liberal thought on the basis of cooperation between states was different; most 
of them thought ideas and values played a major role.506 States would cooperate, 
Gladstone for instance argued in 1870, not out of any particular self-regarding 
motivation, but in order to keep the peace or to support the side on which stood 
absolute right.507 An alliance, he thought, was based not so much in the mutual relations 
of the statesmen of both countries, but in a similar sense of right and wrong among the 
peoples – 'sentiments in great part concurrent … between two great nations' – and in the 
'generous sympathy' to which this overlapping insight into the universal ethics would 
lead.508 Conservatives were dismissive of this liberal perspective, arguing that it did not 
manage to explain the de facto course of international politics and the alignments of 
powers by which it was produced.509 
 Their discussion of the Crimean War peace negotiations provides a good case 
study of how conservatives viewed the role of alliance politics and great power 
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diplomacy in arriving at a settlement in international relations.510 Patterson extensively 
analysed the alliance politics and negotiations of the Crimean War, and these analyses 
were based wholly, and very explicitly, on the notion that a state's international position 
was unrelated to matters of ideology and merely a function of its interests involved in 
an affair.511 Despite this primacy of self-interest, conservatives still argued for the value 
for Britain of cultivating coalitions with other states. It was because Britain could 
arraign a coalition of states against Russia that it was able to secure those interests 
threatened by Russian expansion at acceptable cost. For instance, involving Austria in 
the negotiations added an additional interested party, whose machinations steered the 
peace terms away from Britain’s particular concerns. These concessions did, however, 
gain Britain the threat of Austrian participation in the war against Russia. Russia would 
then face overwhelming force and quickly consent to the necessary guarantees against 
future aggression.512  
 The Anglo-French alliance, conservatives thought, existed in tandem with a 
sustained mutual perception of the alliance partner as a likely future antagonist. France 
and Britain both hoped to realise peace terms which would not only secure their shared 
interest in checking Russian aggression, but would also complicate and constrain the 
foreign policy of their alliance partner in the future. While Britain would have gained by 
continuing the war for another year, not least by having the opportunity to destroy 
Russia’s Baltic Sea fleet, most conservative commentators resignedly observed that if 
Britain continued the war, France would dissolve the alliance and sue for peace. The 
destruction of Russia's Baltic fleet, after all, was valuable to Britain in that it obviated 
the possibility of a French-Russian naval alliance and confirmed British hegemony over 
the oceans. In addition, the territorial settlement which would be enshrined in an 
immediate armistice would direct Russian expansion towards Asia, where it hurt only 
the British and not the French. France would thus act on its interests, conservatives 
stated, and would conclude a peace with Russia before Britain had a chance to gain her 
ends.513 'There is nothing more unstable', Patterson remarked, 'than foreign alliances'.514 
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The self-interest of states informed their positions in international relations, and an 
alliance between states was not so much an island in these choppy waters, as a raft at 
the mercy of its shifting currents. 
 
Honour and international relations 
In debates on British foreign policy, conservatives often invoked the honour of Britain 
as a call to action. Connotations surrounding the notion of honour can, however, give 
the wrong impression of the meaning of this move. For these conservatives, securing 
Britain's honour was not merely about maintaining a general sense of self-importance; it 
involved detailed aspects of the way in which a state was to interact with its peers. A 
state's honour was, for conservatives, exactly not a nebulous concept, a mere rhetorical 
device, but in fact closely entwined in the basic dynamics of international politics. When 
conservatives talked about a state's honour in this sense they meant that the state had 
good stature amongst the countries of Europe. In the most ethically charged 
interpretation, this meant that an honourable state had a reputation for keeping its 
promises and respecting its treaties. The notion generally had a wider meaning, though, 
of which this particular ethical inflection was merely a part. A country with honour had 
the reputation that it followed through on its diplomatic statements with the 
corresponding acts. In particular, such a country would act, if necessary through the use 
of military force, if any of its declared interests were infringed by another state.515 
 The need for a country to maintain its stature had broad implications for the 
way in which statesmen were to comport themselves in international affairs. How 
Britain handled any major affair in international politics would influence its general 
reputation, would reflect on its honour. ‘The prestige of a nation’, Craik and Smith 
asserted in 1877, ‘means the world's estimate of its character and its power, on which 
depends its influence'.516 Conservatives considered stature so important because they 
saw it influencing the conduct of the statesmen of other nations. If a state had a 
reputation for acting to secure its interests, then other countries would think twice 
before infringing on that state’s interests.517 
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 Gladstone saw the conservatives' version of stature, which he termed prestige, 
as a temporary substitute for strength, based on bluster and intimidation – a bullying 
approach to foreign governments based in arrogance and vanity.518 Conservatives, 
however, did not think of stature as a means to attempt influence when strength was 
lacking. Quite the opposite: they considered stature to be the recognition of strength, of 
the actual ability and willingness of a state to use force to gain its ends. Whereas 
Gladstone thought prestige superfluous, given strength, and dangerous either way, 
conservatives thought that, without stature, strength had no influence on international 
affairs until the moment of military conflict. If a state lacked stature, its power would 
not help it to secure its interests or avert aggression. 
 Britain's problem, some conservative commentators noted, was that it valued its 
stature, but then conceptually separated it from its military power, and neglected the 
latter. Britain had long enjoyed an excellent reputation as a result of its glorious 
performance in the Napoleonic wars. 'But', Elwin warned already at the time of the 
Crimean War, 'the power of England is nothing better than a name unless it is brought 
to bear upon the scene of action'.519 Britain could not coast along on the strength of this 
prestige forever. Sooner or later some major power would not be daunted by it, infringe 
British interests anyway, and Britain, without a proper military, would see both its 
interests compromised and its stature in tatters. At the time of the Eastern Question 
crisis of 1876-78, conservatives still complained that Britain was extremely hesitant to 
threaten and deploy the use of force, and as a result 'our European prestige has 
suffered'.520 A state's stature might be the result of its past performance, not its present 
power, but, conservatives argued, any statesman with foresight, taking the long-term 
view, would acknowledge that a state's stature rested on its military strength. 
 The relative prominence of notions of honour in conservative international 
thought is best illustrated by the debates surrounding the Black Sea affair of 1870-71. 
Britain experienced a brief war-scare over the second half of November 1870, after 
Russia declared that it would no longer respect the neutralisation of the Black Sea. This 
neutrality was to Britain the most important clause of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, which 
had ended the Crimean War. There was a brief but heated debate carried on in the 
leaders of and letters to the daily newspapers, in which authors argued how Britain 
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ought to react and whether the issue was worth waging a war over.  
 In these contributions liberals and conservatives generally laid a different 
emphasis. The most prominent radical and liberal contributors to the debate were 
focused on the nature of treaty obligations and their connection to international 
morality.521 Conservative commentators, in contrast, primarily perceived this affair as a 
threat to Britain’s honour.522 They thought that the unilateral repudiation of the Treaty 
by Russia, wholly ignoring the interests of Britain, was a clear insult, and they agonised 
that Gladstone’s government might fail to meet this challenge. If Britain did not act 
forcefully to oppose Russia, conservatives argued, it would confirm to all the states of 
Europe that Britain's preferences could be blithely ignored. Britain would gain the 
reputation of not acting to secure any interests under peril – Britain would lose its 
honour.523 
 Close to the resolution of the affair honour was still foremost in these 
commentators' minds. By the end of November, it seemed likely that the issue would be 
resolved through a conference of great powers, in which Britain would have to 
compromise its interests, in relinquishing Black Sea neutrality, while retaining its 
honour, through Russia's recognition of the treaty system in general and Britain's 
concerns in particular. Most conservative commentators now agreed that this was the 
best possible outcome. With Britain's honour satisfied, these conservatives 
acknowledged, retaining the Black Sea’s neutrality would not be worth a major war.524 
 In the Black Sea affair, as in many others, conservatives laid more stress on the 
potential consequences to Britain's honour than to its particular interests.525 If Britain's 
honour was allowed to be impugned in a significant way, then the consequences would 
reverberate throughout its foreign affairs; Britain would '[cease] to be consulted in any 
great European question', while other states would go from respecting its interests to 
infringing them at will.526 In contrast, if Britain maintained its honour and cultivated a 
reputation for acting decisively whenever its interests were meddled with, then states 
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would tread gingerly around Britain, thus lessening the chance of any dispute dissolving 
into war.  
 
Assertive diplomacy and clear signalling as proper statesmanship 
Given the primacy of interests and force, and the importance of stature, conservatives 
argued that proper statesmanship combined an assertive diplomacy with a clear 
signalling of intent to other states. Thereby, statesmen would secure the interests of 
Britain without necessitating the actual use of force, and preserve Europe’s peace and 
order by preventing aggressive attitudes from arising abroad. 'What Britain has to say 
upon any great question', Aytoun stated, 'should be conveyed in language brief, 
emphatic, and unmistakable'.527 Since, conservatives thought, the potential use of force 
was the main influence on a statesman’s calculations, words were only relevant in 
international politics as signals of the possible use of force.528 An assertive diplomacy, 
for conservatives, meant a clear signalling of the country’s threshold for the use of force 
in defence of its interests and stature.529 
 Conservatives thought that Britain ought always to be actively engaged with 
international affairs, even when it was not to involve itself in a conflict directly. For 
instance, during the Franco-Prussian war, Britain ought to clarify to other states that it 
valued the independence of Belgium and that it was willing to use force to secure this 
interest. An assertive foreign policy was necessary, Cecil stated, for Britain 'to be looked 
upon as a European Power'.530 Britain, Hamley stated, 'cannot stand aloof from the rubs 
and trials of the times … and to be exempt from the disagreeable concerns of the world 
… [rather] we shall have to … behave like men, or else surrender empire, wealth, and 
station'.531 
 Conservatives asserted that far from being bellicose, a clear threat to use force 
was the best way to ensure peace. If, in a dispute, a state’s diplomacy were characterised 
by 'timidity and vacillation', if it merely conveyed 'faint dissuasion', the state addressed 
would assume these words would not be matched with forceful acts.532 The aggressor 
                                                          
527 Aytoun (1854: 599). 
528 Cecil (1864a: 284-5); (1864b: 481-2); Gleig (1866: 642, 648-50); The Globe (1870, Nov 29, p. 4); Hamley 
(1870c: 790); (1871c: 501); Manners (1871: 947-8); Oliphant (1865: 121); Patterson (1864b: 641); The 
Standard (1870, Nov. 23, p. 4); (Nov. 25, p. 4); (Dec. 14, p. 4); (Dec. 19, p. 4); Wilson (1871b: 366). 
529 See e.g. Aytoun (1860: 246); Cecil (1862: 212); Oliphant (1860c: 735). 
530 Cecil (1871: 282). 
531 Hamley (1870c: 786-7); see also Cecil (1870: 556); (1871: 281-2); Dasent (1870: 314); Gleig (1866: 642); 
(1870a: 656); Hamley (1871c: 501, 506); Oliphant (1864a: 386, 395); (1864b: 518); (1865: 118); Patterson 
(1864a: 112); (1864c: 243). 
532 Patterson (1855b: 231) and Aytoun (1854: 599). See also e.g. Hamley (1870b: 513); (1870c: 781); Lever 
108 
would persist in its policy and unwittingly demand too large a compromise, under the 
impression that it would be granted, thereby eliciting war. If, instead, the statesmen of a 
great power were assertive and clearly signalled their willingness to go to war over 
certain well-defined interests, then other statesmen – when not compelled to pander to 
some popular passion – would refrain from infringing on these interests and the 
countries would avoid war.533 Statesmen consequently needed to be 'firm and manly' in 
their conduct.534  
 Conservatives argued from this perspective during the Black Sea affair of 
November 1870. They asserted that if war were to break out between Russia and the 
Ottomans, Britain would sooner or later get involved on the side of Turkey.535 The 
choice, they stated, became simple. Fight a war immediately to reassert the neutrality of 
the Black Sea, while Russia was still unprepared and a naval campaign would suffice; or 
let Russia rearm and prepare, and fight the conflict at a moment of its choosing, leading 
to a full-blown land war. 'Yielding now', The Globe argued, 'will cause a worse war at no 
distant date'; immediate forceful action on the part of Britain was plainly the better 
option.536 Moreover, the mere clear commitment to war would likely lead Russia to 
recant its abrogation. Had Russia not already, The Standard noted on November 21st, 
indicated its willingness to discuss the matter in a conference, merely after Granville's 
assertive dispatches? If Britain were only to commit itself unambiguously to war over 
the neutrality of the Black Sea, then it would, conservatives argued, in fact preserve 
both the peace and the material guarantees for future peace, with British honour 
intact.537 Britain could vacillate and end up with both its reputation in tatters and a 
certain costly war in the future, or it could act decisively right away and thereby both 
preserve its stature and either have an easier war, or avoid war altogether. 
 During the Eastern Question crisis of 1876-78 conservatives again argued that 
the best way to avoid a war with Russia over the Straits and Constantinople would be to 
signal clearly to Russia that Britain would in fact go to war over its interests in the 
Straits. Pacifism was not a sustainable policy: 'a time may come when compliance must 
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cease'.538 And if this were the case, 'can collision best be avoided by loudly proclaimed 
indifference and an ostentatious refusal to prepare, or by timely resolution, and 
unconcealed, but still pacific, vigilance?'.539 Britain ought to indicate clearly under which 
conditions it would shed its neutrality, so as to avoid on the side of Russia 'delusive 
hope – that most certain of all incentives to war'.540 
 Conservatives argued in favour of an assertive diplomacy and of clear signalling 
not only because these worked to secure Britain’s interests without Britain having to use 
military force, but also because these worked to prevent states from taking an aggressive 
attitude and ultimately making a bid for hegemony. Statesmen could be convinced of 
the costs of an aggressive course of action through the right signals from other 
governments, which were to 'provide the greatest inducement for choosing the higher 
path'.541 Here conservatives assumed that the raw power to oppose the country in 
question could in theory be collected. The crux lay in convincing the statesmen in 
question that the will and the ability to wield this power against a particular scheme of 
conquest were present, as well.542  
 At different points during the 1850s, 60s, and 70s, conservative commentators 
argued that both France and Prussia were appropriate targets for such concerted 
signalling by the states of Europe in general, and Britain in particular. In the aftermath 
of the unification of Italy, conservatives thought that the rest of Europe could dissuade 
Napoleon III 'from foreign war by a stern European combination of well-armed 
nations'.543 After the Franco-Prussian war, conservatives were particularly worried about 
Germany and the possible attitudes of its Prussian statesmen. The other great powers 
appeared as a negligible constraint, with France and Austria lacking strength and with 
Russia and Germany seemingly having reached some accord. Conservatives were 
convinced that only 'if we [Britain] make her [Prussia] understand that we are both able 
and willing to restrain her ambition', would the Prussian statesmen decide to fulfil their 
ambitions through peaceful means.544 In the words of Hamley, English engagement and 
leadership could function as a 'surety for Germany', indicating the futility of schemes of 
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conquest and guaranteeing that its statesmen would not take the military path to 
glory.545  
 In contrast, in 1870 Gladstone felt comfortable in rejecting the conservatives' 
concern over a possible bid for hegemony on the part of newly unified Germany. This 
was because, where conservatives saw only a role for other states' potential use of force 
and, in the domestic realm, the possible pressure to pander to the passions of the 
people, Gladstone added a third influence on statesmen: the influence of a universal 
ethics, 'that lofty influence belonging to that general and fixed opinion entertained by 
civilised man, which happily in our times no state or nation, however powerful, can 
disregard'.546 As a consequence, Gladstone thought that, regardless of the attitude which 
the German people would take – Gladstone locating final agency in the nation rather 
than in the statesmen – 'it is idle to believe that they have before them a career of 
universal conquest or absolute predominance, and that the European family is not 
strong enough to correct the eccentricities of its peccant and obstreperous members'.547 
This strength which constrained and corrected was at least as much moral, in 
Gladstone's mind, as it was material. Conservatives trusted only to the constraint of 
material, military force, and were consequently rather more worried, both about 
Prussia’s intentions and the Gladstone government’s seemingly cavalier response. Only 
if British statesmen were assertive in their dealings with foreign powers, conservatives 
reiterated, and clearly signalled that Britain would react forcefully to any major project 
of aggression in Europe, could it remain at peace and preserve the European order. 
 
A proper statesman: the conservative critique of liberal statesmen 
Conservatives argued that the dynamics of international relations demanded a policy of 
assertive engagement with the issues based on realistic assessments of the state of 
affairs, in which the statements of Britain would reliably indicate to what extent Britain 
would use force to uphold its interests.548 The liberal statesmen of Britain, conservatives 
argued again and again, failed to live up to these standards of proper statesmanship. 
 The liberals’ first major shortcoming in the eyes of conservatives was that they 
were overly fearful of war and were consequently not assertive enough. Conservatives 
acknowledged the worth of peace, but argued that liberals held ‘an attitude indicating 
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not so much an honourable desire for peace as a craven dread of war'.549 This attitude 
not only invited hostility, but it also led liberal statesmen to give unclear signals to other 
states, which made war even more likely. Their pacific policies and statements were 
'means which must not only fail of their object, but which tend to bring about the very 
evils which they are intended to avert, while at the same time they render us incapable 
of repelling those evils'.550  
 During the Crimean War, conservatives argued that 'Gladstone and Cobden, 
Russell and Bright', all shared a flaw fatal to their statesmanship. Their attitude should 
have been one which put 'the honour of the country and the interests of Europe' first; 
instead, 'peace with Russia – peace at any price – was their sole desire'.551 Indulging in 
their sentimental, emotional dislike of war, these politicians had all convinced 
themselves that war could be avoided if only Britain really wanted to do so. 
Conservatives asserted that if the Tsar had realised that Britain and France would 
together go to war over his course of action, he would have desisted. 'A decided attitude 
at the beginning', Aytoun lamented, 'might have saved us from all this bloodshed'.552 
The Peelite and Whig government failed, however, to be decisive and to signal clearly. 
This led the Tsar to think that Britain would merely protest, but not act. If only the 
Whig and Peelite statesmen had been willing to consider war a possible necessity in the 
first place and had honestly confronted the Tsar, these commentators assured their 
readers, the war would never have happened.  
 During the American Civil War, conservatives disapproved of the reaction of 
the Liberal government to the several disputes between Britain and the American 
North, and impugned the liberals in speculating as to their reasons for their course of 
action. Conservatives asserted that the North was unreasonable and hypocritical in its 
demands and presumptions; the correct British reaction would have been to rap the 
North on its knuckles, but the Liberal government instead assiduously complied with 
every request. The obliging reaction of the British liberal statesmen, conservatives 
argued, had encouraged the Northern statesmen in their overbearing demeanour.  
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 Conservative commentators ascribed two different possible motivations for this 
putative liberal course of action. They firstly accused the liberals of timidity in their 
dealings with other states of reasonable power. This was a reiteration of a standing 
conservative critique of Palmerstonian foreign policy, which argued that Palmerston and 
the liberals were happy to bully small states over inconsequential matters, but were too 
self-effacing whenever another great power infringed on British interests, fearing any 
possible confrontation. Conservatives secondly suggested that liberals used the 
unreasonable demands made by the North as an excuse to favour the Northern cause, 
which represented the values they held dear. Liberals then privileged the North under 
the cover of being scrupulously neutral and peace-loving – and thus without having to 
justify their partiality to anyone.553  
 Conservatives complained that the liberals' course of action was damaging to 
the stature of Britain, as it gave the impression that Britain could 'be bullied with 
impunity'.554 The British reaction to events such as the Trent affair ought not to revolve 
around abstract issues such as international law; rather, 'the national honour was at 
stake'.555  'To profess a disinclination to fight', Hamley lectured, 'is not the best way to 
deal with a bully'; instead, he commanded, 'leave no doubt possible that we are prepared 
to use our power for the assertion of our rights'.556 Indeed, the Trent affair, Forsyth 
asserted, was a case in point; only after the Liberal government had felt compelled to 
order 'the despatch of large and formidable armaments' did the North heed British 
complaints.557 The British government, they thought, should especially make it clear that 
Britain did not fear a war with the North. Conveying this impression was essential to 
maintaining the stature of Britain as a first-rate power, 'proud in its independence, 
sensitive for its honour, and able and willing to hold its own against all comers'.558  
 As Gladstone succeeded Palmerston as leader of the Liberal party, conservative 
commentators’ criticism of liberal statesmanship became even more pronounced. 
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Hamley summed up the Gladstonian liberals' policy stance, based on their convictions, 
as: evisceration of the military, saving precious money, and disengagement from 
Europe, in the sense that Britain was not to press its rights and opinions, except as a 
neutral arbiter. The idea behind these policies, Hamley noted, was that this 'unobtrusive 
amiability' would charm and impress other states, who would be won over to the same 
behaviour, 'and bring it [the whole world] step by step to the fullness of brotherly 
love'.559 Conservatives argued that, on the contrary, adopting such a demeanour was all 
but asking other states to trample over Britain’s interests, to the point where even 
Gladstone would feel forced to go to war to protect them.560  
 In light of remarks made by Gladstone and others, Hamley hastened to stress 
that having and showing military power did not automatically imply an aggressive 
attitude: '[t]here is a perfectly dignified and undemonstrative bearing which, though 
indicating conscious power, is most studious not to offend or provoke.'561 Indeed, 
Hamley argued, having ample military power even made a peaceful attitude a more 
realistic possibility: '[i]nspire foreign Governments with the belief that you are able and 
ready to resist encroachment and to chastise impertinence, and then they will not 
misconstrue your motives when you show a preference for peace.'562 The liberals' 
professed desire for peace, combined with an unprepared military and a lack of firm 
assertion regarding interests, would, conservatives thought, be interpreted by other 
statesmen as a signal of the state's weakness and would all but invite them to demand 
excessive concessions and compromises. Discussing both Russia's aggressive behaviour 
in revoking the Black Sea clauses and the possibility of Germany acquiring a taste for 
conquest, Hamley argued that '[i]f England were but ready now, she doubtless might 
obviate a fearful struggle, of which none can see the end. But just because she is not ready, 
just because she has been telling barbarous Russia that she is not going to fight, she will have to 
take up the wager of battle'.563  
 Gladstone’s foreign policy was widely identified with an 'excessive pressure for 
retrenchment from a dominant commercial class' which had led to an 'unwillingness to 
pay for proper defence [which] was fatally counterproductive'.564 There was a set of 
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liberals who differed from the Gladstonian norm, and advocated a 'strong foreign or 
defence policy' instead of restraint and economy. They 'robustly opposed humanitarian 
sentimentalism', which Liberalism increasingly came to stand for.565 These liberals, like 
conservatives, regarded an assertive foreign policy and effective army as crucial for 
Britain's position in the international arena. The aims and ends to be pursued from this 
position, however, they imagined differently, namely the realisation of liberal values by 
Britain. 'If England were humiliated abroad', these liberals thought, 'how could it preach 
its progressive gospel? If it were ill-prepared against attack, how would it stand up to 
autocratic or any other threatening powers?'566 Conservatives, in contrast, cared about 
Britain’s interests and honour for their own sake, as unconnected to universal or 
cosmopolitan ends. 
 The second major problem with which conservatives diagnosed liberal 
statesmanship was one not of reticence and ambiguity but of misguided activity. 
Conservatives abhorred the tendency of liberal statesmen to make statements without 
commensurate actions; they thought this brought dishonour on Britain, leaving its 
stature in tatters. Swayne, in 1856 already, remarked that 'We [the British] have done sad 
mischief already by words not backed by deeds'.567 British conceptions of moral 
influence were moulded most, though, by the debates and events surrounding the 
unification of Italy. 
 From the perspective of conservative commentators, liberals constantly asserted 
to other countries how valuable all their liberal ideals were, and how these countries 
ought really to respect them as well, without ever being willing to take action to ensure 
that these ideals were realised. This difference between what British statesmen 
professed to value and what they were actually willing to act upon, conservatives 
thought, was noticed around Europe, and this mismatch of word and deed made it 
increasingly difficult for alliance partners such as Prussia to believe that Britain would 
actually fulfil its commitments if push ever came to shove.568 In this way, conservatives 
argued, the tendency of liberal statesmen to prefer words over acts led to the slow but 
certain isolation of Britain in the international sphere, and to the impotence of its 
diplomacy – it would end up being ignored in international politics, right up to the point 
where it would be forced in fact to use force.   
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 Now, conservatives did not mean to argue that Britain should instead act to 
realise liberal ideals across Europe – rather, they implied that liberal statesmen should 
keep silent about their ideals, and stick to securing the interests of Britain. Regarding 
those particular interests, and unlike vague ideals, Britain could confidently signal that it 
would be willing to use force to secure them, and British pronouncements would again 
be heeded in capitals across Europe. 
 During the events surrounding the unification of Italy, liberals were in fact 
divided on the likely efficacy of British moral support alone in securing the liberty of 
Italy. After the conclusion of the Italian affair, however, it appeared to most liberals as 
if moral support and ethical appeals had indeed triumphed over the undoubted 
reactionary intentions of the autocratic states.569 Conservatives drew very different 
conclusions regarding the efficacy of moral support. Lever noted that 'England, 
however, neither could nor would go to war for an Italian question; and it was in vain to 
expect anything important from notes'.570 Atkinson remarked that '“Nationality,” 
“Independence,” “Republicanism,” are words not of deliverance, but of delusion', while 
Patterson predicted that 'Great Britain and Prussia will send protocols, but no troops; 
and the French Emperor … will prosecute his game to its close'.571 Napoleon III and 
Cavour had realised their aims, and Britain had stood by and let this aggrandisement 
happen. 
 During the Danish Duchies affair, conservative commentators again emphasised 
how liberals, and especially Russell in 1864, indulged extensively in liberal rhetoric, but 
without having the commitment to back this rhetoric up with action – liberals were 
satisfied with merely the 'impression of activity'.572 Russell's statements, conservatives 
argued, had clearly implied that Britain would come to Denmark's aid in a war over the 
Duchies. When the moment came, however, Russell backed down and left Denmark to 
its own devices, using the 'ambiguous language' of the statement as a 'loophole', even 
though a pledge to aid Denmark had been clear.573 As a result, Britain 'incurred [other 
states'] contempt by the way in which we blustered, threatened, and did nothing'.574 In 
the words of Cecil, 'Lord Russell's fierce notes and pacific measures' had weakened the 
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influence and stature of Britain, since other statesmen could no longer assume that its 
declarations were a reliable indication of its likelihood to use force.575 Russell, Patterson 
noted, had 'changed his opinions so often, that no reliance could be placed upon him by 
either party'.576 After Russell’s vapid posturing, Gleig complained, 'not the slightest 
notice is taken' of Britain, while Patterson saw 'her [Britain's] influence reduced to 
zero'.577 The liberals' tendency to strongly worded declarations on topics and issues for 
which they had no willingness to resort to the use of force, was, in the eyes of 
conservatives, very damaging to the stature of Britain. The hectoring and abuse by 
liberal statesmen of their foreign counterparts, over constitutional liberties and the 
sentiment of nationality and such, functioned merely to alienate these statesmen and to 
isolate Britain further.578 
 Conservatives did not doubt that Britain as a country was ready to be assertive 
and forceful when its interests were threatened.579 A crucial step was, however, to 
convey this willingness to other states. During the Black Sea affair, conservative 
commentators generally approved of Granville's initial response to the Russian 
declaration, because of the unusually 'manly and dignified' language which the Liberal 
foreign secretary used.580 Conservative commentators could not help, though, but to 
remind their readers that these words only mattered if they were to be followed by acts, 
and that the liberals were characteristically ambiguous on this score.581 Unfortunately, 
conservatives observed, other liberal statesmen and publicists quickly worked their 
pernicious influence.582 Their pacific statements and writings gave foreigners the 
impression that Britain lacked the will to use force, lacked the determination to demand 
that its interests be respected. Exactly such failed signalling, conservatives noted, had 
caused the Crimean War. If Russia were not quickly disabused of the mistaken 
impression of British lack of backbone given by the liberals, then 'there is no chance of 
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our escaping war': Russia would press Britain too hard again, thinking the British would 
bend, and war would again be unavoidable.583 If Britain refused to act as a great power, 
conservatives warned, it would no longer be treated as one. 
 During the Eastern Question crisis of 1876-78 the Conservative party was in 
government. Still, conservatives argued, liberals did not act as proper statesmen, in 
fostering the Bulgarian Agitation movement at home. As during the Black Sea affair, 
conservatives were concerned over the signals which liberal conduct sent to statesmen 
abroad. These statesmen would let their observations of Britain’s domestic political 
scene inform their expectations regarding the will of Britain’s cabinet and its ability to 
put its desired policy into effect. Domestic dissension would suggest a weak foreign 
policy. Conservatives observed this general effect in all major diplomatic episodes of the 
Eastern Question.584 In particular, they argued most strenuously that the liberals' 
agitation over the Bulgarian atrocities, in the words of Cowell, 'led to such false notion 
abroad as to our changed policy at home'; 'the authority of this country was suddenly 
weakened by apparent vacillation of purpose – apparent hostility to its own 
Government. … The whole drift of agitation was in favour of inviting Russian 
intervention'.585  
 Conservatives thus argued that the emotive ideals which liberals and radicals 
projected onto the European sphere warped their understanding of the basic dynamics 
of international politics, which necessitated an assertive foreign policy. Liberals hoped 
to avoid any and all conflict, but thereby invited war. They hoped to spur the realisation 
of their ethical ideals, but thereby merely squandered the stature of Britain.  
 
Conclusion 
Conservatives assumed that military force and countries' self-interest were the two 
phenomena central to understanding international affairs. These two insights combined 
to form the bedrock of conservative international political thought, and from them 
followed other important facets of this thought, such as the importance to effective 
diplomacy of having an army well-prepared for war, even in times of peace; the basis of 
cooperation between states in fragile, temporary convergences of interests; the 
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importance of a state safeguarding its stature; the vacuity of mere moral support; and 
the consequent necessity for an assertive foreign policy. From this perspective on the 
dynamics of international relations, conservative commentators criticised liberals for 
their poor statesmanship. On the one hand, liberals were not assertive enough in their 
foreign policy due to their aversion to any kind of conflict. On the other hand, liberal 
statesmen had a tendency to demand that their counterparts observe liberal values, 
without being willing to back up these demands with forceful action. Conservatives 
asserted that liberals, through these defects in their statesmanship, squandered Britain’s 
stature and merely invited the conflict they were so eager to avoid.  
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IV. International order 
Conservatives consistently worried about two major threats to the European order; 
general war and the hegemony of a single state. These concerns led them to advocate 
the pursuit of the two converse situations: order and stability and a balance of power. 
These were the main normative commitments of conservative commentators regarding 
international affairs. Conservatives discerned a major role for the treaty system in 
fostering stability in international affairs, by codifying settlements and thereby 
temporarily removing them from the realm of politics and diplomacy. As such, the 
Treaty of Vienna was a major linchpin of the international order, and conservatives 
initially despaired as they saw the treaty losing its grip on European affairs. They 
managed to regain their equanimity, however, due to their reliance on the balance of 
power. This notion pervaded their perspective on European international relations; the 
balance of power had been the final surety for the treaty system, and would, they hoped, 
manage to sustain the order and stability of Europe even after the Vienna settlement 
had gone. 
 
The possibilities of general war and European hegemony 
Conservatives perennially perceived two major threats to the established European 
order: that of European politics deteriorating into a general war, similar to the 
Napoleonic wars, with all its attendant suffering; and that of the preponderance or 
hegemony of a single state with overweening influence, and a concomitant loss of 
independent action for the other states of Europe. A threat to the independence of 
Britain itself did not feature significantly — conservatives from the educated classes 
generally derided invasion-scares as the irrational passion of the masses (even as they 
had no qualms using this sentiment to try and increase funding for Britain’s military).586  
 Conservatives feared that any military conflict between great powers, started 
with however limited aims in mind, could easily come to involve other states and turn 
into a general war between the great powers. They assumed that any conflict would 
inevitably tend to spread as it impinged on the interests of other states, drawing those 
in, until the whole of Europe would again be at war.587 This worry informed 
conservatives’ policy preferences. For instance, as the Crimean War was nearing its end, 
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conservative commentators still saw gains to be made for British interests and stature in 
continuing the war. They were haunted, however, by the possibility of the conflict 
turning into a general war, which would destroy the order of Europe. For most 
conservative commentators the fear of a general conflagration won out over the 
enticement of furthering British interests and prestige.588 Two decades later, in the early 
stages of the Russo-Turkish war, conservatives advocated mediation between Russia 
and Turkey by the other great powers in general and Britain in particular, in order to get 
the two warring parties to agree on a settlement as quickly as possible, and preclude the 
chance of the conflict spreading.589 And during the first stages of the 1859 Italian crisis, 
conservatives worried that the tensions in Italy might lead to a war, which could spread 
to involve the other powers of Europe. Indeed, the policy of Malmesbury and Derby, in 
power until June 1859, was aimed first at avoiding the incidence of war, and when war 
had broken out, at preventing its further spread.590  
 Conservatives were generally willing to countenance the upheaval of a general 
war only if it were necessary to prevent a bid for European hegemony, their second 
perennial concern. At different times throughout these decades, conservative 
commentators felt compelled to warn Britain of possible projects aimed at European 
hegemony entertained by Russia, France, and Prussia. During both the Crimean War 
and the Eastern Question crisis of 1876-78, they argued that Russian policy ‘was part of 
a system … which if not checked, would certainly make the Czar lord-paramount of all 
Europe'.591 Britain had to act vigorously in order to prevent the Tsar from 'establishing 
Russian supremacy in Europe' as part of his ‘schemes of vast and even universal 
empire'.592 Conservatives diagnosed Napoleon III with similar ambitions during the late 
1850s and early 1860s. With peace re-established after the 1859 armistice of Villafranca, 
conservative commentators speculated on the gains realised by Napoleon III and how 
these would enable him to tread a path of successive wars, conceived of as limited in 
scope, but which would nevertheless imperil the European order by furthering 
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Napoleon III’s project for hegemony.593  
 As Napoleon III’s ambitions faded, conservatives saw Bismarck as smoothly 
picking up the torch. At the time of both the Danish Duchies affair and the Sadowa 
conflict, they discerned the first intimations of a possible Prussian project of universal 
dominion.594 The 'transparent … object' of the Germans, conservatives argued, was 
territorial aggrandisement, in the context of a more general ambition to fashion 'a 
mighty German Empire', with the ability to wage aggressive war.595 Prussia’s campaigns 
of 1864 and 1866 had ‘resulted in the establishment of a military empire, on the future 
career of which it would be profitless to speculate'.596 But speculate conservatives did, 
especially after Prussia’s unification of Germany and defeat of France in the 1870-71 
war.  
 These possible projects for hegemony were doubly worrying to conservatives, 
because they thought that any actual bid for hegemony would spark a general war, as a 
coalition would be formed to stop the aggressor from gaining dominion over Europe. 
Conservatives here often referred to the Napoleonic wars as part of their argument. 
They for instance argued that Napoleon III was taking a similar course to Napoleon I, 
with Italian events being merely the first step in a grand project of French territorial 
expansion, which if left unchecked would destroy the existing order of Europe and 
again plunge its states into a “Great War”.597 Conservatives similarly combined these 
two concerns when considering the case of Prussia after the conclusion of the Franco-
Prussian war. They feared that newly united Germany might pursue further conquests 
or even a hegemonic position in central Europe — which would throw the continent 
into a general war.598 Hamley predicted that 'to restore equilibrium will be a difficult and 
possibly a bloody task', while Cecil noted that 'at this moment, the prospects of an 
enduring European peace are gloomy indeed'.599 European international relations faced 
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its two spectres of universal dominion and widespread war. 
 
The desirability of order and stability, and a balance of power 
Conservatives’ perennial concern over the threats of hegemony and general war led 
them to focus on securing the obverse of these situations, namely international order 
and stability and a balance of power. The rest of this chapter will discuss these two 
normative commitments of conservatives, whereby discussion of the first will lead to 
discussion of the second.  
 In the liberals' perspective on the international sphere, ‘right’ loomed large. 
Liberals posited the existence of a universal moral ideal, what Gladstone termed the 'law 
of nations' or 'idea of Public Right'.600 Liberals could detail this universal ethics in 
different ways, from merely asserting the desirability of strong parliamentary systems to 
advocating the self-determination of nationalities and abolition of all armies. Either way, 
they perceived a general progress of civilisation in the European sphere, which would, 
over time, lead to the realisation of their moral ideals across Europe. Liberals 
consequently apprehended the events of international politics through the moral 
categories contained in their universal ethics.  
 In the conservatives' perspective on the international sphere, ‘order’ loomed 
large. Their concern was not with the realisation of a particular ideal configuration of 
Europe, but firstly with the durability of the configuration which happened to exist and 
secondly that any change would be orderly – that war and the use of force, especially on 
a European scale, were avoided. Conservatives thought that the order and stability of 
the European sphere depended on a set of stable settlements, between the great powers, 
of the major potential disputes. There were lots of potential flashpoints in international 
relations where great powers' interests clashed. Europe was stable or orderly when none 
of these conflicts flared up in a major way. This meant that international politics 
consisted primarily of great powers manoeuvring around these major issues, trying to 
ensure stability through settlements, while also securing their interests to the fullest 
extent.  
 Conservatives considered the Treaty of Vienna, a collection of settlements of 
major potential conflicts, an important buttress of international stability. The 
dismantling of the Vienna settlement implied to them the overthrow of the existing 
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order of Europe. For instance, during the Crimean War, conservatives feared the 
conflict spreading partly because it would inevitably 'become complicated with 
revolutionary and national movements'.601 These movements agitated for major 
territorial changes which would dissolve the Vienna settlement and lead to a 
fundamental restructuring of the European order. While the Treaty of Vienna loomed 
large in the conservatives’ vision of the established order of Europe, in the years after 
the unification of Italy they eventually felt forced to acknowledge its demise.  
 The following two case studies, on the debates surrounding the unifications of 
Italy and of Germany, show how conservatives held a strong normative commitment to 
international order and stability, both in the context of the Vienna settlement and when 
deprived of its comforting structuring of European relations. Throughout their 
commentary on Italian events, conservatives were becoming increasingly concerned that 
this treaty system was losing its centrality both to thought on the proper configuration 
of Europe and to the practice of international affairs. They argued that the Vienna 
settlement was worthwhile because it preserved the peace, helped to avoid conflicts, and 
sustained the order of Europe – 'the great European system', as Forsyth put it, 'which, 
while it was respected, secured so many years of peace and prosperity to all'.602  
 Most liberals and radicals, in contrast, thought that order would only come to 
Europe once it was organised along the principles of nationality and of the sovereign 
will of the people. Until that time, those countries in which people lived under detested, 
foreign rule would be perpetual sources of instability and conflict. Russell stated that 
'the independence of states is never so secure as when the sovereign authority is 
supported by the attachment of the people', and Gladstone argued that 'with Italy as it 
has been ever since 1848 Europe never can be safe'.603 Europe would be peaceful only if 
justly ordered. This made the existing Vienna settlement, in its inattention to the wishes 
of the people, a source of disorder in the eyes of liberals, rather than the guarantee of 
European stability.604  
 The most salient difference between liberals and conservatives as regards the 
particulars of the debate on Italian events lay in the fact that when forced to choose 
between respecting treaty rights and realising abstract ideals, as they were over the 
course of Piedmontese and French annexations, liberals privileged the moral ideals 
                                                          
601 Patterson (1856a: 611). See also Cecil (1855: 1600-2); Lytton (1855: 1388-90); Patterson (1856a: 612, 
614); (1856b: 730). 
602 Forsyth (1861: 176-7). See also e.g. Derby and Malmesbury cited in Hicks (2007: 207). 
603 Gladstone (1860: 104). 
604 See e.g. Urban (1938: 387, 397, 427). See also Gladstone (1860: 103-4). 
124 
which they saw realised in Italian events, while conservatives preferred the maintenance 
of general order and stability through the Vienna settlement and treaty system. 
 Conservatives argued that war had its own logic and was strongly path-
dependent, and feared that a war to liberate Italy could easily snowball into a grand 
conflict. Most liberals seemed more sanguine – at least when considering Italian 
affairs.605 Gladstone considered the constrained use of force by Britain for Italian ideals 
a possibility: 'Neither do I think there is any force in the argument that when once 
committed we cannot recede – For what we have in view is a matter of right and 
order'.606 And when right and order were restored, Britain would withdraw again. 
Conservatives argued, in contrast, that even if a war was started with noble ideals in 
mind – and this was a very big if for conservatives – it would, firstly, quickly evolve into 
a struggle for supremacy between the belligerents, and, secondly, likely involve more 
and more other states over time, as their interests would be affected over the course of 
the conflict.607 
 In addition to this immediate threat of a general war, conservatives argued that 
the outcome of the Italian course of events provided amenable circumstances for 
further conflicts and disorder. Many worried about the structural changes which events 
had set in motion.608 In the aftermath of the Italian affair, the incentives, interests, and 
alliances of great power politics had shifted towards a configuration which promised 
further strife. They expected in particular a revival of the Eastern Question by a 
revisionist Austria and Russia, and the French conquest of the German Rhine 
provinces, as part of a French project for hegemony over Europe.609 Whatever allowing 
Austria to be turfed out of Italy might do for the Italians, it promised, according to 
conservatives, but more war and schemes of conquest for the rest of Europe.610 
 Over the course of events in Italy many liberal commentators preferred realising 
the aims of independence and unity for the Italians over maintaining the Vienna 
settlement and treaty system. As the Vienna settlement was both ignored in the practice 
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of international politics and rejected in the debates justifying the course of events, 
conservatives considered these events as a de facto step in and de jure acceptance of  
'breaking up the great European system' embodied by the Treaty of Vienna.611 
Piedmont’s lauded Italian interventions in fact broke down the settlement arrived at in 
Vienna, diminished respect for treaties, and through precedent provided further excuse 
for forceful meddling in the affairs of other states.612 Conservatives worried about these 
developments because they considered the Vienna settlement and its treaty system as 
essential in preserving the peace and stability of Europe.613  
 Conservatives’ concern over order and stability was also in evidence in the 
British debates on the rise of Prussia and unification of Germany. During both the 
Danish Duchies affair and the Sadowa conflict, conservatives discerned the germination 
of a more serious threat to the European order in the future. In 1864 Cecil, Oliphant, 
and Patterson all wondered whether the territorial changes would impair 'the 
equilibrium of Europe' and make less likely 'the preservation of peace'.614 Both episodes 
indicated an aggressive attitude on the part of the Germans, which was likely to threaten 
Europe’s peace and stability in the future.615 Liberals, in contrast, thought the Danish 
Duchies affair was significant – beyond the immediate interests involved – as it involved 
the norms of the self-determination of peoples and the spread of more liberal 
government.616 Moreover, liberals generally approved of the Prussian victory in 1866 
because it banished the deleterious influence of the Austrian Empire from the German 
states.617  
 During the Franco-Prussian war, liberals perceived a good side and a bad side in 
the conflict. They initially sided with Germany and thought the war significant 'as a 
moral crusade whose outcome must raise the pitch of European civilisation'.618 
Conservatives disagreed with this assessment.619 They disapproved of both sides; 
neither, they argued, had a sufficiently compelling reason to justify the general disorder 
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caused by a major war.620 As Prussia extended the war beyond its initial victory, in order 
to force the cession of Alsace and Lorraine, liberals came to think that Prussia had 
abandoned 'fair play between nations' and had lost the imprimatur of morality.621 
Germans, liberals felt forced to conclude, were not as high up on the ladder of 
civilisation as liberals had hoped and assumed.622 Conservatives also thought the 
demand for territory significant, as it meant that Prussia's statesmen had adopted an 
aggressive attitude.623 They felt anxious that this martial passion might persist and 
widen, starting Prussia down a path of conquest and towards a bid for the hegemony of 
Europe.624 A similar difference marked liberal and conservative thought on the 
significance of the annexations themselves. Liberals had a problem with the annexation 
of Alsace and Lorraine, because they thought that the unwillingness of the population 
to leave France and join Germany made annexation immoral.625 Conservatives had a 
problem with the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, because they thought that the loss 
of territory would spark an enduring passion for revenge in France, leading to renewed 
conflict at the earliest opportunity.626  
 Liberal concern, over and above particular British interests involved, was 
consequently over whether events represented the progress of civilisation or rather its 
stagnation.627 Conservatives in contrast primarily perceived the European sphere as in a 
state of order or disorder, with international crises consisting of threats to and 
deviations from this order.  
 
Treaties and stability and order 
Conservatives held a normative commitment to order and stability in Europe. How did 
they expect to secure this stability? This section analyses conservative thought on the 
role of treaties: first an account of the logic of the conservatives’ position that treaties 
helped to provide order, and then an account of the evolution of this thought over the 
decades studied, as conservatives were faced with the demise of the Treaty of Vienna 
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and had to adapt their world-view.  
 
The role of the treaty system in fostering order and stability 
Conservatives thought of treaties as important pillars of international stability.628 
Treaties, in the conservative conceptualisation of international politics, were codified 
settlements, which made explicit and fixed the compromise which the parties to the 
treaty had reached.629 Most treaties would reflect the settlement of a particular dispute, 
but they could, like the Treaty of Vienna, contain grander settlements. Conservative 
commentators usually merely referred to any particular treaties, despatches, or circulars 
relevant to their argument — they rarely invoked the concepts of international or public 
law. This made sense, because for conservatives international law was nothing more 
than the collection of all extant treaties.630 The international law of Europe was then 
nothing more than those particular provisions on which everyone had decided to agree; 
in particular, it had no universal ethical content. Liberals, in contrast, saw international 
law ‘as having an ethical core and purpose’ and as being subject to progress.631 
 Conservatives evinced a distinct preference for a general respect for treaties, but 
they did not think that such respect would make the international realm into a law-
based order. Instead, international relations was still fundamentally founded on the 
possible and actual use of force. Exactly this centrality of force made the treaty system 
valuable; the diplomatic order helped to canalise the effects of changed power 
differentials and made that the centrality of force need not imply the escalation of 
disputes to conflict and war. For conservatives, acting to sustain order and stability in 
international affairs consequently consisted of conserving the established framework of 
negotiated settlements and treaties. As Cowell stated, 'to renew the public respect for 
treaties … has been an achievement worthy of a great Conservative Power'.632 
Conservatives valued the treaty system because it helped to limit the incidence of war 
and, when war did occur, helped to constrain its scope. 
 The first way in which the treaty system sustained stability was by lessening the 
incidence of disputes. Treaties did so because they provided the settlements of 
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international politics with durability. Cecil for instance stated that 'the first object of a 
[peace] treaty … should be to make future war improbable. … the establishment of an 
enduring peace'.633 There were two ways in which conservatives thought more enduring 
settlements made for fewer conflicts.  
 Firstly, any time that an issue became contentious would involve the chance of 
the disagreement spiralling out of control and into open war.634 The more enduring the 
settlement, the less often did the dispute flare up, with its possibility of conflict and war. 
If there were no formal treaty reflecting the settlement arrived at, the issue would be in 
constant flux, drawing the attention of statesmen with every change in the particular 
balance of power sustaining the settlement, and requiring its constant adjustment. By 
making the terms of the settlement explicit, treaties ensured that states had less of an 
opportunity to challenge the details of the settlement in the future. By eliciting the 
consensual, formal agreement of all states involved, treaties ensured that any subsequent 
repudiation of its terms would reflect badly on that state’s honour.  
 Conservatives considered the clarity of a treaty, regarding the commitments 
made by the parties, as particularly valuable.635 Any vagueness or ambiguity would leave 
the issue on the table, with any party tempted to reopen it by advancing an alternative 
interpretation whenever they would see an advantage in doing so. Cecil argued, 
regarding the Danish Duchies affair, that 'the interminable character of this dispute, and 
the disastrous consequences to which it threatens to lead, are owing in no small degree 
to the singular vagueness' of the promises and engagements made by the parties.636 An 
unambiguous treaty would have removed the main excuse the German states gave for 
reopening the dispute.  
 Despite the relative clarity of treaties, though, conservatives still thought that a 
significant part of the game of diplomacy consisted in shaping the commonly 
recognised 'meaning to be attached to the promises' and statements made in extant 
despatches and treaties.637 Moreover, if strong self-interest and a perceived absence of 
forceful repercussions combined, then they trumped any action being clearly against 
treaty obligations: clarity in treaties had not stopped Russia from rescinding the 
neutrality of the Black Sea nor Italy from annexing the Papal States or Venice. A dispute 
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settled through an unambiguous treaty would be removed from international politics, 
but only until such a time that the provisions of the treaty either no longer fit the facts 
on the ground or until power relations changed to such an extent that one of the states 
would reopen the question anyway. 
 Secondly, more enduring settlements made negotiated settlements a more 
worthwhile alternative to the use of force for states wanting to secure their interests. 
Conservatives thought that international politics would only be stable and orderly if 
statesmen had a general sense that settlements would endure, that they were not 
constantly open to renegotiation.638 Treaties, being codified settlements, could provide 
this sense of constancy.639 This was most clear in their characterisation of the observe 
situation. If treaty obligations were routinely ignored, statesmen would start to think 
that they couldn’t trust each other to stick to their agreements, and that they 
consequently could not resolve their differences through negotiated settlements.640 If, 
however, the treaty system was robustly in place, statesmen needed to be less jealous 
and suspicious of each other’s aims and intentions, since they could trust that other 
states were not constantly angling to revive extant disputes. They would be less tempted 
to assume the worst. The more respect there was for treaties, the greater the chance that 
any particular dispute would be resolved through negotiation rather than war. 
 Treaties thus served, for conservatives, as a way of limiting the number of 
disputes which were current in international politics at any particular time. An 
international relations which revolved around settling disputes in treaties was at basis 
orderly and stable, with particular issues being re-settled at particular times. A world 
without robust treaties would be disorderly and unstable.  All settlements would be 
open to readjustment all the time, with the potential of conflict always present.641 And 
the more active disputes there were, the larger the chance of war, and any war could 
spiral out of control into a Europe-wide conflagration.  
 The second boon of the treaty system which conservatives discerned was that 
even if war broke out, the existence of a robust treaty system would help limit the scope 
and intensity of the conflict. Firstly, war would be less likely to spread, since great 
powers which were a part of the original settlement which was now in the balance 
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would feel less of a need to involve themselves. Cowell argued, in the context of the 
Eastern Question crisis in 1878, that as long as there was some trust in treaties, great 
powers would feel secure that they would have a say in the final settlement, which 
would help to keep them neutral even when the conflict came to involve their 
interests.642 In the terms of these conservatives’ theory of international relations, these 
great powers trusted that they would be able to apply their force hypothetically in 
negotiations afterwards, rather than needing to do so actually during the war. If, 
however, these neutral powers thought the belligerent powers would not recognise their 
right to a voice in the final settlement, as derived from their being signatories of the pre-
existing treaty, then they would be better off intervening before gains were a fait accompli. 
The treaty system consequently changed the incentive for neutral great powers into 
involving themselves in any conflict later rather than sooner, making the spread of 
conflict into a general war less likely.  
 Secondly, the treaty system helped to lessen the intensity of war. Here 
conservative commentators assumed that the victor in any war would only be satisfied 
with a material guarantee that its foe would not attack it in turn in the future. Treaties 
could include a guarantee of this nature – such as the neutrality of the Black Sea 
prescribed by the Treaty of Paris, which prevented Russia from again attacking the 
Ottoman Empire. However, conservatives noted, if treaties were in fact not generally 
respected, then they would not form a material constraint – as soon as the conquered 
state felt like it, it would ignore the treaty. If, conservatives predicted, the victor could 
not rely on a treaty to keep his foe harmless, then he would make sure to ruin the 
country sufficiently to make it incapable of revenge.643 The treaty system consequently 
limited the intensity and acrimony of war, making for a more speedy return to order and 
stability in international affairs. 
 Conservatives thought that statesmen ought to act in their country’s interest and 
sustain Europe’s stability and order, and thus ought to support the established treaty 
system, which initially included not least the Treaty of Vienna. This they considered part 
of a moderate as opposed to aggressive attitude towards international affairs.644 This 
sentiment was a far cry from Gladstone's formulation, as understood by conservatives, 
of the public good as deriving from a universal ethics for which a country should act 
even if in opposition to established treaties. For liberals more generally the Treaty of 
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Vienna and conservatives’ reverential attitude towards it inhibited the realisation of 
normative ideals in international affairs. For conservatives the Vienna settlement and 
the treaty system it represented were essential to their normative concerns for the 
stability and order of Europe. Since, for conservatives, a general respect for treaties, for 
the established order, was a crucial means in avoiding large-scale wars, they thought that 
even a cosmopolitan moral judgement would still place treaty obligations over the 
imperatives of sympathy.645 They considered the liberal alternative of a rejection of the 
Vienna settlement and focus on oppressed nationalities as a major problem and a cause 
of the degeneration of international relations over the 1860s, replacing a buttress of 
order and stability with facile justifications for intervention and war. This tension was 
readily apparent in the evolution of conservative thought on the Vienna Settlement and 
the treaty system from the 1850s to the 1870s. 
 
The evolution of conservative thought on the Treaty of Vienna 
Conservative thought on the Treaty of Vienna and the treaty system in general evolved 
over the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s, as conservatives perceived first threats to and then 
the demise of the Vienna settlement, and as they thought about the influence of the 
treaty system on international affairs after these changes. There were four parts to this 
evolution. During the debates surrounding the unification of Italy conservatives thought 
that Britain’s commitment to the Treaty of Vienna was flagging and they argued for the 
treaty’s worth. By the mid-60s, conservatives acknowledged the demise of the Vienna 
settlement and they worried about the disorder and conflict which would be involved in 
the establishment of a new grand settlement of Europe. By 1870-71 this anxiety both 
came to a head and evolved as conservatives no longer considered a new grand 
settlement possible, but instead feared the perpetual continuation of conflict and 
disorder. This anxiety passed, however, and by the late 1870s conservative 
commentators evinced a sense that stability could be secured in international affairs 
without a grand settlement on the model of the Treaty of Vienna, order being realised 
instead through the individual settlement of particular disputes.  
 Conservatives understood the Treaty of Vienna as a grand collection of 
settlements between the great powers, removing many potential disputes from the realm 
of international politics.646 They valued it highly as a great boon for stability and they 
advocated the maintenance of the treaty as a mainstay of British foreign policy, up to 
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and including their contributions to the debates surrounding the unification of Italy.647 
In these debates, conservative commentators evinced a sense that the normative force 
of the Vienna settlement was at stake. In reaction, they argued for the value of the 
Treaty of Vienna, the settlement of Europe which it contained, and the treaty system in 
general. 
 In their commentary on the build-up to the Italian war, conservatives 
emphasised that Austria had her claim to her Italian provinces based on the Treaties of 
Vienna. Respect for these treaties was the conservatives’ primary concern, and they 
stressed that any change in Italy ought to be 'within the limits of treaties … [not] in 
defiance of treaties'.648 Similarly, from the start of the war until after the peace of Villa-
Franca, conservatives argued that any territorial changes consequent to the war would 
not only negatively impact the balance of power, with Austria weakened, but would 
moreover entail a repudiation of the Vienna settlement, and thus of the treaty system in 
general. 'If the arrangements with respect to Italy … [made in] the treaty of Vienna, can 
be set aside’ without the consent of all the great powers, Tremenheere argued, 'a 
precedent will be established which must render all treaties illusory and insecure'.649 
 Conservatives placed a high value on respect for existing treaty obligations, on 
'the faith of treaties which, if once broken through, must cause incalculable mischief to 
the tranquillity of Europe'.650 If the Vienna settlement could be blithely ignored in this 
one instance, without any negative consequences for the offenders Piedmont and 
France, then, conservatives expected, other powers would also ignore it whenever this 
was to their advantage, leading to an international sphere where disputes were mediated 
only by respect for each other's immediately applicable force – a Europe of instability, 
disorder, and perennial strife and conflict.  
 Conservatives identified the principle of nationality as the particular threat to 
the normative force of the Vienna settlement.651 British liberal commentators and 
statesmen seemed to privilege the Italians’ sentiment of nationality over the Treaty of 
Vienna, which implied replacing the Treaty of Vienna with the principle of nationality as 
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the ordering principle of Europe. Conservatives reacted by arguing strenuously that 
liberals had it the wrong way around: the Vienna settlement secured stability, the 
principle of nationality would only bring disorder. For instance, in an 1862 article 
ostensibly reviewing a biography of Castlereagh, Cecil defended the Vienna settlement 
against the attacks of liberal authors like Matthew Arnold. Arnold argued that the 
treaties of Vienna, 'which took no account of popular ideas', had actually ensured the 
instability of Europe 'with their arbitrary distribution of the populations of Europe'.652 If 
the Vienna settlement had instead based itself on the principle of nationality and acted 
to create nation-states, then it might have made for a durable settlement. 
 Cecil vehemently disagreed with Arnold's assessment. He argued that the great 
powers had successfully 'adjusted their differences at Vienna', 'so secur[ing] lasting 
peace to Europe'.653 The aim of the Vienna settlement was to avoid another Great War 
between the great powers, and in this aim it had succeeded admirably. So, Cecil 
concluded, the Vienna system of treaty settlements between the great powers worked 
perfectly fine as the ordering principle of international affairs, and was not to be 
improved upon.654 Problems arose only when the domestic affairs of states became an 
issue in international politics.655 The principle of nationality, Cecil noted, functioned 
exactly to bring this pernicious state of affairs about – it made the domestic 
configuration of states into the ordering principle of international affairs.656  
 By the late 1850s and early 1860s, Cecil had thus become alarmed, like many 
other conservatives, at the possible disintegration of the Vienna settlement, and its 
being replaced among some liberals by the self-determination of peoples as the principle 
which could bring stability to Europe. Conservative observers were of the opinion, as 
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argued here by Cecil, that this norm would merely exacerbate existing sources of 
instability, and remove those supports for European order and stability as still averted a 
slide into another Great War. 
 From the early 1860s onward conservatives came to think that the major 
settlements contained in the Treaty of Vienna had become obsolete. Napoleon III had 
dissolved the alliances upon which the persistence of the Treaty of Vienna depended 
and had through his adventures subverted the major particular settlements, not least 
that of Italy.  Conservatives were anxious at this time over the implications for Europe’s 
politics. Patterson expressed this sentiment well: 'Europe is moving onwards into the 
vortex – into a series of convulsions … the old treaties are being forced into abeyance; 
and through new wars Europe is about to grope her way towards a new settlement. The 
prospect is to be deplored, but it must be faced'.657 Conservatives thought that the 
equilibrium of Europe would disappear together with the Vienna settlement. New 
settlements now needed to be struck and a new understanding between the great 
powers achieved: 'these events, and the episodes belonging to them', argued Hamley, 
'will mould the future of Europe, and influence the character and policy of coming 
generations'.658  
 What especially concerned conservatives, though, was the possibility that the 
European order as a whole would break down as 'many separate causes of quarrel … 
[were] brought to a head at once'.659 Patterson argued in 1859 that the ‘policy [of 
Napoleon III] … places Europe once more in the crucible', adding a year later that 
'Europe is being placed bit by bit in the crucible: it remain to be seen whether, however 
wary the Imperial experimenter, it will not yet slip through his fingers and blaze in one 
common conflagration'.660 The metaphor of the crucible used in these phrases sheds 
further light on the particular perspective of conservatives. Cecil also used it, writing of 
the ability of statesmen 'to throw Europe into the crucible and to cast her anew on a 
theoretic pattern'.661 Conservatives thought of the settlement of Europe as a fixed state 
of affairs, which could only be changed by being melted down in the conflagration of 
another Great War, after which the victor could recast Europe into a new order, a new 
settlement. This metaphor denied the possibility of incremental change, let alone 
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progressive development on some underlying principle, but rather assumed a general 
stasis, punctured only by short episodes of vast change which were themselves enabled 
only through violent disorder and general war, before Europe was “cast anew” and 
again ordered by a grand settlement. 
 Quite possibly, conservatives consequently worried, coping with the end of the 
Vienna settlement would not just come down to adjustments of individual settlements, 
but rather the European order as a whole would be thrown into doubt, treaties and 
negotiation would be rejected as viable instruments, and widespread conflict would 
ensue. During the 1860s, conservatives did not doubt that order and a grand settlement 
would eventually be achieved, but they also had little doubt that disorder and war would 
be rife before then. 
 In reflections on the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war and the Black Sea 
affair, conservatives evinced their most serious concern over the future of Europe. In 
placing the Black Sea affair in the context of recent events in European international 
politics, some conservatives felt compelled to conclude that the established diplomatic 
order of Europe had been unravelling over the last decade, promising a future of 
instability and disorder. The main symptom of this decline, they thought, was the lack 
of respect for the treaties of Europe – the decline of the system, epitomised in the 
Treaty of Vienna, of sustaining established settlements through their explicit affirmation 
in treaties.   
 Conservative authors noted with dismay that over 1870-71 first France and 
Prussia eagerly went to war with each other, and then both Russia and Prussia each 
decided just to ignore treaty obligations which did not suit them. These commentators 
considered this malaise as the flowering of seeds sown a decade earlier. The unification 
of Italy had involved the widespread denunciation of the Treaty of Vienna, the grand 
settlement which had for decades buttressed the order of Europe. With this precedent 
set by France, and applauded by British liberals and radicals, was it any wonder, 
conservatives noted, that the statesmen of Russia and Prussia felt no obligation to 
observe far less exalted treaties?662  
 Conservative commentators thought that the general apathy in reaction to 
Russia’s abrogation of the neutrality of the Black Sea was particularly telling of the little 
purchase which the treaty system then had on international affairs. They presented the 
Treaty of Paris as a model of restraint and reasonableness in the settlement of a dispute 
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after war — its provisions, rather than aggrandising the victors, only worked to prevent 
further aggression. If all states were willing to let a treaty of this particular innocence be 
ignored, then this, conservatives implied, meant in effect the delegitimisation of all 
treaties.663  
 In the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war and the Black Sea affair, 
conservative commentators were pessimistic as to the viability of the treaty system and 
the diplomatic order in general. Unlike in the mid-1860s, conservative commentators no 
longer had a sense that international politics would move towards a new grand 
settlement; such settlements had been discarded. Whereas a world ordered by a treaty 
system, conservatives thought, was at basis orderly and stable, with particular issues 
being re-settled at particular times, a world without robust treaties would be disorderly 
and unstable, with all issues in international relations active as potential conflicts all the 
time.664 They feared that brute force and frequent war would now become the dominant 
tenor of international relations. 
 Conservative commentators such as W.G. Hamley were consequently 
incredulous that Gladstone could write, in October 1870, that 'a new law of nations is 
gradually taking hold of the mind, and coming to sway the practice, of the world; a law 
which recognises independence, which frowns upon aggression, which favours the 
pacific, not the bloody settlement of disputes'.665 Gladstone's perspective, Hamley 
thought, wholly ignored the main recent events in international politics; these events, he 
argued, 'all indicate … that material force is resuming its sway over the minds of men, 
that cunning is before honour'.666 For Gladstone the unification of Italy and Germany 
were realisations of the principle of nationality and steps toward the reconfiguration of 
Europe along morally and providentially prescribed lines. The belligerency of France 
and Prussia, the secret diplomacy between Prussia and Russia, and the brusque attitude 
of Russia and the United States towards Britain could be regarded as minor deviations, 
to be smoothed out by that 'general judgement of civilised mankind'.667 For 
conservatives, these events were all part and parcel of the decline of respect for the 
treaty system of international diplomacy, which had been enshrined in the Treaty of 
Vienna. As The Standard concluded: 'Accustomed as Europe has been of late to witness 
brute force prevailing over right and law, henceforth all belief in the influence of even 
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the most solemn engagements between nations is shattered. The bases of public order 
and peace are dissolved, and nothing but war remains as the rule between nations.'668  
 Exceptionally, at this time, conservative commentators also used the language of 
morality in connection with respect for treaties. This was unusual: both before and after 
these years, surrounding even such hot-tempered debates as on the unification of Italy 
or the Eastern Question, conservatives explicitly cast sustaining respect for the treaty 
system in terms of interests rather than duty. Only during these years, at time of 
significant anxiety and whilst holding a bleak view of the immediate future for Britain in 
Europe, did conservative commentators assert that the decline in respect for treaties 
was tantamount to a decline in ‘the moral sense of the Western nations’.669 
Conservatives certainly considered a lack of respect for treaties as unfortunate, but 
generally argued that such respect was in the interest of states; they only occasionally 
scolded states for a moral failing in ignoring their treaty obligations. 
 While conservatives thus agonised over the demise of the Treaty of Vienna and 
its effect on European international relations, this anxiety eventually passed. By the 
second half of the 1870s, during the Eastern Question crisis of 1876-78, conservative 
commentators were more sanguine about the state of Europe.670 They had come to the 
conviction that Bismarck was a rational statesman who subscribed to the European 
order and its benefits and who would seek to sustain it. They now came to assert that, 
even without a strong respect for treaties under a grand settlement such as the Treaty of 
Vienna, treaties could still function to make settlements endure. Conservatives no 
longer invoked the apocalyptic scenarios, of either a general war to establish a new 
grand settlement or an international politics ruled by brute force and riven with conflict, 
which they sketched since they first apprehended the obsolescence of the Treaty of 
Vienna. Order and stability could still be sustained, if now in the particular settlements 
of individual disputes, rather than through a new grand settlement of Europe. 
International relations would be less stable than the Treaty of Vienna decades, but 
would still sustain order and prevent a slide into general aggression and war.  
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The impact of the demise of the Treaty of Vienna on conservative thought 
The end of the world as kept in order by the Treaty of Vienna was connected to 
changes in the conservatives’ theory of international relations, but changes of only a 
limited extent. The shift which took place between the 1850s and the late 1870s in the 
foreign policy emphasis of conservatives was from the maintenance of the Vienna 
settlement itself to a more general concern for the stability and order of Europe — a 
stability which was now not connected to any grand settlement, but to more particular 
settlements of individual disputes. 
 In both contexts conservatives thought that order and stability were only to be 
attained through the assertive engagement of British statesmen with the issues current 
in international politics. Vigorous action was needed to secure both Britain’s interests 
and the order and stability of Europe — but the context in which Britain was to act had 
changed, from a more associational politics where the great powers focused on 
maintaining the established general settlement of Europe, to a more direct focus on 
dealing with the threats to interests and stability and order involved in a particular 
dispute. But, as should be clear from the various foregoing analyses of debates, this was 
merely a difference of degree, not of kind. The Crimean War, for instance, already saw 
an animated discussion of particular British interests to be furthered and honour to be 
affirmed, while both the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War and the Eastern 
Question crisis saw a discussion of the role Britain was to play in maintaining the 
stability and order and safeguarding the balance of power of Europe.  
 This thesis hereby contributes to recent developments in the historiography of 
the high politics of Conservative foreign policy in Victorian Britain. This latter 
scholarship revolves around a welcome focus on the reality of Conservative statesmen’s 
foreign policy — particularly that of the Derbys and Malmesbury from the 1840s to the 
early 1870s.671 It rightly assigns to the periphery anecdotes about Disraeli’s flamboyant 
initiatives, which had previously received disproportionate attention. The difference in 
demeanour between the foreign policy of the Derbys during the 1850s and 1860s, and 
Disraeli in the late 1870s, leads these scholars to posit the existence of two distinct 
traditions of Conservative foreign policy: a Derbyite tradition which more or less 
concerned itself with order and stability, and a Disraelian tradition which roughly 
favoured prestige and the grand gesture under the guise of sustaining the balance of 
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power.672 They suggest that the Derbyite tradition had been the natural conservative 
position, but that it had been displaced by Disraeli’s newfangled flamboyance and 
marginalised ever since.  
 While Hicks and others are right to stress the differences in temperaments of 
the Derbys and Disreali and its influence of the high politics of foreign policy, their 
subsequent postulation of distinct ways of thinking about international politics in the 
conservative tradition is perhaps a bit too ambitious a claim. 
 This thesis shows that there was, at least among conservative members of the 
metropolitan educated class, a fundamental continuity of perspective on international 
relations from the early 1850s until the late 1870s. Most tellingly, the notions 
emphasised by Disraeli, such as the importance of an assertive foreign policy and of 
Britain’s honour or stature, were actually not novel at all — they had been prominent 
concerns of conservative commentators since at least the Crimean War and were an 
integral part of their worldview. The Derbys meanwhile reflected another major part of 
the conservative world-view, in their concern over stability and order.  
 The impression of a major change in traditions from the 1860s to 1870s is the 
result of a change in the perspectives held by the major actors of conservative high 
politics, combined with changes in the reality of European politics. The preponderance 
of the Derbys and their focus on stability and order gave way to that of Disraeli with his 
focus on honour and vigour, at the same time as the focus of European politics shifted 
from the established settlement of the Treaty of Vienna to the assertion of interests in 
particular disputes.  
 The possibility of a major change in the conservative worldview effected in 
these decades is a plausible enough assumption when one studies the high politics of 
the period, but this thesis argues that an analysis of a wider body of conservative 
commentary shows that the conservative theory of international politics in fact 
remained remarkably constant. The difference was that conservative commentators 
recognised the Treaty of Vienna as a viable instrument through which to pursue both 
order and stability and the interests of Britain only until the early 1860s. After that time, 
conservatives came to think they needed to utilise other means to secure their ends, and 
the same theory of international politics which in the context of the 1840s and 1850s 
had implied a foreign policy focused primarily on maintaining the Treaty settlement, 
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implied in the 1860s and 1870s a foreign policy which focused first of all on the 
vigorous assertion of British interests in the contexts of particular disputes. Rather than 
securing British interests and European order through the maintenance of one grand 
treaty, conservatives thought that Britain now needed to secure interests and order one 
dispute and settlement at a time.  
 
Treaties and the role of force 
Conservative thought on international order had changed with the demise of the Treaty 
of Vienna, but in the end they could adapt relatively easily, because of their notion that 
international law was not part of a different order, but still enmeshed in a world of 
force. This section expands on that aspect of their understanding of the workings of 
treaties, and starts the shift from talking about international order and stability to talking 
about the balance of power and its role in international relations. Conservative 
commentary showed their ambivalence towards treaties and the treaty system; on the 
one hand they valued this system as a constraint on power politics, and they worried 
about its perceived demise, while on the other hand they subsumed treaties and the 
treaty system, in their particular analyses, under the basic dynamics of the balance of 
power. 
 Conservatives thought that the salience of treaties wholly depended on power, 
on states having the willingness and ability to enforce the treaties. Statesmen would not 
feel morally bound to keep their treaty obligations. Treaties were codified settlements, 
and consequently forced states to compromise their interests. A state would only be 
willing to do so, conservatives asserted, as long as it thought that other states would use 
force to sustain this compromise. 'It is only natural, as well as an established fact,’ 
Patterson observed, 'that the Power upon whom a treaty has been imposed, seeks the 
first opportunity of shaking off its obligations'.673 The purchase of treaty obligations on 
statesmen rested, conservatives thought, on the likelihood that transgressions would be 
rectified.674  
 Conservatives thought that the peace treaty concluding the Crimean War with 
Russia was particularly problematic in this sense. Establishing the peace settlement had 
required a coalition of Britain and France, and it was all too likely that the interests of 
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these states would diverge in the future, creating a situation where they would not be 
willing or able to join together again to coerce Russia and enforce the treaty – at which 
point, conservatives thought, Russia could be expected to promptly rescind it, raising 
the Eastern Question once more.675 
 During the debates surrounding the unification of Italy, conservatives worried 
whether the Treaty of Vienna was still sufficiently buttressed by force. The concern 
besetting conservatives was that with the Italian episode Europe had arrived at a state of 
affairs where one great power, France, was actively trying to dismantle the Vienna 
settlement; another, Russia, was willing to let this happen; while a third, Britain, seemed 
to lack the vigour and decisiveness needed to form a coalition of powers committed to 
preserving the Vienna settlement.676  
 This primacy of force also came to the fore in conservatives’ argument on 
Britain’s legal disputes with the North during the American civil war. Discussing the 
Trent affair, Forsyth asserted that power, not legal detail, was where the crux of the 
matter lay: 'The case in fact lies in a nutshell. We claim for our flag the right to cover with its 
protection all persons found under it … The moral support which Great Britain has 
received from the other European Powers in this dispute is without parallel'.677 What 
mattered was not some general injunction of an abstract international law, but that 
powerful Britain made a particular claim for itself, asserted a certain right, and was 
backed up in this by the other great powers of Europe. The North did not have the 
letter of the law on its side, Forsyth argued, but even if it did, he continued, the more 
pertinent fact was that its actions conflicted with the British interpretation of the law, 
and that this British interpretation was shared by the other great powers. Rules were 
only viable as long as there was a willingness and ability to enforce them – after all, 
conservatives argued, it had been the threat of force, not the legalities involved, which 
had made the North reconsider and release their prisoners678 – and by extension, force 
determined in the end the practical meaning of the rules. 
 The aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war further proved, in the minds of 
conservatives, the dependence of treaties on a will and ability to enforce them. The 
collapse of French power had suddenly made such enforcement unlikely for several 
established settlements. Hence, conservatives argued, Russia's rejection of the Black Sea 
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clauses and Italy's usurpation of the temporal power of the Pope.679 As The Standard 
noted regarding the Treaty of Paris: 'If England and France will not fight to maintain 
the stipulations of the treaty, Russia may treat that great European act as waste paper'.680 
Russia saw hostile France powerless, friendly Prussia the dominant power on the 
continent, and calculated that, Gladstone being in power in Britain, there existed neither 
the will nor the ability among its signatories to sustain the Treaty of Paris by force – so 
Russia promptly repudiated it.681 
 Conservatives' thoughts on treaties were consequently rather ambivalent. They 
desired to uphold treaties' de jure permanent validity while acknowledging that treaties' 
de facto impermanence was natural and inevitable. They argued for the importance of 
general respect for the treaty system, and agonised about the consequences of the 
seeming decline of this respect — and meanwhile, in their particular analyses they 
invariably argued that what sustained a treaty was the potential application of military 
force in defence of its protocols. Indeed, they then broadened this analysis to argue that 
stability and order in Europe could only be secured through a general balance of power 
between the great powers. 
 
The balance of power as the principle ordering international relations  
Conservatives thought of the balance of power as the final security against their two 
main concerns in international politics: the possibilities of general war and universal 
dominion. The balance of power helped to prevent a state of perennial dispute and 
conflict which would quickly lead to the outbreak of another Great War and it stopped 
any state establishing itself as hegemon of Europe, impinging on the independence of 
the great powers. Conservatives used the concept of a balance of power in two senses, 
imagined both as a general feature of the European sphere and as a particular state of 
affairs in this sphere. In different contexts, the balance of power could consequently be 
'adjusted' or 'secured'.682  
 As a general feature of Europe, the balance of power, in the minds of 
conservatives, meant the state of relations among the great powers. The great powers 
would each have the capability to project a certain amount of power – their ability and 
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willingness to use force – and they would have certain relationships with each other – 
antagonism or cooperation over particular issues, and alienation or alliances between 
the statesmen in general. Through a 'calculation' of these different elements statesmen 
gained a sense of the balance of power in Europe, the particular distribution of power 
and ability to act among the great powers.683  
 Conservatives often, though, used the concept in a second sense, to describe a 
discrete state of affairs. In this sense, power in Europe – among the great powers – was 
either balanced, or not. The balance which conservatives imagined was not one of equal 
measures of power among the great powers, or even of roughly equal alliances arraigned 
opposite each other. Balance did not mean positive equality, it meant absence of a 
particular state of excessive inequality. Conservatives thought that there existed a 
balance of power if no great power had achieved such a predominant position, through 
its ability to use force and relations with other states, that it could assert its interests at 
will.684 The balance of power consequently existed primarily in the recognition by every 
great power that if it were to try and use force to adjust the major settlements of 
Europe in its favour, it would be stopped by the other great powers.685 
 While conservatives often wrote of the balance of power of Europe, they 
generally narrowed their sense of scope in particular analyses, to the balance between 
certain great powers in a particular region. The general notion of a European balance of 
power certainly had meaning — conservatives were for instance alarmed by the changed 
balance of power after the upheaval caused by France’s defeat and Prussia’s ascendancy 
in a united Germany in the Franco-Prussian war — but even in this case such a lack of 
balance had effect in the more local equilibria which it upset, such as that sustaining the 
neutrality of the Black Sea. Conservatives’ anchoring of the general balance of power of 
Europe in local equilibria was especially evident in their commentary on the Crimean 
War and the Eastern Question crisis. 
 Conservatives argued that the Crimean War needed to be fought to preserve the 
balance of power of Europe. At the same time, they equated this result not with a 
general diminishing of Russian power, but with safeguards in one particular locale only. 
Securing the European balance of power meant, in effect, enforcing a stable equilibrium 
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, by obviating the possibility of Russian 
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aggrandisement in the region. They consequently thought that the destruction of 
Russia's Black Sea fleet and its military port at Sebastopol were rightly the main focus of 
the British and French war effort.686 Finances were Russia's weakest point; the 
destruction of its relevant expensive capital goods – its ships, ports, and fortresses on 
the Black Sea – would consequently do most to secure the balance of power.687 
 During the Eastern Question crisis of 1876-78, as in the Crimean War, 
conservatives focused on a balance in the particular region, rather than a balance of 
military power as such. Cowell for instance asserted that there was no need for Russia 
to be 'suppressed … [and] shattered to pieces'; rather, it would be enough to 
'counterbalance that [Russian] influence'.688 Conservative commentators further 
remarked that there was no possibility of a balance of power as long as Austria and 
Germany failed to cooperate in 'decisive action' to counterbalance Russia in South-
Eastern Europe.689 Only when Germany and Austria formed an alliance around the time 
of the Congress was the balance of power in the area restored.690 Conservatives 
understood the balance of power as a constant, localised balancing between the great 
powers whose interests were involved in the particular dispute. 
 
The balance of power - securing general stability 
Conservatives thought that the overall order and stability of Europe depended on the 
durable settlement between great powers of the major issues of international politics.691 
The likelihood that a particular settlement would again become contested depended not 
just on developments intrinsic to the issue, but also on developments in the relations 
between great powers in general. The order and stability of Europe were based on the 
existence of an equilibrium, a balance of power between the great powers. 
Conservatives initially conceived the balance of power of doing so by sustaining the 
Treaty of Vienna; after the latter’s demise they argued the balance of power sustained 
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the diplomatic order in general. Conservatives thought that an associational balance of 
power was needed to uphold the Treaty of Vienna and its settlement of Europe. Only 
an alliance of states willing to pool their forces with the aim of maintaining the Treaty 
could secure this settlement.692 In contrast, their later conception of order and stability 
sprouting from individual settlements could function in context of adversarial balance-
of-power politics, too. The conservatives' understanding of great power politics and the 
European order was thus wrapped up in these two concepts of equilibrium and the 
balance of power, each with multiple connotations. 
 Conservatives talked about equilibrium as something that pertained to Europe – 
'the European equilibrium' or 'the equilibrium of Europe' – and that could be 'unsettled' 
and 'restored'.693 A state of equilibrium first of all meant stability, a sense that the major 
settlements between the great powers were secure and enduring.694 As Hamley 
explained, while equilibrium existed 'the nations dozed pleasantly', merely concerned 
with increasing their prosperity.695 Equilibrium would exist when the settlements 
between the great powers adequately reflected their respective willingness and ability to 
use force over the issue.  
 Equilibrium was equated with a particular balance of power – one where power 
was indeed balanced.696 Equilibrium was impossible if there were no balance of power; 
if a great power achieved a position in which it no longer feared reprisals by other great 
powers for its actions. If given such an opportunity to remould existing settlements 
with little chance of censure, the statesmen of a great power would, conservatives 
thought, be tempted to do so. The major settlements would again become issues of 
dispute. Thereby the equilibrium of Europe would be unsettled, and, if this course of 
action went unchecked, possibly be shattered.697  
 Conservatives observed this link between the balance of power and the order 
and stability of Europe most closely in 1870-71. First had come a major upset of the 
balance of power, as French power fell away and Prussia ascended in leadership of 
united Germany. Then, with Italy annexing the Papal States and Russia abrogating the 
neutrality of the Black Sea, came the disorder and disputes — such ‘barefaced robbery’ 
— which could be expected to follow the absence of a balance of power, as states 
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attempted to change existing settlements to their favour.698 
 Conservative commentators predicted that the actions of Russia and Italy were 
but the first of many such. They wondered whether statesmen would start to lose their 
confidence in the world of diplomacy, with not only these settlements being revised 
unilaterally, but also Prussian statesmen making secret agreements and plots.699 Indeed, 
conservatives thought that the diplomatic order itself depended on the balance of 
power. Statesmen could only be trusted in their commitments if they were convinced 
they would in the end not be able to renege on these commitments. This conviction 
disappeared, conservatives thought, once the balance of power was gone, and 
consequently trust and confidence became impossible. 'Until equilibrium is restored', 
Hamley lamented, 'there can no longer be belief in assurances or treaties'.700  All that 
was left as a means in international politics was the actual use of force. International 
politics would turn into a 'general scramble', involving the widespread use of force.701  
 Conservatives presented the behaviour of the American North as a 
confirmation of their assumption that the balance of power made for a civilised 
international politics. Hamley argued that 'the main source of the less pleasing points of 
American character has been their undisputed supremacy on that great continent. 
Amongst the great powers of Europe courtesy and forbearance have become essential 
attributes of their constant intercourse' – they generally adhered to the conventions of 
the existing diplomatic order.702 America, in contrast, was 'exposed to none of the 
vicissitudes and contests that keep the kingdoms of Europe on their guard', not being a 
part of the European military sphere.703 Americans consequently had nothing but 
'contempt', Forsyth concluded, 'for many of the rules which regulate the intercourse of 
the old monarchies of Europe'.704 Only after the expected secession of the South would 
American statesmen ‘be infinitely more agreeable than before. The salutary check of a 
neighbour who may become an enemy, will produce there, as in Europe, a courteous 
and considerate diplomacy'.705 Conservatives thought that only because a state was 
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subject to a balance of power, did it follow the rules of the diplomatic order.  
 In the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war and the Black Sea affair, 
conservatives observed that Europe's international relations would be fraught with 
instability until either France managed to regain something of her former position, or 
Britain were to show leadership and take on an assertive role, exerting herself to restore 
balance to Europe's international sphere.706 They argued that these events were a strong 
counter-example against those people who thought that the notion of the balance of 
power was obsolete and ought to be abandoned. Events had confirmed the balance of 
power, conservatives asserted, both as an analytical perspective through which to 
understand the course of events, and as a necessary condition for peace and stability in 
international politics. 
 
The balance of power – preventing hegemony 
Conservatives thought that the balance of power, as well as enabling stability and order, 
was necessary to stop any state establishing itself as hegemon of Europe. If there was a 
balance of power, then rather than one state dominating international relations, all the 
great powers had influence on affairs and could foster their interests. Conservatives 
generally assumed that, if a great power were to make a bid for hegemony, a coalition 
would arise sooner or later to restore the balance of power. For statesmen to secure the 
balance of power, Hamley argued, meant that they 'would have ready some plan of joint 
action against a possible time of jeopardy', 'to check the inroads of tyrannous power, if 
such should attempt to dominate'.707 In their occasional exhortations for Britain to form 
such a coalition, they hoped to pre-empt other states making such a bid in the first 
place, avoiding the major war which would otherwise be needed to stop them. The 
balance of power consequently functioned primarily in the recognition by all the great 
powers that if they were to try and use force to adjust the major settlements of Europe 
in their favour, they would be checked by the other great powers.708 Securing the 
balance of power so as to prevent a bid for hegemony was a major strand of 
conservative commentary on the Crimean War and Eastern Question, and in the 
aftermath of the unifications of Italy and Germany. 
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 The primary aim of the Crimean war, conservatives thought, was to stop 
Russia’s bid for hegemony over Eastern Europe. Conservatives argued that the balance 
of power would collapse if Russia were allowed to conquer the Ottoman Empire’s 
European provinces; Russia would gain unassailable military leverage over central 
Europe, acquire preponderant influence over these states, and, while not threatening 
French and British independence directly, would no longer need to concern itself with 
their wishes and concerns — Russia would in effect be the only remaining great power 
of Europe.709 Conservatives thought that the threat of Russian hegemony justified, even 
compelled, Britain and France to confront Russia and to go to war over the issue if 
necessary. Peace was valuable, but only with a balance of power in Europe could there 
be a true peace, with independence for all countries – 'a calm which falls like quiet 
sunshine all over Europe, and allows each nation to develop its powers in its own 
way'.710  
 In their reflections on the Eastern Question crisis of 1876-78 conservatives 
again characterised Russia as having the long-term goal of 'establishing Russian 
supremacy in Europe' through its ‘schemes of vast and even universal empire’.711 
Conservatives consequently presented Russian aggression as a threat to 'the 
independence and liberties of the world' and called upon Britain and the rest of Europe 
to join together to '[defend] the cause of freedom and civilisation' and be the 'champion 
of European liberty' — understood as the independence of the established states of 
Europe from domination by a hegemonic state.712 
 Over the course of the unification of Italy, conservative commentators argued 
that these events should be placed in the context of a likely grand French project of 
aggrandisement.713 Patterson in particular argued that Napoleon III 'aims to attain for 
her [France] the position of despotic arbiter in the affairs of Europe'.714 Conservatives 
consequently exhorted Britain to act assertively to check France in its possible bid for 
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hegemony. If the aims of Napoleon III were the aims of Napoleon I, then of course, 
conservatives implied through this analogy, British policy too ought to take its cue from 
the victorious British who had dealt with the first Napoleon. Whereas many liberal 
commentators at this time favoured an alliance with France in support of liberal values 
across Europe, conservatives argued that Britain ought to establish a coalition to 
oppose France, in order to pre-empt a possible French bid for hegemony and maintain 
the balance of power in Europe.715 
 Not every war disturbed the balance of power or threatened to shatter the 
equilibrium of Europe. During the events of the mid-1860s, such as the Danish 
Duchies affair and the 1866 Prussian war with Austria, conservatives did not perceive 
the European order as being under threat – 'it is not without anxiety, though without 
alarm, that we look forward to the events of the year', wrote Patterson in 1864.716 But 
whatever might have been their reactions in the 1860s, after the Franco-Prussian war, 
conservatives did think that the European order was in peril. The balance of power had 
been lost with the collapse of French power, the collusion of Russia and Prussia, and 
the isolation of Britain. Prussia was now in a position where it might indeed feel 
untouchable, free to embark on a course of conquest with minimal immediate 
opposition from the rest of Europe. Hence the importance which conservatives 
ascribed to the attitude which the Prussian statesmen would take.717 This was not a 
matter, conservatives argued, which Britain ought to leave to chance, but currently it did 
so.  
 Conservatives consequently thought it crucial to secure at least the possibility of 
a balance of power, after which equilibrium and a confidence in the European order 
could slowly return, even if, as Hamley predicted, 'to restore equilibrium will be a 
difficult and possibly a bloody task'.718 Redressing any of three issues would suffice, 
conservatives thought, to restore a balance to the extent that the Prussian statesmen 
would consider reprisals too likely and would not adopt an aggressive attitude. Enough 
of a balance of power would be achieved if either France was restored to strength – but 
this was the business of years and would consequently take too long; if the relationship 
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between Russia and Prussia was based in antagonism rather than collusion719 – 
conservatives considered the breakdown of cooperation likely sooner or later, but 
argued that it could not be counted upon, as both sides still gained from their 
relationship at the moment; or finally if Britain would organise a coalition with the 
weaker states of Europe as a potential counterweight to an aggressive Prussia. 
Conservatives argued for the assertive leadership of Britain in European politics as the 
best means to secure a balance of power and prevent Prussia from making a bid for 
hegemony.720  
 
Nationalist justifications for annexation: the balance of power at stake 
By the 1870s, the familiar threat of a state’s desire for hegemony to the balance of 
power was joined in conservative commentary by a new and similarly threatening desire 
of states and peoples, for pan-ethnic unity. When discussing Germany’s possible bid for 
hegemony in 1870-71 and Russia’s aggression in 1876-78, conservatives commented on 
the Pan-Teutonic and Pan-Slavic sentiment which helped to drive this desire for 
aggrandisement forward. 
 From the perspective of conservative commentators a nationalist desire for pan-
ethnic unity was a threat similar to the desire for hegemony. In both cases foreign policy 
was made not to further limited interests, but rather as part of a grand emotive project. 
And, conservatives noted, given the expansive definitions which were often given to the 
extent of the ethnicity, the two projects were all but indistinguishable in practice. Wilson 
explicitly remarked that the exhortations in German debates for Germany to rule 
‘wherever any vestige of that nationality is extant’ were in effect 'German claims to 
something like universal dominion'.721 Both pan-ethic unity and universal dominion 
implied the creation of a vast empire through a series of major wars, resulting in the 
absence of any semblance of a balance of power in Europe.722 Conservative 
commentators seldom seriously mooted the possibility of Britain being invaded, let 
alone conquered — what they did fear was another major war ending with Britain no 
longer being a great power of the first rank. This was the threat which German and 
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Russian visions of a grand Teutonic or Slav empire held, just as surely as the Spanish 
and French desires for universal dominion had done in yesteryear.  
 Conservatives not only considered the sentiment of nationality to be a problem 
because it enjoined extensive conquests which would destroy the balance of power. 
They also argued that the principle of nationality was problematic, because it undermined 
the legitimacy as well as the reality of the balance of power, by being proposed as an 
alternative ordering of European politics. In this context, a leader writer for The Globe 
argued that settlements based on interests and power, and a balance of power sustaining 
the treaties enshrining these settlements, was still the best way to organise the 
international sphere. He set the balance of power off against the preferred organising 
principle of many of its detractors: the principle of nationality. These detractors argued, 
the author stated, that a balance of power could and should not be maintained, since it 
involved infringing on the principle of nationality. It was fine to prevent one state from 
becoming too powerful when this power was 'attained by the forcible annexation of 
alien races', but no longer now that such power 'is acquired by the natural concretion of 
kindred ones'.723 The ethical principle of nationality trumped the pragmatic 
consideration of the balance of power.  
 The Globe's author was willing to concede this point initially, for the sake of 
argument. 'But', he continued, 'what then? What is to prevent an empire of race from 
becoming an empire of conquest?' Once a state had become the dominant power 
through national accretion, there would be no barrier left to stop it from expanding 
further and conquering its neighbouring small, independent states. And, the author 
noted, there was every reason to assume such a development: 'We shall be told, of 
course, that we start from a mistake, because empires founded on nationality will 
respect nationality in others. But that is the purest assumption. Is it not characteristic of 
dominant races to assume they have missions?'724 Allowing the principle of nationality 
to trump the balance of power – not stopping a state from expanding into a position of 
continental dominance, when such an expansion came through national accretion – 
would finally allow that old bugbear of European politics, a hegemonic state bent on 
universal dominion, to be realised. And what the organising principle of international 
relations should first of all provide, the author argued, was 'security for the peace of the 
world [and] the liberty of nations [i.e. states]'.725 The balance of power, conservatives 
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observed, had always secured Europe against both general war and universal dominion, 
and was still Europe’s best guarantee of order, stability, and independence.  
 
Conclusion 
The notion of a balance of power was central to conservatives’ conceptualisations of 
international relations. Above all, it allowed them to cope with their two main worries 
regarding European politics: a descent into general war and the rise of a hegemonic 
great power. The balance of power was by definition a guarantee against the latter, and 
also worked to prevent the former, by allowing statesmen to put their faith in a 
diplomatic order based on settlements encoded in treaties. The demise of the Treaty of 
Vienna alarmed many conservative commentators, who feared an international relations 
of unfettered force. However, their commitment to the notion of the balance of power 
allowed them to eventually envisage an orderly and stable Europe which rested no 
longer on one grand settlement, but on treaties codifying settlements of individual 
disputes — treaties whose purchase was in the end buttressed by a balance of power in 
Europe. The main threat to the European order was now not a king desiring universal 
dominion, but the transformative and normative force of the sentiment and the 
principle of nationality. 
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V. Nationality and International Relations 
The “principle of nationality” featured prominently in liberals' analyses of international 
affairs. This chapter analyses conservative thought on nationality, and thereby shows 
how conservative thought was distinctive with regards to one of the main ontological 
and normative commitments of Victorian liberal international thought. The chapter 
contributes six insights regarding the role which notions of nationality played in 
conservative analyses. Firstly, conservatives accorded a relatively minor role to the idea 
of national character in making sense of international politics. Secondly, they spoke of 
the sentiment rather than the principle of nationality, with its referent lying in the 
imagination rather than in reality. Thirdly, conservatives did not consider national 
sentiment to be the main driving force behind the unifications of Italy and Germany. 
Fourthly, they argued that notions of nationality had led to an increase in aggression in 
international politics. Fifthly, they rejected the normative principle of nationality. Sixthly 
and finally, conservatives argued that the sentiment of nationality jeopardised the values 
of liberty and patriotism, and ought to be renounced. But first, to provide the necessary 
context for the discussion of conservative thought, the chapter starts off with a succinct 
description of the role of the concept of nationality in the thought of the conservatives' 
liberal interlocutors. 
 
The conservatives' liberal interlocutors and nationality 
This brief discussion of the role of the idea of nationality in liberal thought had best 
start with the notion of patriotism. As Varouxakis has argued convincingly, Victorian 
thinkers assumed the necessity of a sense of patriotism among a people – a love of one's 
country and a pride in its exemplary institutions, traditions, or convictions. The concept 
was generally affirmed, while at the same time its exact meaning was 'highly contested', 
with authors distinguishing between 'commendable … [and] reprehensible form[s]' of 
patriotism.726 Liberal thinkers often employed notions of nationality when elaborating 
on the proper meaning of patriotism, resulting in a language in which patriotism and 
nationalism were not clearly distinguished.727  
 Victorian liberal thinkers assumed the existence of a national community with a 
national character.728 Liberals advocated a patriotic pride not in institutions per se, but in 
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that these furthered certain universal ideals and signified certain admirable traits of the 
national character.729 Love of country now implied love of nation, too. In addition, 
these liberals had a strong concern for the general progress of mankind. Liberals 
consequently distinguished between an exclusive pride in the traits and achievements of 
the country, which they rejected, and an admirable pride in the nation (and its 
improvement) as subsumed in a concern for mankind (and its progress) in general.730 
 Victorian thinkers shared not only a general affirmation of patriotism, but also 
the notion that patriotism was a necessary principle of social cohesion. Where they 
differed was as to what this cohesion consisted in. Liberals perceived the principle of 
cohesion of society as present among the population, which was to ‘feel that they are 
one people’, a national community with a national character.731 For conservatives, in 
contrast, cohesion lay not in a shared identity, but rather in a shared patriotic pride in 
certain institutions. People all had a vertical relationship with certain institutions, such 
as the Crown and the Empire, rather than a horizontal relationship with one another.732  
 Notions of nationality, especially that of national character, were of central 
importance to the attempts of liberals to make sense of their world. Varouxakis is right 
to remark that, while there were 'cursory references [to collective characteristics] in the 
works of most thinkers, only some proceeded to theoretical discussions of the very 
category [of national character]'.733 This distinction well illustrates the very different 
roles which the notion of national character played in the thought of liberals and 
conservatives. For liberals the notion of national character was central to their schemes 
of analysis and interpretation. Liberals primarily came to think of national characters as 
not the result of a type of government – the view dominant in the eighteenth century – 
but as a determinant of what type of government the country was fit for, and would 
have.734 Bagehot asserted that all 'thinking persons' agreed 'that of all … circumstances 
… affecting political problems, by far and out of all question the most important is 
national character', while Mill thought that 'a philosophy of law and institutions, not 
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founded on a philosophy of national character, [was] an absurdity'.735 As a consequence, 
the national characters of countries and their implications for government and politics 
'were problems that preoccupied Victorian thinkers intensely'.736 For conservatives, 
though, the situation was rather different. 
 
Conservatives on national character, national community, and nation 
The notion of national character did not feature much in conservatives' attempts to 
make sense of their world. While they would on occasion talk of such things as 'the 
political traditions and social habits of the British people', the idea of national characters 
was assigned at best a minor causal role in their analyses of the origins of foreign policy 
and the course of international affairs.737 This was not because conservatives explicitly 
rejected the notion of certain general differences between the populations of different 
countries, but because for them any such alleged difference was not particularly salient 
to international politics. This was the case both because conservatives had little sense of 
a national community which could share this character in the first place, and because 
conservatives thought of international politics as enacted by statesmen, rather than by 
such a national community as a whole. 
 
Conservatives, national character, and national community 
The first reason why the notion of national characters did not feature much in 
conservative thought was because conservatives did not perceive a homogeneous 
national community within a country which would share such a character. 
Conservatives thought that the differences between classes within a country were more 
meaningful than the commonalities within each country and differences between them. 
In addition, conservatives considered convergent or divergent interests as more 
influential on the position of states than the (dis)similarity of peoples.738  
 In Britain in general, ‘the people’ had become a political category during the 
1830s and liberals had begun to reflect on ‘the English national character’. 
Conservatives, however, lacked a vision of an English national community with a 
national character: they 'neither wanted nor needed an idea of an English people of 
similar traits or qualities', and retained a hierarchical, class-based understanding of the 
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characteristics of people.739 The idea of there being one national community stayed 
closely linked to liberalism throughout the nineteenth century, with the conservatives 
not fully incorporating it into their world-view until the early twentieth century.740  
 The notion of a national community appeared in conservatives’ writings 
primarily when they contested liberal arguments, as for instance in reaction to the liberal 
assumption that the cohesion of society required a certain amount of homogeneity 
among the population. Conservatives disagreed with this ambition to fashion a national 
community. They certainly thought that a country needed internal stability, 'social 
cohesion', and unity.741 But for conservatives social cohesion did not rest on a national 
community. Indeed, they argued that the attempt to fashion such a community, to attain 
a certain homogeneity among the population, was in fact damaging to the cohesion of a 
society.  
 It was only France which conservatives sometimes treated as if it had a 
homogeneous, national community and national character, and they portrayed France as 
an unfortunate exception. In general, conservatives argued, a stable, orderly polity 
rested on 'traditions' and 'enduring institutions'.742 They advocated a stratified order with 
multiple classes, with each class adhering to its particular societal role and with the 
general mass of the people deferring to the authority and leadership of the ruling 
class.743 Cohesion was provided through an institutional patriotism, a shared loyalty to 
certain symbols and institutions which could 'bind the country together'.744 France, 
conservatives argued, had over the last eighty years destroyed its traditions and 
institutions, over an endless cycle of revolutions, and this attempted homogenisation of 
its society had in effect destroyed social cohesion. As Wilson put it, France may have 
'rendered her people more homogeneous than any other. Pity she cannot also boast that 
they are more united. Pity she cannot also boast that concord of classes in a solid social 
order'.745 
 The general absence of the notion of a national community from the ontology 
of conservatives was further underscored by their use of the term “nation”, which 
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generally did not have a national community as its referent. They employed it often, but 
generally merely as a synonym for country, with no further semantic burden added.746 
Hamley, for instance, saw no problem in using the term nation to refer to Prussia or the 
Austrian Empire.747 In less common instances, conservatives' use of nation did not refer 
to a country, but rather to the inhabitants of a country – with, however, no sense of 
designating a particular cultural whole, a national community. Hence for example 
Oliphant's use of the term nation in referring to the population of Holstein.748 A further 
sign of this wariness towards the notion of a national community was that conservatives 
generally invoked ‘the country's interests’ rather than ‘the national interest’.749 
Conservatives wrote of a nation as of an established political reality, rather than 
referring to a sense of cultural commonality among a population, which had the 
potential to gain political expression as well in a nation-state.750  
 The conservatives' distance from the notion of national communities was also 
evident in their commentary on the American South. Those few liberals who spoke 
favourably of the American South during the civil war, did so in terms rejoicing about a 
new nation establishing itself.751 Gladstone, for instance, stated that the 'leaders of the 
South have made an army; they are making, it appears a navy; and they have made what 
is more than either, they have made a nation'.752 Conservatives inverted this assessment. 
They disregarded the abstract notion of a distinct nation; what compelled recognition 
were rather the functioning practical institutions of government, both civil and military; 
the deference paid to this government by the populace; and the de facto independence of 
the South.753 
 And while conservatives emphasised the marked differences between North and 
South, they did not consider these the result of different national characters. The South 
had able statesmen and generals, while the North had demagogues for the former, 
whose infighting led to the appointment of incompetents for the latter. But this was the 
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result of different political systems; while a cross-section of the people would look fairly 
similar, the Northern democratic system supplied worthless leaders, with the talented 
avoiding public life, while the South's aristocratic system did funnel the men of ability 
into government.754 Indeed, conservatives saw no difference between the British and the 
Americans significant enough to prevent them from asserting that democracy's failure 
overseas compelled the conclusion that it would surely in Britain lead to anarchy or 
tyranny too.755  
 
International politics, national characters, and statesmen’s attitudes 
The second reason why the idea of national characters did not feature much in 
conservative thought was because they assumed that the course of international affairs 
was the result of the decisions made by statesmen, whose attitudes were consequently 
important, rather than based on the people, whose character would be crucial. Regardless 
of the existence of a national character or community, statesmen could not be 
subsumed in either – they would not be steered by any national community, their 
attitudes would not be determined by any national character.756  
 The different value which conservatives placed on the role of peoples and their 
characters on the one hand and statesmen and their attitudes on the other is evident in 
Hamley’s six leaders on the Franco-Prussian war for Blackwood's Magazine. In the early 
stages of the war, Hamley's initial judgement, based on his knowledge of the German 
people in general, was that after this conflict the Germans would prefer peaceful means 
to glory.757 This assessment was not so much based on a positive idea of a German 
national character, as on the understanding that the Germans were not the French; 'it is 
extremely unlikely’, Hamley argued, ‘that any other nation would pursue or use 
conquest as the French nation did'.758 Moreover, conservatives generally did not portray 
the popular passions possibly motivating foreign policy as being an aspect of a national 
character. Even when speaking of this aberrant French proclivity they used terms such 
as 'intoxication'.759 More important than the details of Hamley's assessment of the likely 
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disposition of the German people, is that he discarded these inquiries as the war 
progressed. The actions of the Prussian army and the German terms for peace, Hamley 
thought, provided some insight into the attitudes of Prussia's statesmen. This was then 
the basis for Hamley's further speculations on the possible course of events in Europe 
in the aftermath of the war.760 The attitudes of statesmen were what really determined 
the course taken by a country in international politics.  
 Conservatives made little use of the notion of national characters in making 
sense of international affairs, both because they did not have a strong sense of national 
community, which could share such a character, and because they thought that 
statesmen, rather than countries as a whole, were the actors of international politics. 
When liberals did invoke the centrality of national character, conservative 
commentators disapproved. This contrast was especially prominent in conservative and 
liberal commentary on the Franco-Prussian War and on the Eastern Question crisis of 
the late 1870s. 
 
National character and the Franco-Prussian War 
In reflecting on the cause and significance of the Franco-Prussian war, the notion of 
national characters loomed large in the narrative of liberal commentators, while it did 
not feature much in the conservatives' explanatory schemes. Liberals located the 
immediate cause of the war in France's type of government, but they also assumed that 
it was the particular French national character which had made Napoleon III’s 
Caesarism possible.761 Liberals furthermore thought the war represented a struggle 
between the values of ‘German discipline, domesticity and morality against French 
disorder and sensuality’, as present in 'the national characters of the belligerents'.762 As 
the war drew to an end, liberals asserted that forcing France to cede Alsace and 
Lorraine had lost Prussia the imprimatur of morality.763 Liberals felt compelled to 
conclude that the admirable German national character had been either an illusion or 
was now a thing of the past. The peace demands had revealed the aggressive, 
unenlightened national character of the Germans, which could be expected to endure 
                                                          
760 See e.g. Hamley (1871c: 495-6, 504-5). 
761 Pratt (1985: 549); Varouxakis (1998: 386). 
762 Parry (2006: 282) and Pratt (1985: 547). See e.g. Bagehot (1871a: 253); Dwyer (1870: 386); Gladstone 
(1870: 564-5, 578-80); Mill (1870). See also Parry (2006: 247-8, 277-8, 282-3); Postgate and Vallance 
(1937: 127-8); Pratt (1985: 543-4, 548-50, 557); Raymond (1921: 73-5). 
763 Parry (2006: 283); Pratt (1985: 559-60, 562). 
160 
and to inform future policy.764 The notion of national characters was thus central to 
liberals’ accounts of the cause of the Franco-Prussian war as well as of the significance 
of both the war in general and the peace terms in particular. 
 Unlike liberals, however, conservatives did not think that the war revolved 
around different national characters, one admired and the other reviled. They saw the 
war as having been caused by 'evil passions … on both sides'.765 And conservatives 
thought that the war was significant, beyond the interests involved, not as a struggle of 
values, but as a possible cause for further disorder and instability in Europe.766 Prussia’s 
desire for Alsace and Lorraine, finally, merely indicated a current attitude of Prussia’s 
statesmen, rather than a German national character.767 If Prussia's aggression had 
followed from its national character, then one could expect Prussia's future policy to be 
aggressive too. However, the question whether Prussia's aggressive attitude would 
endure beyond the war was exactly a topic of conservative concern and speculation.768 
In this debate, conservatives and liberals held a fundamentally different perspective on 
events, due to their giving salience, or not, to the notion of national characters. Half a 
dozen years later, during the Eastern Question crisis, conservatives went further and 
explicitly argued against those liberal accounts which assumed an essential difference 
between national communities. 
 
Drawing distinctions during the Eastern Question Crisis: Muslims and Christians, Turks 
and Europeans 
In the debates surrounding the Eastern Question crisis of 1876-78, conservatives 
rejected the notion of national characters, as part of their arguments aimed at proving 
Hamley's assertion that 'there cannot be the slightest moral reason why we should desire 
to have the rule of the Muscovite substituted for that of the Turk in Europe, and there 
are many and strong political reasons why we should object to such a substitution'.769 
 Conservatives argued for the absence of any 'innate barbarity' in the Turks, 
admonishing liberals for their 'hasty generalisations' based on 'false sentiment' about the 
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supposedly 'unspeakable Turks'.770 They noted that vices and virtues were present in the 
traditions and customs of all peoples and religions. In particular, conservatives argued 
that Islam and 'Mohammedan law' should be considered as compatible with 'something 
like good and just and progressive government', with the reforms recently enacted in 
Egypt in mind.771 Several conservative commentators even admonished the liberals for 
interpreting their Christian humanitarianism in such a way as to lead them to 'advocate 
injustice or persecution against a whole race, merely because that race is not 
Christian'.772  
 In reaction to the Bulgarian atrocities, conservatives argued that the faults of 
Ottoman administration ought not to be understood as the result of essential difference 
following from a Muslim or Turkish national character. The atrocities were the result of 
the institutional weakness of the Ottoman state.773 Furthermore, acts such as these were 
'not the property of one race or age': all European states had acted similarly to the 
Ottoman Empire in dealing with revolts and rebellions.774 Finally, the rule of Christian 
Russia would prove even more oppressive: 'her cruelty and oppression differ from [the 
Turks'] only in degree whilst her intolerance is greater'.775 The proper reaction to the 
Bulgarian atrocities, conservatives concluded, was not to deprive the Ottoman Empire 
of its European provinces, but rather to help it improve its institutions and thus quality 
of government. The conservatives’ perspective focused on the effects of social and 
political institutions and consequently lacked the sense of hierarchy and – depending on 
the particular conceptualisation – immutability associated with the idea of national 
characters.776  
 The idea of national characters did not play an important role in the attempts of 
conservatives to make sense of their world. In this they differed markedly from their 
liberal interlocutors, for whom national characters were positively a preoccupation.  
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Nationality as a sentiment of the people 
Conservatives associated the idea of nationality with liberals and their particular 
perspective on the international sphere. Patterson for instance spoke of the liberals and 
their 'pet principle of nationality', and Cecil characterised 'Nationality and Free Trade' as 
'the doctrines of the Liberal party'.777 Conservatives did not themselves discern a role 
for nationhood as an empirical fact rather than a notion held and furthered by particular 
parties – they viewed nationality as an idea, part of a rhetoric, with its referent lying in 
the imagination rather than in reality. Neither did any conservative author clearly define 
the concept of nationality. The understanding running through their arguments, 
however, was that the principle of nationality was expressed through a particular author 
presenting their vision of a certain collection of culturally similar people who ought to 
be part of one polity.  
 Conservatives recognised that the notion of nationality had increasingly gained 
currency since the end of the Napoleonic wars. Some conservatives, however, placed 
the concept in the realm of art and high culture, rather than of politics and general 
society. In the conservative periodicals, Italian feelings of local patriotism and of 
nationality were discussed, not in articles on Italian affairs in international politics, but 
rather primarily in articles dealing with recent Italian cultural output. In this way, 
conservatives portrayed the sentiment of nationality as involved first of all with the 
imagination of artists and authors – all the easier then to paint the principle of 
nationality as a delusion, without connection to reality, merely the 'visionary vapouring' 
of idealists.778 
 Conservatives generally spoke of ‘the sentiment of nationality’, as compared to 
liberal talk of ‘the principle of nationality’. For liberals the notion denoted first of all an 
ethical norm and was prescriptive. For conservatives the notion denoted first of all a 
certain emotional commitment and was used descriptively. Conservative authors located 
the notion of nationality in the realm of passion rather than reason; they for instance 
spoke of the 'idea of German unity' as a 'romantic', 'poetic notion'.779 Cecil argued that it 
was impossible to engage substantively with the principle, since the notion of nationality 
was illusory, mostly a mere imputation. 'The modern theory of nationality', Cecil began, 
'is safe from refutation. The blows of argument fall harmlessly upon its unsubstantial 
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forms. … a domain of thought where no term is defined, no principle laid down, and 
no question propounded for investigation'.780 As a consequence, the theory of 
nationality could be used without consistency, for whatever purpose a particular author 
desired. As Cecil noted; 'Then it [the Treaty of Vienna] was denounced for enlarging 
Bavaria and Prussia at the expense of petty states, and for suppressing the ancient 
republic of Genoa by annexing it to Piedmont; now it is despised for not having risen to 
the grandeur of the conception of a United Germany and a United Italy'.781 Cecil thus 
argued that the authors advocating the theory of nationality were changeable in their 
claims and theories, in where they located a prescriptive sense of nationality. These 
authors could act thus, conservatives thought, because the notion of nationality was 
insubstantial, at basis a passion, resting in the imagination rather than in reality.  
 Following from this understanding of the sentiment of nationality as a passion, 
conservatives linked it primarily to the general populace, as opposed to statesmen. 
Conservatives generally assumed, with Lever, 'that the upper and lower classes of 
society have nothing in common, and speak each in a different political language'.782 
Cecil observed that German authors, in trying to justify the German conquest of the 
Danish Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, employed two different discourses: one 
aimed at statesmen, focusing on treaty rights and obligations, and one aimed at the 
people in general, which played on the sentiment of nationality, or what Cecil termed 
'the language grievance', which 'has been kept chiefly for popular use'.783 This 
characterisation had the strong subtext that the former claims could be reasonable – 
even if they were not in the context of the Danish Duchies affair – while the latter were 
merely an emotional appeal, without legitimate purchase in the first place.  
 While statesmen, in the conservative reading, did not subscribe to the sentiment 
of nationality, the notion could thus still influence them in their actions. Statesmen 
might either try to utilise the sentiment as a means to further their own objectives – as 
conservatives thought Cavour, Napoleon III, and Bismarck did – or they could feel 
forced to pander to the passion present amongst their people — which conservatives at 
different times observed among rulers such as Napoleon III and the Tsar Alexander.784 
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The influence of nationality on the unifications of Italy and Germany 
In reflecting on the unifications of both Italy and Germany, conservative authors 
accorded the notion of nationality little influence on events. It played a role not as a 
genuine motivation, as an independent causal force, but merely as a superficial 
justification for all-too-common schemes of aggrandisement. 
 As the events of 1859-61 led to the unification of Italy, conservatives at no 
moment thought that a widespread Italian desire for national unification was driving 
these events. There was, first of all, no Italian national community which could spur 
unification on. Forsyth for instance remarked in 1861: 'Men forget also, that since the 
fall of the Roman Empire (if even before it) there never has been a time when Italy 
could be called a nation, any more than a stack of timber can be called a ship.'785 A 
nation was here understood as a politically unified state, nationality dependent on 
citizenship. A single Italian nationality, in conservatives' understanding of the term, 
could only be the consequence of the realisation of a unified Italian polity, rather than 
an impetus to it.  
 Conservative commentators argued that the Italian sentiment of nationality had 
a negligible causal force. Hardman observed that the Piedmontese supported the war 
with Austria from deference to their king and possibly a detestation of the Austrians – 
the people did not understand or care about the notion of Italian independence, let 
alone unity.786 In contrast, the liberal Matthew Arnold explicitly argued for the force of 
Italian nationality, based as it was in the shared history of glorious Rome.787 Swayne 
gently suggested that the appeal of the Roman classical heritage to educated Britons had 
resulted among them in an imagined vista of Italy 'far brighter and more glorious than 
reality'.788 Most conservatives were less tactful, with for instance Atkinson writing that 
the 'nationality of Italy, we have seen, is but the baseless phantom of political romance. 
... we deem Italian nationality, unity, or indeed, political independence, to be among 
those wild chimeras and alluring phantoms', those 'words … of delusion' and that 
'visionary vapouring', characteristic of demagogues rather than statesmen.789 
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 Their different thoughts on Italian nationality also led conservatives and liberals 
to assign a different significance to the treaty of Villafranca. Both conservatives and 
liberals thought that with Villafranca Napoleon III had effectively distanced himself 
from the realisation of independence for Italy. Unlike conservatives, liberals took this as 
a reason to increase their support for the Italian cause. Now that Napoleon III was no 
longer associated with the ideal of Italian liberty, liberals reasoned, there was no danger 
any more of him perverting the Italian movement to his own despotic ends. Support for 
Italy no longer implied support for France, and could thus be all the more 
wholeheartedly given.790 For liberals Italian events had their own impetus, based on the 
ideals of Italian independence and later on Italian national unity. Once uncoupled from 
the suspect French involvement, which could be for aggrandisement as well as for 
liberty, the Italian movement was pure in pursuing developments aiming at the 
realisation of liberal ideals. Matthew Arnold, for one, argued that 'the free internal 
development of Italy' would see 'her progress towards a national unity'.791 For 
conservatives, though, events were driven by French and Piedmontese desires for 
aggrandisement, and the liberals’ ethical ideals and principles did not reflect a second 
impetus to events, but rather a mere sham structure of justification for these 
expansionist actions. Villafranca had not decoupled an admirable movement based on 
moral ideals from a movement of doubtful morality, as for the liberals, but had rather 
shown the irrelevance of the moral ideal of the principle of nationality to the substance 
of international politics. 
 Conservative commentators credited the war against Austria, the unrest and 
annexations in central Italy, Garibaldi's exploits in the south of Italy, and the eventual 
unification of Italy by Piedmont, partly to Napoleon III and his meddling, and most of 
all to Cavour and his exceptional ability as a statesman. An ability exercised, 
conservatives thought, in service of the aggrandisement of Piedmont, not of Italy as a 
whole. Even Lever's retrospective account, written in 1863, placed Cavour front and 
centre as the impetus behind the events culminating in the unification of Italy, with only 
an instrumental role for the people and the revolutionaries Mazzini and Garibaldi, and 
not so much of a mention of any supposed trend to or norm for the formation of 
nation-states.792 
                                                          
790 Beales (1961: 111); Bevington (1953: xviii); McIntire (1983: 124-7); Parry (2006: 228). 
791 Arnold (1859: 4-11). 
792 Lever (1863a: 580-1, 583); (1863b: 653, 657, 659, 661-4); (1863c: 54, 59-61). See also Cecil (1859: 4); 
Forsyth (1861: 133-4); Hardman (1858: 464); (1859: 612-5); Oliphant (1860c: 735, 740); Patterson (1860: 
104-7); (1862c: 503-5). 
166 
As when understanding Italian affairs, in making sense of the unification of 
Germany from 1864 to 1871 conservatives envisaged only a minor role for the 
sentiment of nationality. Liberals regarded these events as revolving around the German 
'national cause', the 'creat[ion of] the unified nation for which Germans had yearned', 
part of the broader telos of the international sphere.793 Conservatives, in contrast, did 
not think that unification had been propelled by the sentiment of nationality. Political 
integration was not the inevitable outcome, and mostly driven by various forms of great 
power competition.794 The sentiment of nationality primarily influenced events as one 
particular scheme of justification employed to legitimise Prussia’s acts of 
aggrandisement. 
 There was little sense in conservatives’ considerations of German unification of 
the relevance of the idea of nationality. Unification was seen as an explicitly political 
project, resting on the twin pillars of German ambition and the threat of France to the 
minor German states.795 Conservatives emphasised that the events from 1864 to 1871 
ought to be interpreted as driven by competition between Prussia, Austria, and France. 
All were motivated by a patriotic desire to increase the glory of their polity. For Prussia 
and Austria, glory lay in having the sole, uncontested leadership of the German states. 
Conservatives emphasised that Bismarck did not 'care one straw for German unity', but 
was interested instead in the 'ascendancy of Prussia in Germany, to the exclusion of 
Austria'.796 When Austria was mostly side-lined after the battle of Sadowa in 1866, 
conservatives still perceived the process as revolving around the ambition of Prussia, 
rather than any German national endeavour. 'The events between 1863 and 1870 must 
be looked upon', Cecil asserted, 'as one transaction – as successive acts of the great 
drama of Prussian aggrandisement'.797  
 The smaller German states were, conservatives argued, also motivated by a 
desire for glory.798 Due to their limited power, however, these polities could not achieve 
imperial glory without deferring to the leadership of a major state, such as Prussia, with 
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a similar ambition. Only by 'confiding to the charge of Prussia its ambitions … its 
diplomacy … its glory, its external force and aggrandisement' could the German states 
hope to realise any of their ambitions.799 Moreover, the threat of French conquest was 
needed to galvanise the German polities into unification. Conservatives observed a 
slowly changing general dynamic in international politics, where a polity needed to be of 
increasingly considerable size to guarantee its independence and influence.800 Regarding 
Germany in particular, Wilson remarked that the competition between all the German 
polities would 'inevitably terminat[e] – unless Germany were to share the fate of Poland 
– in the concession of avowed supremacy to that which at length proved the strongest 
of the conflicting powers'.801 By giving the German states a stark, immediate choice 
between Prussian supremacy and French subjugation, the French declaration of war 
'precipitated' the unification of the German states under Prussian leadership.802  
 The Germans' desire for glory and for independence from France thus impelled 
them to band together with and defer to Prussia, despite them being 'by no means 
particularly fond of the Prussians'.803 Oliphant, who had travelled through the Duchies 
during the crises, emphasised repeatedly the dislike and distrust evident between the 
various Federal German polities, Prussia, and Austria.804 The unification of Germany 
was consequently emphatically not, in the minds of conservatives, a political unification 
of an otherwise harmonious national community. Unification was the supremacy and 
leadership of one over the others; Prussia was 'placing herself at the head of Germany 
so united', 'was now at the head of United Germany, and … might annex as much of 
Germany as she chose', or was plain 'absorbing Germany'.805 Conservatives thought of 
Germany as in effect a Prussian empire, with the German states only assenting because 
they needed Prussian leadership for their position in the international sphere to be 
viable.806  
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 Furthermore, this coherence was contingent – several conservatives remarked 
that without an external threat, internal animosity might prove too strong, and the 
bonds would dissolve.807 Throughout the 1860s especially, conservatives thought of the 
unification of Germany as uncertain and reversible, which contrasted with the liberals' 
perception of unification as an inevitable development. In 1864 Cecil considered 
disintegration ‘a far likelier’ outcome for Germany than unification.808 Regardless of 
whether they thought dissolution or union more likely, conservative commentators 
considered the result uncertain, following from contingent events and not from the 
instantiation, sooner or later, of an absolute trend to the realisation of the principle of 
nationality.809 
 Conservatives thus did not accord a central role to the sentiment of nationality 
in making sense of the unification of Germany. It was considered neither a necessary 
nor sufficient cause of unification – at most, a shared language would be a boon.810 The 
sentiment of nationality functioned merely to justify and legitimise the aggrandisement 
and annexations involved in the unification of Germany. 'The high ambition to make 
Germany one and great', Gleig noted, 'supplied a ready excuse for [Prussia's] acts [of 
conquest]'.811 The Germans’ basic desire was not for unity, but for glory, and unity was 
merely a necessary means to glory.  
 When considering the significance of unification, as well as its cause, 
conservatives employed the narrative of great power politics rather than nationalities. 
Conservatives first and foremost understood this event as part of the aftermath of the 
Franco-Prussian war, as one of the major and minor changes affecting the balance of 
power and unsettling the equilibrium of Europe.812 They conceptually paired the 
unification of Germany with the collapse of France. Liberals, however, understood the 
unification of Germany first and foremost as part of the progress of civilisation and of 
their ethical ideals.813 In contrast with conservatives, liberals conceptually paired the 
unification of Germany with the unification of Italy. They were both part of a general 
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progress, towards a Europe configured in accord with the principle of nationality.814  
 
The sentiment of nationality and aggression in international politics 
The main role which conservatives discerned for the sentiment of nationality in 
international affairs was as a spur to aggression, war, and conquest. On the one hand, 
for people passionately caught up in the idea of nationality, the sentiment would 
function as an encouragement to war. The likely mismatch between the principle of 
nationality's normative order and the de facto configuration of Europe would imply 
territorial acquisition through military conquest. On the other hand, for people 
overtaken by a more general territorial ambition and desire for military glory, the 
principle of nationality functioned as an ad hoc justification available to legitimise, to 
audiences who subscribed to the principle, a course of conquest.815 Confronted with 
people overwhelmed by national sentiment – for instance 'involved in the mania for the 
triumph of the German idea' – statesmen would either feel forced to pander to them, or 
would try and utilise this passion to further their own ends.816 
 Conservatives saw the principle of nationality as primarily a facile justification 
for aggressive war, leading Europe into widespread disorder and instability. In the 
Italian context in particular, conservatives thought that their invocation of the principle 
of nationality had allowed Napoleon III and Cavour to gain support and approbation 
for what was in effect a policy of military conquest and territorial aggrandisement. 
Conservatives further accused Napoleon III and Cavour of fabricating the very 
revolutionary agitation on behalf of which they claimed to intervene. Where the actions 
of Napoleon III and Cavour should have been widely denounced for placing the peace 
and order of Europe in jeopardy, the purchase of the principle of nationality among 
some liberal and radical circles had actually, conservatives complained, caused their 
actions to be applauded.817  
 When taking a more general view of international politics, conservatives also 
considered the principle of nationality a danger to European stability; it in effect allowed 
a state to invade another country under the pretext of helping some nationality or other 
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to regain its independence or proper territorial extent. As Forsyth remarked on the 
implications of the invocation of the principle of nationality with regards to Italian 
events: '[Russell's] “Italy for the Italians” is a captivating cry. It seems to express the 
sentiment of liberty with the force of a truism … [but it in fact implies] the right of one 
independent State to interfere and foment insurrection in the dominion of another'.818 
Cecil similarly argued in 1862 that the principle of nationality made the relations of 
states with their subjects into an international issue. As a consequence, the principle of 
nationality made possible 'interventions in the internal affairs of other nations on the 
plea of political sympathy’ wherever an unscrupulous statesman wanted: ‘the real danger 
to Europe's future peace'.819  
 Patterson, Cecil, Dasent, and Wilson, some the conservative commentators who 
paid most attention to the role of the concept of nationality, thought of nationality as a 
new influence – 'the modern sentiment of nationality' – but one which fitted well within 
the established narrative of countries making a bid for universal monarchy or European 
hegemony.820 While the sentiment of nationality might in theory seem more constrained 
in its scope than these aims – even seem antithetical to them – in practice, these 
conservatives argued, the sentiment of nationality was effectively on the same 
continuum as the desire for European hegemony, and nationalist passion could easily 
come to imply a bid for universal dominion over Europe. These frameworks of 
justification might be theoretically incommensurable, but they were merely utilised to 
legitimise a pre-existing lust for glory through conquest – they were not a principled 
basis for analysis and action.821 
 This was the role in which Patterson cast the principle of nationality in his 
discussion of Napoleon III's foreign policy project. The principle of nationality was 
merely an excuse which Napoleon III used in order to dismantle the Vienna settlement 
and with it the existing order of Europe.822 Patterson developed this argument through a 
direct analogy with the developments surrounding the French revolution and 
Napoleonic wars: 'Napoleon III revives the policy of his Uncle … The “Rights of 
Man,” as understood by the Convention, was the idea developed by the first 
Revolution; the Rights of Nations, as interpreted by Louis Napoleon, is the corollary 
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idea which the New Revolution proposes to realize'.823 In essence, Patterson argued, the 
project of Napoleon III was the same as that of Napoleon I. They were different only 
in that these days, one needed a structure of justification – 'a homage, however 
insincere, to public opinion' – to mask a policy of territorial aggrandisement: 'his 
Principle, “the sovereignty of the people,” … is a mere mask for his ambition’; 'in the 
principle of nationality … he finds a safe and potent lever for assailing the existing 
fabric of European power … to aggrandise France amidst the general disorder'.824 The 
principle of nationality, as a sentiment which gained purchase in the passions of the 
masses, was an excuse which Napoleon III could use to destroy the Vienna settlement 
and gain hegemony over Europe, after which he could reorder Europe to the glory and 
aggrandisement of France. 
 Conservatives perceived this possibility of nationalist passion leading to a 
project of hegemony over Europe most strongly during the 1870s, first in the pan-
Teutonism of Germany and later in the Pan-Slavism of Russia.825 Dasent argued that 
due to the dominant influence of the sentiment of nationality in Germany 'the world … 
[might] see a repetition of the Napoleonic conquests', because 'while the Germans 
pretend that they are fighting for German unity, they are, in fact, taking a leaf, and one 
of the worst leaves, out of the First Napoleon's book'.826 Wilson, meanwhile, warned 
that the German ideas of pan-Teutonism and of 'the European empire which it claims 
to have held and lost' led to a sense of German nationality which, in its 'most 
comprehensive and complete form' would lead to 'German claims to something like 
universal dominion founded on these notions'.827 Here the sentiment of nationality 
directly implied a bid for European hegemony. Wilson noted that this combination of 
the ideas of German nationalism and unification with the idea of the reunification of 
the Holy Roman Empire was intellectually incoherent: 'but the baseless fabric of an 
anachronistic vision'.828 While these, though, may have been incompatible in theory, in 
practice they were mingled without problem. This was the realm of ideas and emotion, 
after all, not reason. The idea of nationhood was here merely a stepping stone towards 
the idea of universal dominion.  
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 Cecil affirmed the same conclusion. In his commentary on the Danish Duchies 
affair in 1864, he had recognised national sentiment, but had subsumed nationality in a 
world-view focused on great powers and geopolitics. The sentiment of nationality, he 
thought, revolved mostly around a wish for one's nationality to have hegemony over 
Europe.829 As a consequence, while Cecil approved of a German desire for unity – the 
smaller polities would need to combine in order to form a viable state – he disapproved 
of the shift from this desire to a sentiment of nationality, with delusional dreams of 
dominion over Europe. By the time of the Franco-Prussian war, Cecil had come to 
recognise that the sentiment of nationality was related to a certain conception of rightful 
territorial boundaries.830 For Cecil, however, as for Wilson, a crucial feature of this 
conception was the expansive character which it could assume. Cecil considered the 
'definition of the Fatherland' in the 'national aspirations' of infatuated Germans as 'mad 
pretensions … the freak of a whole people … who are displaying in this war 'for an 
idea' the ferocity they were wont to reserve for the wars of religion'.831 
 Conservatives themselves, during this time, tended to perceive more diversity 
than uniformity in any collection of peoples. Most viewed assertions by authors of the 
existence of a certain nationality as suspect, likely to be an arbitrary demarcation 
motivated by other concerns, either over great power politics or over territorial 
aggrandisement. The sentiment of nationality, conservatives thought, fostered the other 
aggressive passions, while the principle of nationality provided yet another excuse for 
wars of aggression and bids for European hegemony. 
 
Conservatives' rejection of the normative principle of nationality 
Conservatives rejected the normative argument for particular state boundaries based on 
the principle of nationality. They did discern a role for the sentiment of nationality when 
considering the boundaries of states, but merely as a practical rather than a moral 
constraint.832  
 
The rejection of the principle of nationality 
For many liberals, the principle of nationality prescribed what the proper boundaries of 
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a state could be.833 Commenting on the Prussian demand for the cession of Alsace and 
Lorraine during the Franco-Prussian war, Gladstone stated that annexation was only 
'justified … [if] the population be willing parties to the severance'.834 Since the people of 
Alsace and Lorraine had no wish to join Germany, the demand for cession, Gladstone 
thought, was 'repulsive to the sense of modern civilisation'.835 Liberals thought the 
annexation was immoral. While conservatives also argued that Prussia ought not to 
annex Alsace and Lorraine, the basis for their arguments towards Prussia was different. 
Conservatives asserted that Prussia's demand for territory was ill-advised and short-
sighted. They recognised that victory in war, especially a defensive war, implied a right 
to territorial gain; there were 'precedents … for treating cessions of territory as the 
natural prize of a successful campaign'.836 Annexation was not, as for Gladstone and 
other liberals, a moral wrong because the people of Alsace and Lorraine did not want to 
be a part of Germany; it was instead a practical mistake.837 
 Throughout their works, conservative commentators rejected a normative role 
for the principle of nationality. They did not consider claims for self-determination 
morally weighty. Wilson, for instance, considered the idea of 'what is termed … 
nationality, as the only legitimate basis of dominion' a ridiculous 'extravagance'.838 Cecil, 
Oliphant, and Patterson, the main conservative commentators on the Polish Question 
and Danish Duchies affair in 1863-4, distinguished between territorial claims based on 
history (established practice and treaty recognition) and on nationality (the territory 
where an imagined people resided). They took seriously the claims based on treaties, on 
'customary right' and 'the history of actual practice', discussed them even if they rejected 
them, while they dismissed claims based on the principle of nationality, as too absolute 
and essentialist.839 A contingent commonality of customs or even language conferred no 
rights, held no normative power. 
 Conservatives, unlike liberals, did not consider the self-determination of 
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populations to be a relevant concern.840 They did, however, endorse the notion of 
independence, as pertaining to the state, rather than self-determination, as pertaining to 
the nation.841 When, for instance, Denmark was about to have two of its provinces 
appropriated by the German states, several conservatives did speak of the 'international 
rights' of states.842 They elaborated little, but these seem to have been the right to 
govern a certain territory and be a sovereign state. Commenting on the course of 
German politics from 1864 onward, Dasent complained that 'the victory of an idea [the 
principle of nationality] means the destruction and extinction of existing rights'.843 This 
right to sovereign rule over a certain area was not, however, based in a moral 
affirmation of the self-government of peoples. During the Eastern Question crisis, for 
instance, conservative commentators never described the rule of an empire over its 
subject people as foreign or alien government. Cowell moreover remarked on 'the 
redistribution of territory, which is sure to follow in the wake of a considerable war', 
without any sense that this change in governing state could be inherently problematic.844 
This contrasted with the liberal belief that the territory of state and nation should 
coincide, or at least that territory was not to be transferred from one state to another 
without the wishes of its inhabitants being considered.845 Since conservatives did not 
acknowledge the salience of the idea of nations, the latter's self-government was for 
them a non-issue.846 In their writings there was no sense of nationality as a prescriptive 
concept, standing above the de facto arrangements of politics and implying a more ethical 
configuration of the European sphere.847  
 
Italy, the debates on intervention, and the principle of nationality 
Conservatives’ rejection of the principle of nationality was particularly stark in the 
debates on intervention in the context of the unification of Italy, from 1859-61. First of 
all, conservatives did not consider the Italian events of 1859-61 through the normative 
lens of the possible realisation of the principle of nationality in Italy.848 Most 
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conservative authors simply did not pay much attention in their writings to the future 
and valuation of Italian domestic arrangements.849 Instead they were primarily 
concerned with the general peace and stability of Europe.850 
 The absence of Italian nationhood from the ontology of conservative 
commentators, let alone the principle of nationality from their normative commitments, 
was most evident in where conservatives considered the boundaries between inside and 
outside to be, in the debates on intervention in Italy. When discussing Italy as a political 
entity, conservatives used the existing states of Italy and their boundaries to demarcate 
the internal and external.851 Aytoun, discussing the internal disturbances in the Papal 
States early in 1860, portrayed the possible involvement of either Naples or Piedmont 
as external intervention, the thin end of a wedge which might lead to multiple great 
powers becoming involved.852  
 Liberals’ affirmation of the notion of nationality led them to view Italian affairs 
as not intrinsically international, but primarily a matter of 'local freedom and reform in 
the several states'.853 Importantly, unlike conservatives liberals had a tendency to think 
of Italy as a distinct realm. In January 1860 Gladstone was very concerned to prevent 
external, foreign intervention in central Italy, in the form of Austrian, Russian, or 
Prussian involvement. Only as an afterthought – a literal postscript in a letter to Russell 
– did Gladstone mention that Piedmont, too, was not to interfere in central Italy.854 
Furthermore, liberals were very willing to accept the annexation of the central Italian 
polities to Piedmont as the will of the Italian people. In April 1859, Gladstone had 
already written of 'the whole national sentiment of Italy' arranging itself behind 
Piedmont, as the champion of Italian liberty.855 Despite the occasional verbal gesture of 
respect to the actual boundaries between states, in their concerns, initiatives, and ends 
liberals made a clear distinction between an Italian sphere, where the people shared a 
nationality and in which, as a whole, developments and progress could take place, and 
all states outside of Italy, whose interference in these Italian affairs would be a 
tampering with the expression of the will of the Italian nation. Liberals acted as if 
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morally speaking, the demarcation between the Italian nation and the rest of Europe, 
rather than those between existing states, was the salient distinction to make when 
considering the threat of external intervention in Italy.856 
 This respective affirmation and rejection of the principle of nationality informed 
the positions which liberals and conservatives took on particular Italian issues. In early 
1860, liberals adopted the stance that the people of Italy should be left to decide their 
own future, without external intervention into their affairs, while conservatives thought 
that the fate of central Italy was properly a European question, ideally to be decided by 
a Congress of both those states directly involved in the issue and those states who were 
party to the relevant treaties which had ordered this area in the Vienna settlement.857 
Liberals hoped to avoid making the future of central Italy into a European rather than 
Italian affair, and were willing not to make an issue out of the French annexations of 
Savoy and Nice in return for a similar French treatment of Piedmont's expansion in 
Italy.858  
 As Piedmont meddled in and annexed first central and then south Italy, liberals 
argued that Britain should stand ready to protect these internal, Italian developments 
from external intervention at the hands of the forces of despotism. Conservatives, in 
contrast, remarked rather incredulously that liberals were calling on Britain to act against 
France and Austria from the principle of non-intervention, in defence of a series of acts 
by Piedmont which themselves were blatant instances of external intervention. Forsyth 
criticised Russell’s position in the latter’s October 1860 dispatch, arguing that 'the 
Government had preached to Austria and France the doctrine of non-intervention as 
the one sole principle to be observed by the Great Powers in the question of Italy', but 
that 'in the opinion of Lord John Russell, this doctrine of non-intervention did not 
apply to Garibaldi or Victor Emmanuel ... [who were] justified in interfering because he 
was an Italian patriot ... an Italian king. But letting this pass, it excluded all who were 
beyond the limits of that which was once called a “geographical expression” – Italy'.859  
 Forsyth’s rejection of the principle of nationality played a central role in his 
argument: 'we cannot admit that Garibaldi was 'a patriot fighting for the independence 
of his country,' unless we assume that there was no difference between a subject of 
Sardinia and a subject of Naples, because both were Italians ... Will [Russell] venture to 
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assert that community of language effaces distinction of country, or that, according to 
the doctrine of natural boundaries, geography is to determine citizenship and 
allegiance?'860 Forsyth subsequently argued for the priority of the established European 
order over the principle of nationality: 'The question ... is not as to the rights of subjects 
to resist, but the right of a stranger to interfere. But then it is alleged that Sardinia is not 
a stranger, because she is Italian; and that this gives her a title, which makes the case 
exceptional … we cannot admit that Sardinia alone ... [is] to be held free from the 
obligations of international law'.861 
 To conservatives, Piedmont's meddling in the affairs of other Italian states and 
annexing them wholesale entailed the grossest, most blatant external intervention in the 
affairs of other states. Liberals, led by their assumption of Italian nationhood and 
endorsement of the principle of nationality, considered the events as part of the internal 
progressive development of Italy, and hoped to safeguard these auspicious 
developments from reactionary foreign intervention. Conservatives, lacking both these 
commitments, viewed the liberal position as one which fulminated against potential acts 
of external intervention, in order to safeguard a whole series of actual interventions in 
the affairs of other states on the part of Piedmont. Conservatives considered this a most 
pernicious precedent. 
 For Mill, too, the principle of nationality was crucial for the logic of his position 
on intervention. Mill argued that when the government of a polity was foreign, like 
Austria in Lombardy, or even when the government of a polity depended on the 
support of a foreign power, like those of the central Italian Duchies, then there existed a 
state of continual external intervention. Here Mill supposed the existence of a 
nationality and he considered this the entity which was to be sovereign, to decide on the 
configuration of its internal affairs without outside interference. For Mill and other 
liberals, the polities actually existing, let alone their governments, were secondary, and 
could only lay claim to a right to non-interference if they conformed to the wishes of 
their people.862 Conservatives, in rejecting the principle of nationality, thought of the 
principle of non-interference as a simple injunction to respect the boundaries and 
accept the governments of the existing polities of the European sphere. 
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The sentiment of nationality as a practical constraint on the extent of states 
Some conservatives recognised the influence of the sentiment of nationality and the 
desire for self-determination of peoples, but as a practical — as distinct from ethical — 
constraint on the possible configuration of empires. The inconvenient ‘fact of its 
existence … [of] the new-born enthusiasm of nationality' could make for disloyal 
subjects domestically, and internationally for a neighbour intent on forcibly recovering 
‘its’ territory.863 Domestic discontent and a foreign desire for revenge were possible 
without any sentiment of nationality, but the latter, conservatives thought, intensified 
and prolonged these passions, to the extent that annexation might no longer be the 
sensible choice for statesmen to make. 
 The first problem which the sentiment of nationality could create for states was 
that of disaffected subject populations, or otherwise ‘disloyal’ parts of the population. 
They were a source of domestic instability and thus of state weakness.864 Conservative 
commentators noted this phenomenon in a variety of contexts, from discussions of the 
lack of vigour of the Austrian Empire to the future relationship between North and 
South after the American civil war.865 Oliphant in 1864 noted the troubles which Poland 
caused Russia, Hungary caused Austria, and Holstein caused Denmark.866 Patterson 
similarly remarked regarding the Polish Question that Russia was unable to gain the 
loyalty of the Polish people – 'a cordial union of Poland (with an autonomy) and Russia 
under the sceptre of the Czar seems to be hopeless' – while repeated rebellions put the 
stability of the whole empire in danger.867 Commenting on Prussia's intention to annex 
the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine in 1870-71, Cecil was one of several conservative 
authors who argued that annexation would merely saddle Prussia with intractable 
problems – and that it was exactly the sentiment of nationality which made these 
problems intractable.868 
 Cecil started with the observation 'that the French sentiment is intense among 
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the population'.869 And while in previous times one could have expected the people to 
switch their allegiance to Prussia over time – these people had in the past been part of a 
(very different) Germany, after all, and were now staunchly French – with the modern 
sentiment of nationality, such a shift in loyalty was unlikely to take place.870 Instilled and 
maintained artificially by teachers and publicists, the sentiment of nationality made that 
any disaffection on the part of subject populations would linger, that their loyalty would 
persistently be in doubt.871 Alsace and Lorraine would not, Cecil concluded, be a source 
of strength to Prussia, with its population restive and loyal to another state, and would 
even come to impair the governance of Germany as a whole.872 The sentiment of 
nationality, conservatives thought, had made any conquest and annexation a decidedly 
less attractive proposition, and put firm constraints on the worthwhile extent of any 
polity. 
 Conservatives did not always, however, frame state weakness following from a 
diversity of communities in terms of nationality. They preferred a perspective which 
privileged the institutional and political realms, as was evident in their discussion of the 
Ottoman Empire during the Eastern Question crisis of 1876-78. The Ottoman Empire, 
like empires in general, differed from European states in that it was not politically 
integrated and homogeneous – it had 'all her confusedly mixed institutions and 
usages'.873 The crucial difference lay in political institutions – conservatives did not think 
in the categories of nationhood or identity. The Ottoman political system, conservatives 
argued, was less efficient and capable, less able to mobilise the country's resources, than 
the politically — not ethnically — homogeneous system present in European states, 
where all were citizens of the state on the same terms, all under the rule of the state's 
law.874 As a consequence, the Ottoman Empire’s neighbours had become too powerful, 
inducing instability as internal factions tried to leverage this external power for their 
own gain.875 The Ottoman Empire would need to end its internal political 
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fragmentation. The solution to the Eastern Question was not national self-
determination for the European provinces, but reform of the empire through a 
conservative adaptation of institutions to their changed environment.876  
 The second problem which the sentiment of nationality could create for a state 
was that of a neighbouring country with a persistent desire to recover territories lost to 
it. Discussing the possible cession of Alsace and Lorraine in 1870, conservatives argued 
that annexation would guarantee Germany another war with France. The other peace 
terms were relatively inconsequential and would quickly be forgotten – ask only them 
and Germany could be at peace. But demand territory, conservatives predicted, and a 
passion for revenge would simmer in France, leading to renewed conflict at the earliest 
opportunity.877 Conservatives did not themselves affirm the indivisibility of a country's 
territory, but they did recognise that elements of the general populace, infused with the 
sentiment of nationality, would perceive their country's territory thus. These people 
would consequently persist in looking for an opportunity to go to war and recover the 
lost lands.  
 Just as the sentiment of nationality ensured that a subject people would not 
come to accept their new state, the sentiment would also, conservatives thought, keep 
the passion for revenge aflame. This becomes evident through a comparison of 
Hamley’s opinion with that of Cecil. Unlike Cecil, Hamley did not consider the 
sentiment of nationality when reflecting on the French desire for revenge and, as a 
consequence, he painted this desire as potentially far more transient. He thought the 
cycle of revenge might be broken, as long as 'opportunity [for revenge] will not occur 
until … new interests, new relations, new distributions of power … wear out the bitter 
grudge'.878 Cecil, in contrast, thought that the abstract nature of the sentiment of 
nationality, with its ideal, essentialist sense of national boundaries, could keep the flame 
of revenge burning for generations. He remarked that 'we know what the modern 
sentiment of nationality, worked up by popular literature, can do. The French youth will 
be brought up by countless teachers to long for the lost provinces'.879  
 Some conservative commentators consequently did discern a role for the 
sentiment of nationality and the desire for self-determination in international politics. 
This was not a normative role as a basic right of peoples, however, but merely a 
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practical role as a cause of conflict and constraint on the possible configuration of 
empires. 
 
The sentiment of nationality and liberty and patriotism 
Conservatives argued not only that nationalists and separatists lacked a valid normative 
underpinning for their endeavours, but also that their abstract ideals hindered the 
advancement of those goods of which conservatives could recognise the value, namely 
constitutional liberty and patriotic loyalty to institutions. Whereas liberals tended to 
assume that all these values were closely connected and that progress would be general 
across all fronts, conservatives countered that the sentiment of nationality and demand 
for self-determination could put the causes of liberty and patriotism in jeopardy – 
thereby implying that liberals, if they truly valued liberty and patriotism, would rescind 
their approval of the principle of nationality and their support for demands for self-
determination.880 Conservative commentators admonished liberals that they 
sympathised only with groups arguing from 'an ideal basis' and proposing 'revolutionary 
measures'.881 The principle of nationality was an absolute idea, could not admit the 
possibility of compromise, and consequently could not recognise or value established 
rights, incremental improvements in liberty, or a limited autonomy providing the 
institutional trappings of patriotism.882  
 For conservatives, separatism was wrong exactly because its patriotism involved 
the nation and with it the desire for self-determination. For the radically liberal British 
Positivists, patriotism was admirable exactly when it involved nationalism. Harrison 
argued that 'it is for us to insist how precious to the life of the world are these growing 
aggregates of people when the lofty conception of nation first comes to supersede the 
narrower idea of clan or tribe'.883 Varouxakis concludes that 'the implication is that the 
Positivists … respected all patriotisms' – all patriotisms which were based in a focus on 
the people, on nationality, as this shift from the local to the national was what made 
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them valuable.884 Conservatives, in contrast, held that any patriotism which involved 
nationalism would quickly, in its focus on the nation and its self-determination, 
marginalise any concern for those institutions which conservatives considered the 
proper focus of patriotic sentiment.  
 In the case of the American civil war, this conservative perspective implied, 
uncommonly, sympathy with the separatists. While conservatives did not involve the 
notions of nation or nationality in their discussions, they were full of praise for the 
patriotism of the Southerners, noting how 'the Southern States have given ample proof 
of their courage, ability, and devotion to the cause of their independence'.885 
Conservative commentators were less enthusiastic about the North's patriotism, arguing 
either that it was lacking altogether, with the Northern populace trying to avoid 
enlistment – Fremantle witnessed and was sure to mention the draft riots in New York 
in July 1863886 – or that their patriotism was wrapped up in the prestige of the Union, 
democracy, and the general notion of American exceptionalism.887 This debased 
patriotism was then the cause of the delusional tenacity with which the North continued 
the war and worsened its means, long after it ought to have sued for peace and 
recognised the South. Conservatives admired the patriotism of the South, with its self-
sacrifice, and they derided the patriotism of the North, with its close connection to the 
sentiment of national unity and its exultation in institutions which conservatives 
disliked. This contrast in patriotisms, they thought, was yet another reason to favour 
Southern victory and independence. 
 Italy, Poland, and the Danish Duchies affair were the main debates where 
conservatives emphasised the perverse effects of striving after the principle of 
nationality for the values of liberty and institutional reform. To the limited extent that 
conservatives concerned themselves with the future of Italy itself, they expressed a 
desire for reform within its existing polities and established treaties, rather than for 
independence or unification. Importantly, they invariably noted that the main obstacle 
to reform was not Austria, but 'the wicked dogma of the extreme revolutionary party’, 
agitating for national independence, which left Austria no choice but repressive rule.888 
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Conservatives further argued that the principle of nationality distracted people from 
more worthwhile endeavours. In the various Italian states the sentiment of nationality 
led people to reject the authority of their de facto government and to 'dwell either in 
memory or imagination', rather than to pursue practical, local reforms of 
administration.889 Cecil complained of the 'obtuseness … [and] confusion … 
engendered by that strange mania for ideal nationalities which is the moral epidemic of 
the age, and which appears to have the power of overshadowing all substantial 
grievances'.890 Conservatives considered the nationalist movement in Italy a distraction 
for its peoples at best, and the main cause of their repression at worst.  
 Patterson, Oliphant, and Cecil all commented in 1864 upon annexation, 
separatism, and nationalist sentiment, in the context of the Polish Question and Danish 
Duchies affair. The tenor running through their arguments was that nationalists were 
too absolute in their demands. The separatists were wholly focused on independence 
and pursued this end at the cost of liberty, autonomy, and the institutional trappings of 
their (erstwhile) polity, all the latter of which would be better realised if only the 
separatists could countenance compromise.  
 Conservatives thought that the established power, by virtue of being established, 
could expect to be reasoned with by disaffected parts of its population, rather than 
wholly rejected. Even if a territory had initially been 'unjustly acquired', Patterson 
argued – as Russia's Poland had been – after the conquering state had institutionally 
integrated the territory into the whole country, the conquering Power 'cannot be 
expected to cede it', either to another state or to secession.891 The problem with 
separatism based in the sentiment of nationality, Patterson argued, was that it could only 
conceive of independence as its end. If separatists were willing to grant their loyalty in 
return for concessions, then Russia could feel comfortable granting the occupied 
populace significant liberty, autonomy, and the institutions which were the focus of the 
people’s patriotism – in the case of Poland its Diet, army, and fortresses. But since 
nationalist separatists did not care about the character or quality of government, only 
about the identity of it, 'reconciliation becomes impracticable, and a cordial union … 
hopeless'. Separatists consequently forced the state into a choice between allowing the 
territory to secede and practising an 'iron despotism'. The latter alternative was 
abhorrent, Patterson affirmed, but it was also 'the natural consequence' of separatism; 
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'what other course could [the ruler] follow?'892  
 While Cecil and Oliphant were not as quick to absolve statesmen of censure 
over their repressive rule, they shared Patterson's assessment of the character of 
nationalist separatism – of its absolute aim and the dangerous extremes to which this 
attitude led. Cecil remarked that the separatists in Holstein unequivocally rejected 
Danish rule, even when constitutional reform meant that Danish citizens would be 
'enjoying a liberty with which they are little acquainted' in the neighbouring German 
polities.893 The sentiment of nationality cared not for the 'reconciliation of conflicting 
interests … [or] attainment of constitutional liberty', those proper 'modest objects of 
desire'.894 'How impossible it is', Oliphant grumbled, 'to devise a form of government 
which shall satisfy a people whose sole aspiration is separation', since 'unfortunately 
there is no amount of political liberty which will satisfy the sentiment of national 
independence, which is in most instances unreasonable; … people would rather govern 
themselves badly than let other people govern them well'.895  
 For the British Liberal party, the conceit that they were the champion of the 
cause of constitutional liberty in Europe was a central tenet of their self-image and their 
political vocabulary.896 Conservatives consequently tried to suggest that British liberal 
supporters of the German national and democratic movement were willing to sacrifice 
liberty and constitutional principles for the principle of nationality.897 The liberals would 
either have to re-conceive of their role in Europe, relinquishing their identity as the 
champion of constitutional liberty, or they had to renounce the sentiment of nationality 
and movements for self-determination.  
 For conservatives, the crucial factor in matters of annexation and separatism 
was the emotional nature of the sentiment of nationality. This meant an absolutist 
politics with little scope for compromise or settlement, which would fail to further the 
values of liberty and patriotism. As a consequence, while conservatives were generally 
sceptical of the benefits of annexation, they also lacked sympathy for separatist or 
nationalist movements, let alone argued that ethics put these movements in the right.  
 Even effective secession and the granting of self-determination could, 
conservatives argued, be a curse for a people, rather than a blessing. Some people would 
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be better off as safely part of an empire. Discussing the Ottoman Empire, conservatives 
argued that there were two goods which an empire provided and which would be lost 
were it to disintegrate. Firstly, an empire had the role of ruling the various ethnic and 
religious groups living throughout its territory.898 Conservatives argued that these 
groups, if given free rein, would in fact harass each other more than the Ottomans 
oppressed them. The Ottoman Empire was all that stood 'between its subject races and 
the fearful misery incident to a race-struggle and a religious war'.899 Secondly, collecting 
multiple peoples in an empire made it possible to have a polity powerful enough to be 
independent. Conservatives here invoked precedent; Greece, Serbia and Romania had 
separated from the Ottoman Empire but had never really become sovereign states. And 
just like Serbia and Romania, conservatives argued, any newly created autonomous 
states in south-eastern Europe would just fall under the domination of Russia.900 
Empire secured order and independence, neither of which self-determination would 
provide. 
 Conservatives thus deployed two variants of a jeopardy argument against the 
sentiment of nationality and self-determination. One was aimed at liberals in particular 
and argued that the sentiment of nationality advanced at the cost of constitutional 
liberty – which liberals also professed to value and which they assumed progressed in 
tandem with self-determination. Conservatives rejected this assumption and implied 
that if one really valued liberty, one would renounce the sentiment of nationality. The 
second jeopardy argument entailed that the sentiment of nationality made it impossible 
for a people to retain, when part of an empire, those institutions valued by a “proper” 
patriotism, or, when seceded, even their independence. The abstract idea of nationality, 




Notions of nationality did not play a major role in conservative commentators’ 
comprehension of their world. Liberals for instance drew heavily on the concept of 
national character in their attempts to make sense of the start, course, and conclusion of 
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the Franco-Prussian war, and they invoked the idea of national communities and the 
principle of nationality when considering the impetus for and significance of the 
unification of Germany. Conservatives, in contrast, made sense of these events without 
according much significance to nationality. They did so first of all because they felt they 
had no need for the notion in order to comprehend events. Their established scheme of 
interpretation, with its focus on statesmen and ambition as focused on the interests and 
glory of countries, still provided plausible explanations of the impetus and significance 
of events. Secondly, they had no strong sense that a national community either existed 
or was desirable; it was not a fait accompli which had to be accommodated in their 
conceptual scheme. In fact, conservatives positively disapproved of the notion of 
nationality; both its reality in effecting a detrimental homogenisation of society, and its 
idea in providing an excuse for war and marginalising the values of constitutional liberty 
and patriotic loyalty towards institutions. The only sense in which, some conservatives 
conceded, nationality was incontrovertibly present, was as a sentiment among parts of 
the people, merely providing demagogues with yet another strategy of justification for 
acts aimed at aggrandisement and martial glory. 
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VI. Liminal groups and figures: Conservative thought and 
the wider intellectual landscape 
The previous chapters already related conservative thought to the interlocutors which 
they imagined for themselves; most commonly their targets consisted of a conflation of 
radical and Gladstonian liberal positions. That comparison alone, however, gives too 
much of a sense of difference; reality wasn’t as Manichean as conservative 
commentators presented it. This chapter shows how conservative international thought 
was firmly embedded in and interconnected with the wider landscape of Victorian 
international thought. It will do so through a study of two strands of thought liminal to 
Victorian conservatism: the international thought of Whigs and of “hard-headed” 
liberals.  
 The first strand of liberal international thought with clear affinities to 
conservative thought treated here is Whig thought, the world-views of the old 
establishment. The study of Whig international thought is an apt means through which 
to place conservative thought in the context of Victorian international thought more 
generally. Whig opinion was a feature of the Victorian intellectual landscape self-
consciously distinct from conservative opinion, being propagated through different 
channels and being connected to the rival political party. At the same time, while 
distinct, it was more or less close to conservative thought on the spectrum of Victorian 
opinion, which for instance saw radical commentators rhetorically tarring Whigs with 
the Tory brush.  
 The second strand of liberal international thought which is helpful for our 
purposes is that of the burgeoning newly educated classes, as represented by the 
Saturday Review. The Saturday held a prominent and prestigious place in the landscape of 
Victorian periodicals, self-consciously representing the cream of the metropolitan 
educated classes. While it was not politically partisan, the paper is generally presented in 
the historiography as moderately conservative, especially on social issues and on 
reform.901 The Saturday is however presented here as liminal to mainstream 
conservatism, because even though the Saturday ended up taking a conservative position 
on many domestic social and political issues, and even though it might have seemed like 
a bastion of principled conservatism to a radical Liberal intellectual such as J.S. Mill, 
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many of its prominent contributors affirmed liberal values.902 They considered 
themselves hard-headed liberals, in contrast to both the sentimental radicals such as Mill 
and the aristocratic Whigs.  
 An analysis of Whig and ‘hard-headed’ liberal thought on international affairs, 
of their overlap and difference with the perspective of conservatives, consequently 
provides us with important insights into both the distinctive elements of conservative 
international thought, and the aspects of conservative thought which found wider 
purchase in Victorian Britain.  
 
The Whig perspective on international relations:  
The international thought of Henry Reeve, 1854-1880 
Henry Reeve (1813-1895) suggests himself as an exemplar of Whig thought. Reeve was 
one of the most prominent and enduring commentators on international affairs in 
Victorian Britain. He also explicitly positioned himself as a Whig in the political 
landscape, 'between the two extremes' of Tories and radical or advanced Liberals.903 
Reeve's influence was the result of his positions as premier foreign affairs 
correspondent for The Times (1840-55) and as long-standing editor of and contributor to 
the Edinburgh Review (1855-95).904 In addition, Reeve cultivated close relationships with 
prominent Whig politicians and maintained a 'prolific correspondence with the great 
figures of European politics and culture', with whom he had a convenient 'habit of 
forming lasting friendships'.905 
 In his commentary on international affairs, Reeve was first of all concerned to 
prevent the Liberal party's 'deviation, from the moderate liberal principles which we 
term Whig, to the extreme liberal principles which we term Radical'.906 As a 
consequence he mostly argued against the positions taken by advanced liberals and 
radicals such as Gladstone, Cobden, and Bright, and showed little direct engagement 
with conservative commentators.907 
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 The international thought of Reeve and of conservatives contained two 
fundamental differences, both clearly linked to the established Whig—Tory divide. 
Firstly, regarding the domestic genesis of foreign policy, Reeve prescribed the primacy 
of Parliament in setting foreign policy, as distinct from conservative primacy of 
statesmen and executive. Secondly, Reeve envisioned the potential progress of 
civilisation in international affairs, through supplanting the rule of force with the rule of 
international law. Conservatives were emphatically not committed to any notion of 
progress in the international sphere and thought of the treaty system as embedded in 
the primacy of force, rather than offering an alternative ordering principle for 
international relations.  
 There also existed, though, two significant areas of agreement between Reeve 
and conservatives. Both valued the Treaty of Vienna, if for different reasons, and 
disapproved of the principle of nationality. These two commitments were crucial in 
leading Reeve into a darkly pessimistic assessment of the state of international relations 
over the 1860s and especially 1870s, in contrast to more optimistic advanced liberals. 
Whig international political thought was fundamentally distinct from that of 
conservatives, but the two could still converge in particular assessments of international 
affairs, especially when confronted with radical alternatives. 
 
I. The genesis of foreign policy: statesmen, Parliament, and the public 
Reeve's thoughts on the proper role of statesmen, Parliament, and the public in setting 
foreign policy were markedly different from those of conservative commentators, 
reflecting long-standing differences between Whigs and Tories. Reeve imagined a 
curated role for the public and gave primacy to Parliament, rather than to statesmen and 
an independent executive.  
 Unlike conservatives, Reeve thought that the general public had a role to play in 
setting foreign policy. Discussing the country's dissection of the war effort in 1855, 
Reeve approvingly noted that '[t]he whole country participates in the contest, and lends 
its intelligence and its resources to the army'.908 Public deliberation on past and future 
policy helped to improve Britain's foreign policy by allowing for novel reasoning and 
insight to be applied. In particular, such public scrutiny of possible and actual 
government policy helped to preserve peace. Whereas in autocratic states 'war itself 
might be resolved upon in the secret mind of a single individual', in a more open system 
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'war was avoided by the publicity and freedom of debate … by the force of argument 
and the might of public opinion'.909 Through public debate, Reeve thought, 'the 
aggregate intelligence of the nation criticises and controls [the ruling class]'.910  
 Reeve here adopted the common liberal assumption that autocratic rulers were 
more likely to steer a country into war than the general public was. In discussing the 
likely foreign policy of France, for instance, Reeve emphasised repeatedly that the 
general populace of France was 'averse to war' and functioned as a restraint on the 
sometimes ‘warlike’ Napoleon III.911 Conservatives on the other hand often asserted the 
reasoned nature of the decisions which statesmen would make, generally implying the 
avoidance of war, and contrasted this with the passionate pleas of the public, which 
could for no proper reason force a country into conflict. 
 The exact character of 'popular influence' was, however, an issue for Reeve. The 
criticism and control exerted by public feeling and debate on a state's foreign policy was 
only valuable, Reeve thought, if it were based on 'progressive reasoning'.912 Raw popular 
influence on policy would merely be the rule of sentiment and passion, and of this 
Reeve strenuously disapproved. When discussing, for instance, both the North in the 
American Civil War and the role of Bismarck's Prussia in Germany, Reeve argued that 
the unchecked 'passions of the populace' had led to the North's abrasive attitude in 
international affairs and had made possible, under the guise of realising the Germans' 
sentiment of nationality, Prussia's grand course of territorial aggrandisement.913 Reeve 
similarly condemned as merely sentimental the Bulgarian Agitation of 1876.914 Disraeli's 
foreign policy, too, pandered to ‘[a] somewhat vulgar and often misplaced sentiment', 
which had informed his policy from making the Queen Empress of India, to buying the 
Suez shares, sending Indian troops to Malta, and establishing a British naval base on 
Cyprus.915  
  Public participation, Reeve concluded, ought to be filtered and guided, so as to 
ensure it worked through reason and for progress.916 The institution par excellence to 
adopt this role, and to involve itself more directly in steering the government's foreign 
policy, was Parliament. Reeve consequently expressed a qualified support for Reform in 
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1860s Britain. Through reform the energy of the “popular class” would get channelled 
through Parliament and be properly curated.  
 Reeve had little to complain about the role played by Parliament for most of the 
period analysed here. He addressed the issue explicitly only during the Eastern Question 
in the late 1870s, when the Conservative party was in power and radicals formed an 
extra-parliamentary movement. Reeve rejected the Bulgarian Agitation as exactly the 
kind of passion-driven popular involvement which ought to be avoided. He blamed 
politicians such as Gladstone and Bright for side-lining Parliament, which he considered 
the proper venue for judgement of the government's policy.917 Reeve criticised the 
government, too, for minimising the influence of Parliament on its foreign policy. He 
disapproved of Disraeli and thought that the latter's policy was 'essentially novel and 
unparliamentary ... [in] a very strong exercise of the executive powers of the Crown', 
which impaired the quality of Britain's foreign policy; 'If we were living under the old 
traditions of the British Constitution, or under the strict restraint of modern 
Parliamentary government', Reeve argued, 'many of the surprising events which we have 
recently witnessed would probably not have occurred'.918 Only an 'ambitious and 
aggressive nation' would want to limit Parliament's involvement in setting foreign 
policy.919 Britain was not such a nation and, Reeve implied, Disraeli should not try to 
turn it into one. Parliament ought consequently, Reeve thought, to be intimately 
involved in policy-making, curbing the excesses of both the passionate general public 
and an unrestrained executive.  
 Reeve also discussed how foreign states came to decide on their foreign policy. 
In these analyses, Reeve emphasised the importance of the country's institutional 
structure, rather than its national character or its statesmen — the preferred 
explanations of respectively advanced liberals and conservatives — in determining the 
likely tone of its foreign policy.920 Reflecting on the likely attitude of Germany when 
unified under Prussian hegemony, Reeve argued both in 1866 and in 1871 that German 
foreign policy would be either good or bad for Britain and Europe, depending wholly 
on whether Germany's political institutions would be liberal or autocratic. In 1866 
Reeve wrote that 'we have certainly nothing to apprehend from the increasing power 
and influence of Germany, when that power is exercised under the control of 
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parliamentary government' and again in 1871 he reiterated that 'We have no fear at all of 
the power of Germany, if we are satisfied that it will henceforth be exercised under the 
strict control of a free popular government; … [of] the Federal Parliament or Diet.'921 
Reeve furthermore predicted that under an autocratic state, lacking an assertive, 
independent parliament, the Germans would choose to pursue military glory rather than 
their characteristic peaceful accomplishments.922 Germany's attitude in international 
relations, whether moderate or aggressive, would be determined, Reeve assumed, by 
whether the country's political institutions would be organised along liberal 
constitutional or autocratic lines. 
 Reeve's Whig antecedents consequently closely influenced his thoughts on the 
proper genesis of foreign policy, mandating a prominent role for Parliament and a clear 
constraint on the free action of statesmen and the Crown, as favoured by conservative 
commentators. 
 
II. The progress of civilisation in international relations and the centrality of 
international law  
Reeve’s second fundamental difference from conservative international thought came in 
his commitment to the cause of progress in international affairs. Most aspects of 
Reeve's perspective on the possible motivations and attitudes of states in international 
relations matched that of conservative commentators. The main difference between 
them lay in their sense of what a moderate attitude towards international affairs entailed. 
For conservatives this meant that a state would prevent the slide of Europe into a 
general war, by working to sustain order and stability. For Reeve a similar commitment 
to peace between the great powers was tethered to fostering respect for public law and 
to working for the progress of civilisation in international relations.  
 Reeve thought that Europe had seen a significant increase of civilisation from 
the end of the Napoleonic Wars onwards. International relations, however, had not 
progressed similarly. The time had come, Reeve argued in 1854, for international 
relations 'to meet the wants of a progressive age, and to apply to these delicate 
questions the more humane and temperate maxims which have happily prevailed in 
every other branch of public affairs'.923 Reeve maintained this normative concern for 
progress throughout the period analysed here, still arguing in 1876 for 'the adoption of 
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principles … in harmony with the changes and progressive spirit of our times'.924 A 
major change took place, however, in Reeve's perception of the realisation of such 
progress. Until 1863, Reeve was optimistic about the spread of civilisation in the 
international sphere. After 1863, with the behaviour of first Prussia and then Russia, 
Reeve's mood turned sour and he perceived a re-barbarisation of international relations. 
 The following analysis will firstly unpack Reeve’s notion of progress. It will then 
argue that the first conservative element of his international thought was his rejection of 
the principle of nationality; progress did not imply the creation of nation-states. Reeve’s 
second major conservative strand was his commitment to the Treaty of Vienna. Finally, 
this analysis will convey how his concept of progress and these two conservative 
elements combined to lead Reeve to his distinctly pessimistic outlook over the 1860s 
and especially 1870s.  
 
Reeve’s notion of the progress of civilisation 
Reeve's notion of progress in international relations denoted both a general attitude 
among states and particular areas in need of improvement. Generally speaking, all 
countries, Reeve thought, should be enlightened enough to refrain from pressing their 
narrow self-interest whenever it impinged on 'the general interest of the world'.925 This 
would make possible the rule of law, rather than force, in international affairs. The 
particulars of the progress of civilisation were, for Reeve, mostly related to the 
limitation of war, both in instance and extent; the spread of constitutional liberty; and 
an increased prosperity and freedom of trade.926  
 Reeve extolled respect for public law among states because he thought this 
made possible a different kind of international relations. For conservatives the treaty 
system was important as well, but because it gave durability to settlements based on a 
balance of power and so fostered stability and order in the international sphere. For 
Reeve the promise of international law was more significant, more fundamental. It was 
'designed to substitute the humane provisions of public law and mutual faith, for the 
brutal operations of military force.'927 It could provide an alternative 'governing principle' 
for international relations, a more civilised way for states to relate to each other, 
'something higher than accident and force … the rule of right'.928 Such an 'enlightened 
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respect for the principles of international law, and for the rights of others' not only 
prevented the rule of force, with its obvious benefits of fewer conflicts and protection 
for small states, but also prevented international affairs from being regulated by 
accident.929 Only respect for public law enabled a steady course of progress in the 
international sphere, rather than mere neutral or deleterious change. Where for 
conservatives treaties took the edges off a system based on force, for Reeve law and 
force were two different dynamics of international relations. 
 International law could only effect the progress of civilisation if it was matched 
with the right attitude among states, 'the more enlightened conscience of nations', which 
specifically meant 'a more dispassionate consideration of the rights of others, aided by a 
more enlightened perception of our own national interests'.930 'There is no greater mark 
of the progress of reason and civilisation', Reeve argued, 'than the fact that on many 
important questions, this consent has triumphed over national jealousies and particular 
interests, and has established some few rules and maxims for the common benefit of 
humanity.'931 Countries ought to take a cooperative stance in international affairs aimed 
at the progress of all, rather than an adversarial stance aimed at the aggrandisement of 
the state itself.  
 But neither was Reeve's perspective to be equated with a position like 
Gladstone’s instantiation of a universal morality. Reeve emphasised that he did not aim 
to found international law 'upon the abstract ground of natural justice and equity; … we 
are not tempted … to quit the beaten track of legal tradition and political expediency'.932 
Reeve criticised the Positivists, for instance, for their apparent suggestion that moral 
commitments could take the place of a treaty system: 'In place of those positive 
obligations, on which the maintenance of peace and order depends', Reeve stated, 'they 
would substitute an ill-defined allegiance to the idea of Humanity'.933 States needed to 
have the right attitude, certainly, but Reeve considered the consent given by the great 
powers to particular principles of international law as essential to the system having 
purchase in international relations.934 Reeve recognised the malleability of international 
law, but where conservatives connected this malleability to states' self-interested re-
interpretations of the law, Reeve saw the possibility for progress and a more civilised 
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international relations.935  
 Reeve thought that only with a general respect for public law would a real peace 
be possible, a peacefulness in international affairs. '[T]hat which makes peace effective 
and secure', Reeve argued, '[was] mutual confidence, common obligations, respect for 
treaties, [and] an open policy'.936 What instead existed in Europe was a mere stability and 
order resulting from a balance of military power; 'an armed peace – a peace maintained 
by armaments as vast, by an expenditure as profuse, as has been caused in other times 
by the efforts of war. We look in vain for that confidence in the written law of 
Europe'.937 Where for conservatives such an equilibrium through a balance of power 
was the fundamental principle of order and stability in Europe, merely buttressed 
further by a robust treaty system, for Reeve it was a melancholy reality, providing peace 
for the moment but with war always on the horizon – far from the realisation of a 
peaceful, civilised international relations. 
 Reeve's normative vision for the international sphere was consequently focused 
on the rule of international law, rather than on a durable balance of power or the 
instantiation of universal moral principles – though each of these notions had their own 
role to play, through an enlightened attitude among states and through the absence of 
an aggressive hegemonic state, in making the progress of civilisation and the rule of 
international law possible.  
 Until roughly 1863 Reeve thought that progress had indeed taken hold in 
international relations. For each of his three major markers of progress — the freedom 
of commerce, the limitation of war, and the spread of constitutional liberty — Reeve 
located its main advance in the period to 1863: the Franco-British commercial treaty of 
1860;938 the change in the naval capture law during the Crimean War;939 and the spread 
of constitutional liberty in Italy in 1859-60.940 During these years, Reeve envisioned 
Britain as in a position of moral leadership in Europe. The interests of Britain, he 
argued, were closely interwoven with the cause of progress and civilisation.941 Britain 
stood for 'a liberal and progressive policy', which promoted 'institutions framed in a 
more liberal spirit, more unrestricted commercial intercourse, … and a more intimate 
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connection between the common interests of neighbouring countries', thereby fostering 
progress and the spread of civilisation.942  
 Reeve advocated for Britain a general policy of non-interference, in which it was 
'to aim at an indirect, rather than a direct, influence on other nations', through a 
combination of her 'example' and of her moral support – 'friendship and … confidence' 
– for the side of peace, civilisation, and progress.943 A particular instance of this means 
of influence was Britain's handling of France, which, Reeve thought, had not acted to 
throw Europe into chaos in the early 1860s mostly due to the constraining influence of 
Britain, whose support Napoleon III wanted to retain.944 Reeve, in contrast to 
conservative commentators, thought moral support a viable tool of foreign policy.  
 These achievements in the cause of progress and civilisation were, Reeve 
argued, the foundation of Britain's honour. He concluded after the Trent affair that the 
government's vigorous action had sustained the honour of Britain – because it had 
effectively asserted the rights of neutrals and compelled respect for international law.945 
By the late 1870s, Reeve still thought of Britain's honour as following from its ability to 
effect progress in the world, however recalcitrant this world had become to British 
good intentions.946 Much as for other liberals, for Reeve honour lay in Britain ensuring 
the progress of civilisation, not, as for conservatives, in its ability to assert its interests. 
 There were consequently significant differences between Whig and conservative 
thought on international relations. Reeve favoured Parliament rather than the executive, 
was committed to the notion of progress, hoped to realise progress through an 
international order based on law rather than force, thought that a policy of moral 
support was effective in securing progress, and that effecting progress was the basis of 
Britain’s honour. At the same time, there were two consequential areas where the 
thought of Reeve and conservative commentators overlapped. 
 
Conservative element I: Progress and the principle of nationality 
Reeve thought that the spread of constitutional liberty on the British model was an 
important part of the general progress of civilisation. This concern featured most 
significantly in his writings on the unification of Italy and the state of Europe until 
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1863, and, in the late 1870s, on the future of the European provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire. His concern did not extend, however, to the principle of nationality, which in 
these contexts he ignored or outright repudiated. Reeve argued for a 'cordial sympathy 
with the cause of freedom and national rights abroad', but this mindset was to be held 
'without abetting war and revolution'.947 In his single extended discussion of the 
principle, Reeve first argued that the principle of nationality was an ideal notion, with 
no country, '[not] even France', actually ordered along its lines.948 Asserting the 
normative validity of the principle of nationality consequently meant denying the 
legitimacy of existing states, and 'the application of this principle would lead to the 
entire dissolution of the multifarious states which are properly called empires.'949 Some 
people saw the end of empire as a positive result, but Reeve rejected this perspective, 
calling on the authority of historical precedent: the notion that empires were 'monstrous 
anomalies ... is contradicted by the entire history of mankind'.950 A Europe consisting of 
empires was, Reeve thought, perfectly compatible with a Europe which saw its 
civilisation ever progressing.  
 Reeve's rejection of the principle of nationality did not mean, however, that he 
thought any sentiment of nationality among a population could be ignored as a 
misguided flight of fancy. The sentiment of nationality was, if not an expression of 
'moral right and universal conscience', a clear indication of unenlightened 
administration.951 The sentiment was a call, Reeve argued, not for granting a people 
independence, but for the dominant state to reform its government along liberal and 
constitutional lines. Reeve thus rejected any revolutionary implications which the 
principle of nationality might have, and turned the existence of such a sentiment into an 
argument for the realisation of his valued principles of constitutional liberty.  
 This perspective on nationality informed Reeve’s positive view of the 
developments in Italy from 1859 onward. Unlike conservative commentators, he did 
not present the course of events as one of Piedmontese aggrandisement; with other 
liberals, he rather framed it as Piedmontese leadership in 'the cause of national 
independence'.952 Like many moderate liberals, however, Reeve supported independence 
and unification only in one particular form; unification through 'self-improvement 
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under the aegis of constitutional monarchy'.953 Reeve contrasted this outcome, as 
supported by Britain's 'liberal policy', to that of independence and unification as 
achieved through the upheavals of Mazzini's 'revolutionary party', or through the 
'foreign intervention and … military aggressions' favoured by France.954 Only through 
the internal expansion of a constitutional monarchy in Italy, Reeve argued, would 
national unification be achieved with the stability and 'prolonged peace' necessary for 
the progress of civilisation in the peninsula.955 Reeve was consequently satisfied with the 
course which events took, the unification and 'pacification of the Peninsula … under 
the aegis of the constitutional monarchy of Victor Emmanuel'.956  
 Reeve's commitment to the spread of civilisation and concomitant rejection of 
the principle of nationality also played an important role in his understanding of the 
Eastern Question. Reeve assumed that Russian rule would not advance civilisation in 
the area, so he stipulated that any independence from the Ottoman Empire for the 
peoples of south-eastern Europe ought to be a real independence, from Russian 
domination as well.957 He recognised the salience of military might in this calculus, and 
consequently rejected a reorganisation of the area along the lines of the principle of 
nationality – all the peoples would need to be unified in one state for them to be strong 
enough to reject Russian dominance.958 At the same time, Reeve was not willing, as 
conservatives were, to argue that these people ought to remain part of the Ottoman 
Empire, in the cause of balancing Russia in particular and order and stability in the area 
in general.959 He was convinced that the spread of civilisation was impossible for a 
Christian population under Muslim rule. He equated 'Christianity and Islamism' with 
'civilisation and barbarism' and he thought that 'abuses … [and] incurable decay … 
[were] implanted in the very essence of Mussulman domination'.960 Reeve consequently 
favoured the creation of a single ‘Christian state, capable of self-government and self-
defence'.961 And from a combination of classical affinity and similar national attributes, 
Reeve proposed the Greeks as the Englishmen of the area, taking the lead in the 
progress of civilisation and the creation of this Christian polity, unifying the various 
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extant nationalities under one state.962 Reeve’s normative concern was over 
constitutional liberty, not nationality, and when he discussed the principle, it was to note 
how it conflicted with the orderly progress of liberty and civilisation. 
 
Conservative element II: international law and the Treaty of Vienna 
Reeve noted that much of actual international law, those 'legal principles … regulating 
… the differences of empires', was formed or confirmed during the Napoleonic Wars, 
and had changed little afterwards.963 Since that time, some of those established rules and 
agreements had become 'inconsistent with the milder manners, the more extended 
intercourse, and the more liberal policy of modern times'.964 And since international law 
existed to service the cause of progress and civilisation – 'the true test of the existing 
Law of Nations', Reeve argued, 'is in … its congruity to the interest of civilised States 
rightly understood' – that meant that these laws would have to change, made 'more 
humane and temperate'.965 In articles in the 1850s, '60s, and '70s Reeve argued for more 
limited rights of naval capture, constraining belligerents in favour of the rights of 
neutrals and the freedom of commerce.966 In this more 'progressive age', he argued, the 
'most liberal' policy would relinquish the belligerents' right to seize enemy trade goods 
on neutral ships.967 Reeve's penchant for progress was however carefully delineated: he 
valued the set of treaties making up the Vienna settlement, as the linchpin of respect for 
public law, and was hesitant to countenance the possibility of its wholesale supersession. 
 Reeve argued against those who criticised the supposedly reactionary nature of 
the Vienna settlement, as merely a tool of the powerful, making empire and repression 
possible. He characterised the settlement instead as a check on the abuse of power by 
the strong. 'Great Powers', Reeve observed, 'might be able to hold their own by their 
military strength; but small States owe their very existence to the treaties they affect to 
denounce. In reality treaties serve to restrain the former and to preserve the latter'.968 
The Treaty of Vienna was a buttress of small states' independence. 
 More importantly, though, Reeve thought that the Treaty of Vienna held such a 
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central place in the public law of Europe, that derision and rejection of the Vienna 
settlement could be equated to the absence of respect for international law in general. 
He feared that particular abrogations of the Vienna settlement would lead to a 
dissolution of the Treaty of Vienna as a whole, and that with this august treaty would 
disappear respect for international law and for the rights of states.969 The cooperative 
attitude of states would turn into an adversarial one, and the promise of the progress of 
civilisation in international relations would not be realised. While both conservative 
commentators and Reeve valued the Vienna settlement, their approval had a different 
basis. Conservatives valued the Vienna system primarily for the stability and order 
which the rigid settlement of potential conflicts supplied. They still perceived an 
adversarial attitude amongst states; this was exactly why the settlement was needed. 
 Reeve was preoccupied with the fate of the Treaty of Vienna over the course of 
its slow demise during the 1850s and 1860s. As Italy became unified, Reeve was 
satisfied with Italy's internal developments, but less sanguine about the state of Europe 
in general. Early on he noted that Austria had clear and recognised rights based on 
established treaties. Progress for Italy would mean states acting against these rights, and 
so acting against the treaty system. Reeve was not comfortable with this, and he initially 
privileged his commitment to international law over the opportunity to further liberal 
values. The wider ill effects of 'a deliberate breach of the public law of Europe', Reeve 
argued, 'bind us imperatively to the maintenance of treaties even when they are at 
variance with the liberal sentiments and free institutions of this country'.970 These strong 
feelings, though, did not stop him from rejoicing in the eventual unification of Italy. By 
1866, Reeve wholly approved of the developments in Italy. The progressive nature of 
events, he implied, had robbed them of their sting, and respect for public law had 
persisted.971  
 Reeve's second worry concerned the intent of Napoleon III, and the latter’s 
seeming desire ‘to wrest the fundamental Treaties of Europe from their true intention' 
and to overturn the Vienna settlement.972 His fear in 1860 was that Napoleon III would 
choose to continue on a path of 'restless designs of political change and territorial 
aggrandisement, backed by military force'.973 Over the following years, however, Reeve 
was pleasantly surprised 'with the habitual moderation of the course he [Napoleon III] 
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has pursued'.974 Although Reeve generally disapproved of Napoleon III,975 he was less 
censorious than most conservatives. Reeve, like many liberals, thought that the 
Emperor's destructive impulses were effectively checked by his alliance with Britain.976 
Britain would only support French initiatives which were to the benefit of mankind, 
and, Reeve concluded, French policy had consequently not proven a threat to Europe 
and its system of public law.977 All signs pointed to 'the progress of freedom and good 
government' throughout Europe.978 
 Reeve's rosy vision was dispelled in the following years, however, as Prussia 
took a leading role in European politics. It required Prussia's aggressive and self-
aggrandising policy, barbaric rather than in service of progress and civilisation, for the 
abrogation of particular aspects of the Vienna settlement to blossom into a wholesale 
decline in respect for international law and the rights of states.  
 
1863-80: International law and the re-barbarisation of international relations 
Reeve’s liberal vision of progress and conservative rejection of the principle of 
nationality and commitment to the Treaty of Vienna came together to form his 
particularly pessimistic view of international politics between 1863 and 1880. The utter 
disregard shown to the Treaty of Vienna over the 1860s was even more consequential 
for Reeve than it was for conservatives. For Reeve, this indicated the impotence of his 
vision of progress through an international society ordered by law rather than by force. 
Conservatives regained their sanguineness over the 1870s as Bismarck seemed to adopt 
a more moderate attitude and as basic balance of power principles seemed able to 
provide stability and order. For Reeve, this primary role for force merely emphasised 
the promise of the law-based order which was lost, and he remained despondent about 
the tenor of international affairs until the end of the period treated in this study.  
 By 1866 Reeve observed a 'great and dreadful change in the condition and 
prospects of Continental Europe'.979 Prussia had instigated and won aggressive wars 
with first Denmark and then Austria, in 'breach of every engagement [of international 
law]', and would merely confirm this aggressive attitude in 1870-71 by its war with 
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France and designs on Luxembourg.980 Through its utter disregard for treaty obligations 
Prussia had effected a change in the character of international relations. With one great 
power ignoring public law, other states could no longer count on it being observed, and 
would themselves lose their respect for it. Reeve felt forced to conclude '[t]hat respect 
for the general public law of Europe, which had been maintained for half a century, in 
spite of numerous revolutions and of some partial changes which are inevitable in all 
human affairs, is lost. … the authority of treaties and the restraint of common 
obligations are at an end'.981 Bismarck's conduct had re-established the 'spirit of mutual 
mistrust' in Europe's international relations.982 
 Reeve related the loss of respect for public law to the end of the Vienna 
settlement, those 'great treaties, on which the law of nations and the peace of Europe 
rested'.983 If states could not trust one another to adhere to even the Treaty of Vienna, 
then, Reeve thought, they could no longer trust public law in general. Reeve even 
equated the Treaty of Vienna to the Treaty of Westphalia, arguing that 'the same spirit 
pervaded both', and that with its actions Prussia 'has in reality overthrown and reversed 
the principles of the Treaty of Westphalia itself, so far as they might still be traced in the 
public law of Europe' – so large loomed the Vienna settlement in Reeve's perception of 
the public law of Europe.984 Whereas conservatives thought that the unification of Italy 
and attendant French policy had caused the demise of the Treaty of Vienna, Reeve 
stated that 'the final overthrow of the great settlement of 1815 … [was] the result of the 
policy of Prussia in 1864 and 1866'.985  
 Reeve's pessimistic outlook persisted throughout the 1870s. Where Prussia had 
caused the initial loss of faith in public law among states, Russia further strengthened 
this dynamic during the 1870s, unilaterally abrogating part of the Treaty of Paris in 
1870986 and acting with similar disregard for established treaties during the crisis of the 
Eastern Question from 1876-78.987 Together Russia and Prussia had 'annihilated the 
faith in treaties concluded between all the great Powers of Europe'.988 The period from 
1863 to 1878 was one during which aggressive states such as Prussia and Russia ignored 
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their treaty obligations in order to aggrandise themselves through military conquest. 
Prussia had asserted, and Russia had confirmed, that states ought to approach 
international relations as an antagonistic affair, governed by force and might.  
 Reeve thought that the absence of trust in international law was accompanied by 
a wider decline in the civilisation of the international sphere. The enlightened attitude 
among states was lost, and statesmen now had ‘ambitions to gratify and selfish objects 
to gain'.989 Even more damningly, the promise of a rule of law in international affairs 
had been betrayed. The decline of respect for public law, Reeve stated, 'throws us back 
from a state of peace based on law, to a state of war regulated by force'.990 In 1866, 
Reeve worried that the acts of Prussia and Russia seemed to set the stage for ‘a lawless 
scramble'.991 By 1878, he had argued repeatedly that 'in this, the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, we have fallen back into a state of anarchy, in which the 
independence, the freedom, and the territorial rights of nations are defended by force 
alone'.992 He recalled the optimistic conclusion which Gladstone had given to his 1870 
article on the state of the international sphere and, while sympathetic of the aspiration, 
he noted that its vision was wholly at odds with reality: 'We see independence crushed, 
aggression triumphant … the general judgement of mankind defied and derided, and 
the idea of Public Right contemptuously overthrown'.993 The last time a similar anarchy 
had reigned, Reeve recalled, was when Napoleon had been in power, when public law 
was re-established only after a general war involving a coalition of all the great powers 
of Europe.994 Europe now seemed to be entering a similar period of conflict, governed 
by 'war and the causes of war, only to be terminated when the exhausted world reverts 
to the salutary control of public law'.995  
 Reeve envisioned international law as an alternative foundation for international 
relations, which would obviate the rule of force. As respect for international law 
deteriorated, however, Reeve also asserted the need for a forceful response in order to 
uphold the system of public law. Conservative thought also showed this tension, but 
there it was somewhat resolved since particular treaties made the use of force less likely, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
988 Reeve (1878a: 561-2, see also 564-6). 
989 Reeve (1871b: 283). 
990 Reeve (1871b: 284-5). See also (1860b: 551) 
991 Reeve (1866: 277); see also (1867: 269-70); (1871a: 31); (1871b: 277, 285); (1871c: 460, 473-7). 
992 Reeve (1878a: 565). See also (1877a: 266); (1878a: 562). 
993 Reeve (1878a: 563-4); see also (1877a: 266). See further Gladstone (1870: 592-3). 
994 Reeve (1878a: 565). Note also that Reeve here characterised the Napoleonic war as a coalition 
attempting to re-establish the rule of public law, not, as conservatives presented it, as a balance of power 
coalition against a potential hegemon. 
995 Reeve (1878a: 563). 
204 
while respect for the treaty system depended on the existence of a general balance of 
power. Reeve considered force and law to be less closely entangled. He thought that 
states could follow public law and respect their treaty obligations even in the absence of 
force – countries which took an enlightened attitude would act in that way. Treaties 
could consequently be 'obeyed and respected' either 'from considerations of duty and 
honour … [or] from the armed strength of those who support them'.996  
 As long as international relations was a fairly civilised realm, Reeve thought, 
Britain's moral influence sufficed to sustain respect for public law. It was only as the 
tenor of international relations declined that the threat or use of force became 
necessary.997 Tragically, Reeve reflected in retrospect, Britain had missed its opportunity 
to forcefully stop Prussia in its tracks during the Danish Duchies affair. By the time it 
did contemplate action, with Russia's abrogation of Black Sea neutrality, British action 
in support of the treaty system had become a 'Quixotic task': allies were wanting and 
any action would most likely merely spark a general war.998 
 By 1878, Reeve had become fully convinced of the antagonistic attitude 
pervading international relations and the concomitant rule of force alone. Reeve argued 
that 'the maintenance and defence of public law and justice' now required 'a vigorous 
use of armed force on the side of law and justice … [treaties] can only be maintained by 
those who are prepared to uphold and defend them'.999 As had been the case when 
Napoleon swept away the public law of Europe, now force would have to be used in 
order to re-establish respect for public law, and make this same threat of force finally 
obsolete.  
 So whereas for conservatives the potential use of force was closely interwoven 
with the proper functioning of treaties, for Reeve such a role for military force implied 
that international relations was already no longer functioning properly, that respect for 
public law had waned. States ought to adhere to international law out of their 
enlightened interest in the peace and progress of Europe. Only those states bent on 
aggrandisement, which already had decided to step outside of the framework of public 
law, had to be forced back into its confines. For Reeve a sense of civilisation, not the 
threat of force, was the primary foundation of the treaty system. Only when, by the late 
1870s, this enlightened attitude had broken down did he discern the necessity for a 
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forceful restoration of respect for public law. 
 
Conclusion 
Reeve shared some affinities with the liberal internationalist thought identified by 
Casper Sylvest. Both ‘aimed to reform the conditions of international politics’ in order 
to realise progress, justice, and a non-anarchical order, and saw international law as a 
potential locus of progress.1000 Much like Reeve, liberal internationalists lawyers 
understood international law as positivist in the late 19th century and felt the need to 
‘identify and codify (or rewrite) these rules as civilisation developed’.1001 In contrast with 
Reeve, though, these internationalist lawyers were in fact optimistic during the 1870s, 
perceiving ‘a new era of international law’, rather than its disintegration.1002 
Furthermore, in Britain in particular, Reeve was out of tune with the dominant, 
Gladstonian strand of liberal internationalism.1003 Reeve affirmed the Treaty of Vienna, 
rejected a role for the principle of nationality in the progress of Europe, and privileged 
institutional development over moral uplift. The proper morals were important to him, 
but exactly because they made the improvement of international laws and establishment 
of the rule of international law possible. His sense of international progress thus had 
more of an institutional slant than that of most British liberals and radicals of the time 
— it was more closely wedded to the established forms of great power cooperation and 
consensus in positive law.1004  
 As a Whig participant in British debates on foreign policy, Reeve's international 
political thought was characteristically different on several major counts from the 
Victorian conservative perspective on international relations. Reeve's Whig antecedents 
closely influenced his thoughts on the proper genesis of foreign policy, mandating a 
prominent role for Parliament and a clear constraint on the independence of statesmen, 
as favoured by conservative commentators. Reeve's thought contained strands of 
positional conservatism in his preference of established empires over the newly 
imagined nation-states and in his conviction that the Treaty of Vienna had to be 
sustained as central to the system of public law. In a Whiggish move, Reeve rejected any 
revolutionary implications which the principle of nationality might have, and instead 
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turned the existence of such a sentiment into an argument for the realisation of his 
valued principles of constitutional liberty.  
 The fundamental tenor of his vision of international relations was markedly not 
conservative, in a normative commitment to progress and the spread of civilisation and 
in envisioning the promise of an international legal order which would obviate the 
primacy of force in international politics. This vision of steady progress within an 
enveloping institutional structure was decidedly suitable to a Whig world-view, even if 
during these decades the international sphere proved less amenable than Britain itself to 
a Whig mental ordering of events. 
207 
The Saturday Review and conservative international political thought 
The Saturday Review was founded in 1855 as an explicitly non-partisan weekly periodical. 
Instead it had a clear class affiliation; it was written by young, academically distinguished 
university graduates and conceived of the metropolitan educated classes as its 
audience.1005 Bevington, the paper's foremost chronicler, argues that the Saturday is 
'significant in that it is in a very real sense representative … [of the] opinions of the best 
informed conversational circles of the time'.1006 It was also popular: by 1868 'the 
circulation of the Saturday was in excess of 10,000 and considerably greater than that of 
any [other high-brow] weekly paper'.1007 This general appeal was carefully fostered by 
editor J.D. Cook, who 'employed the Liberals to write on the matters where they were 
most Conservative, and the Conservatives on topics which they could treat liberally'.1008 
 The paper did, however, adopt a political inflection over time. As Collini has 
observed, 'those members of the educated classes who came to maturity in the 1850s 
and 1860s' often came to reject Gladstonian Liberalism during either the early 1870s or 
1880s and adhered to 'an increasingly conservative Liberalism'.1009 Indeed, by 1883 the 
Saturday showed settled support for the Conservative party. The world-view from which 
the Saturday and its main contributors eventually arrived at their conservatism in the 
1880s was however distinctive from that of contemporary conservative intellectuals. 
This difference between mainstream self-identified conservative commentators and the 
Saturday's commentary was present in their international political thought, perhaps even 
more so than in their positions on domestic affairs. 
 There were three major divergences in the perspectives of conservatives and the 
Saturday. Firstly, whereas conservatives often worried about Britain’s honour, the 
Saturday accorded little salience to the honour of Britain in its policy advocacy. 
Secondly, the Saturday's analyses of international affairs showed a disregard for 
international law even more complete than that of conservatives, rejecting not only the 
possibility of international law as an alternative ordering principle of international 
affairs, but also the relevance of treaties in general and the Vienna settlement in 
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particular. Furthermore, and wholly in contrast to conservative commentators, the 
Saturday did express respect for the sentiment and the principle of nationality, as having 
both normative value and practical worth. The chapter finishes with a case study of the 
Saturday’s commitment to the unification of Germany, the most distinctive of the 
positions which the Saturday took in the British debates on international affairs during 
these decades. 
 
British Honour in the Balance 
The Saturday shared with conservative commentators a similar understanding of the 
basic dynamic of international relations. The same conceptual scheme, revolving around 
great power politics, the primacy of force and interests, and the concerns of stability and 
peace, informed the Saturday's perspective on international affairs, especially in the 
debates on the Crimean War,1010 the Franco-Prussian war and abrogation of Black Sea 
neutrality,1011 and the Eastern Question.1012 The one main difference between the 
Saturday and conservative commentators, within the paradigm of great power politics, 
force, and interests, was that the Saturday consistently showed less of a sense that British 
honour was at stake.  
 The Saturday emphasised just as much as conservatives that a state needed to 
have stature in order to have influence in international politics; it needed to have a 
reputation for being willing and able to use force to secure its interests, especially in 
those cases where it had already verbally expressed its displeasure with events.1013 The 
Saturday, again just as conservative commentators, invoked the importance of Britain's 
stature in its arguments against the moralising of Gladstone and of radicals such as 
Cobden, Bright, Mill, and Froude. These people, in the eyes of the Saturday, either 
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expressed their disapproval of foreign governments, without having an attendant 
willingness to act on this displeasure, or they excused the offensive behaviour of foreign 
governments, while British interests were in fact substantively affected. Either way, such 
behaviour made for confused rather than firm and assertive signalling to other states. 
Those states would consequently attend to British opinion less and less, and Britain 
would see its influence in international affairs diminish.1014 
 While the Saturday thus also asserted the importance of Britain's stature, it 
seldom perceived the honour of Britain to be in the balance to the extent that war was 
worthwhile. In particular, while it insisted that Britain only assert verbally what it was 
willing to enforce militarily, it was unwilling to actually advocate the use of force merely 
to make sure Britain kept its word when no other considerations favoured going to war. 
Compared to the Saturday, conservative commentators both had more of a sense that 
Britain's prestige was precarious, and they seemed to consider honour more of an end 
in itself.  
 During the Danish Duchies affair, conservative commentators argued that 
Britain had all but promised over the course of its diplomacy that it would safeguard 
Denmark. They feared a fatal stab to Britain's stature now that the government was 
unwilling to act against Prussian and Austrian aggression. The Saturday, in contrast, 
argued against going to war as calls began spreading for forceful action by the 
government. The Saturday did not think that the statements of the government had 
placed Britain's honour in the balance and it consequently thought that any British 
involvement would be based wholly on support 'for the ambiguous rights of Denmark', 
which it did not consider worth a war.1015 
 During the American Civil War, conservative commentators perceived gross 
slights to British honour in the North’s demeanour during the Trent affair and in 
Northern demands for Britain to impound Southern ships in British docks. The Saturday 
disliked the North quite as much as conservative commentators did, but lacked their 
enthusiasm for the South.1016 Whereas conservatives consequently saw a war with the 
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North not only as a means to safeguard British honour, but also as a means to secure 
the desired end of Southern independence, for the Saturday there was no upside to war 
with the North; it would be 'an unmixed evil'.1017 The Saturday was consequently happy 
with the measured response of Britain to the Trent affair, merely demanding redress 
rather than, say, breaking the North's blockade of the South in a fit of pique.1018 
Similarly, it was pleased at the seizure of the Alexandra in British docks, thought it 
unfortunate that the Alabama had escaped, and hoped Britain could avoid being forced 
into a profitless war with the North.1019 Compared with conservative commentators, the 
Saturday was more concerned to keep the peace and less concerned to compel the 
respectful treatment of Britain; it rather characterised Britain's 'calm and courteous' 
forbearance under American brutishness as a sign of Britain's self-confidence and 
magnanimity.1020  
 In the Danish Duchies affair, sympathy with the German cause gave the 
Saturday a positive reason not to insist on a war for Britain's honour. In the American 
civil war there would have been no reason for war except for honour, and the Saturday 
advocated keeping the peace if at all possible. During the Black Sea affair, though, the 
Saturday argued for forceful action by Britain either to maintain the neutrality of the 
Black Sea or to secure a similar guarantee of Russian non-aggression. Still honour 
played no role, however. Where conservatives felt anxious over the affair's effect on the 
stature of Britain, and where Reeve worried over its effect on respect for public law, the 
Saturday only valued the substantive issue of 'checking the ambitious projects of 
Russia'.1021  
 The initial war-scare resulted in Russia’s acquiescence to a conference to be held 
in London. Most conservative commentators presented this as a belated recognition of 
the relevance of British opinion, and concluded that British stature was secure, even if it 
had to concede some of its interests. The Saturday, in contrast, was primarily 
disappointed that its preferred alternative to Black Sea neutrality, general access to the 
sea for military vessels, was not even proposed at the conference. Everyone seemed 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Jun 29: 653); (1861, Oct 5: 339); (1861, Dec 28: 650); (1862, Jan 4: 2, 5-6); (1862, Mar 15: 285); (1862, Sep 
20: 330); (1862, Oct 11: 445-6). Pace Bevington (1941: 72). See also Campbell (2003: 48-9). 
1017 Saturday (1864, Mar 5: 276). See also (1861, Nov 9: 445); (1862, Jan 4: 14); (1862, Jan 11: 29-30); 
(1873, May 2: 549). 
1018 Saturday (1861, Dec 7: 578, 580); (1861, Dec 28: 650); (1862, Jan 4: 1-2); (1862, Jan 11: 31-2). 
1019 Saturday (1863, May 2: 549-50); (1863, Jul 4: 6); (1865, Feb 11: 156); (1865, Oct 21: 502). These ships 
were Southern commerce raiders being constructed in British wharfs. 
1020 Saturday (1865, Oct 21: 501-2). 
1021 Saturday (1870, Nov 19: 641). See also Saturday (1870, Nov 19: 640); (1870, Nov 26: 670-1, 676-7); 
(1870, Dec 3: 700, 704); (1870, Dec 10: 732-3, 736). 
211 
more concerned 'to conceal a defeat', it grumbled, than to secure an alternative material 
guarantee against Russian aggrandisement.1022 The Saturday did not think Britain's stature 
had really been at stake in the affair and would have preferred Britain to focus on the 
substance of the matter, which it did think grave, rather than on the observance of 
pleasing forms.  
 Conservatives often saw the honour or stature of Britain as being under threat 
in a particular episode of international affairs, enough so for them to advocate that 
Britain forcefully reassert its relevance, compelling the respect of foreign governments. 
The Saturday, however, never considered British stature to be under threat to the extent 
that it influenced the magazine's arguments for or against the use of force. The Saturday 
certainly valued the honour of Britain; it just did not think that this stature was placed in 
jeopardy by the occasional travails of diplomatic upheaval.  
 
The Saturday Review, international law, and the principle of nationality 
The Saturday shared with conservative commentators a concern for order and stability 
among the great powers of Europe. Beyond that, though, its normative commitments 
were markedly different. The Saturday expressed a sympathy for national feeling, 
considered the sentiment of nationality reasonable and laudable, and envisioned a 
significant role for the principle of nationality in ordering Europe and providing stability 
to the continent. At the same time, it rejected the Treaty of Vienna and had little regard 
for international law as a way to order international politics. 
 
International law and the Treaty of Vienna 
The Saturday took the position that the course of international relations was determined 
by force and interests, not by treaties or respect for international law. Since the latter 
were not the drivers of international politics, the Saturday only gave them limited 
attention in its analyses of international affairs. And with international law only having a 
small possible role in constraining states, the Saturday considered that not much of value 
was lost in its non-observance. It consequently evinced little concern to maintain 
respect for international law, or indeed to let law and treaty constrain its policy 
advocacy. 
 The Saturday asserted that any ostensible influence of international law on 
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international politics was really the influence of the threat of force.1023 Considering the 
possibility of French aggression in the 1860s, for instance, the Saturday argued that 
'neither Belgium nor the Rhine provinces possess any security against French greediness 
except the arms of the Great Powers who are interested in protecting their 
independence'.1024 Even the relevance of the Treaty of Vienna settlement lay only in 
great powers being willing and able to use force in order to assert its provisions.1025 
Those great powers, the Saturday asserted, would enforce the observance of 
international law not based on ideals of right or justice, but only by consideration of 
their own self-interest.1026 International law had consequently come 'to suit the 
circumstances of six or seven great States which are sufficiently powerful to be really 
independent'.1027 Public law had nothing to do with notions of morality or justice. As a 
consequence, the Saturday argued, the demands of justice, and even of the general 
stability of Europe, were often at odds with the established precepts of international 
law. Moreover, justice and stability were more important than the observance of public 
law. ‘[M]oral and political expediency’ lay for the Saturday in the principle of nationality 
and peace and stability of Europe.1028  
 The Saturday repeatedly advocated that established international law be ignored, 
in favour of such moral and political expediency. The Saturday did not care that events 
in Italy went against 'the pedantries of international law' and 'constitute[d] technical 
offences against the treaty rights of neutral Powers'.1029 It was happy that for Italy 'the 
rules of law are set aside to leave room for the larger principles of natural justice'.1030 
The boons of Italian unification, in justice for the Italian people and stability for 
Europe, justified the illegal means used to effect it.1031 When 'positive law' was in 
conflict with 'moral fitness', when treaties prevented the national self-determination of a 
people, then the demands of justice and stability outweighed the value of observing 
                                                          
1023 Broderick (1860, Jun 23: 803); Saturday (1855, Nov 24: 59); (1856, Mar 1: 334); (1858, Jun 19: 630); 
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1031 Unless those means included a general European war. Saturday (1859, Feb 12: 172); (1859, Jun 23: 93-
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international law.1032 Discussing the Danish Duchies affair, the Saturday again asserted 
that 'legal rights must sometimes give way to political expediency'.1033 The Saturday 
argued that the 1852 Treaty of London merely complicated the matter further by 
ignoring the 'wishes of the population'.1034 On Poland, too, the Saturday advocated for 
Britain to ignore the strictures of international law and recognise the Polish government 
at the first possible opportunity, if genuine independence seemed possible.1035 
Established international law, the Saturday concluded, was incommensurable with the 
ends of stability and justice, and ought to be ignored in favour of the application of the 
principle of nationality. 
 In the cases of Italy, Poland, and the Danish Duchies the prescriptions of 
international law had been in conflict with what the Saturday understood as the course 
of moral and political expediency. Its rejection of international law was not, however, a 
mere issue of convenience. In both the Black Sea affair and the Eastern Question crisis 
of 1876-78, where an appeal to established treaties and respect for international law 
would have supported its position, the Saturday all but ignored international law, 
focusing instead on the effectual elements of interests and force. During the Black Sea 
affair, it drew attention not to Russia’s treaty obligations or the state of respect for 
public law, but to Britain securing a material guarantee against Russian aggression.1036 
During the Eastern Question crisis, the Saturday trusted to the menace of Austrian and 
British hostility to bring Russia to the table, and, unlike conservatives, did not invoke 
Russia's treaty obligations as a reason for it to parley with the other great powers.1037 
The Saturday consequently did not even invoke respect for treaties for the purpose of 
furthering British interests – it was all but uninterested in involving international law in 
its analysis of international relations. 
 The one exception to the Saturday's usual treatment of international law as a 
tangential irrelevance were the debates surrounding the American civil war. Here the 
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Saturday did discuss the details of maritime international law and reflected on the 
conduct and policy which it prescribed for Britain and the North.1038 It focused on the 
law, however, because this seemed the best way to avoid a war with the North. Through 
its focus on the legalities involved in the various disputes between Britain and the 
North, the Saturday tried to convince its readers that Britain's honour was not at stake, 
and that the issue could be resolved through the mere adherence of the North to the 
law's technicalities.1039 No war to reassert Britain's honour was necessary.  
 Much like its general opinion of international law, the Saturday saw no value in 
the Treaty of Vienna, whether it were understood as Henry Reeve's foundation of the 
treaty system, or as the conservatives' rigid settlement of most extant potential conflicts. 
From the first years of its publication the Saturday was already dismissive of the Treaty 
of Vienna. During the Crimean War it encouraged its readers to expect the dissolution 
of the obsolete settlement.1040 From 1859 onward, the Saturday argued that the Treaty of 
Vienna was not just obsolete, but positively deleterious. Across Europe, the Saturday 
asserted, 'the settlement of 1815 had wholly failed of its object', because it was based 'on 
very unsound principles' which did not recognise the moral and political salience of the 
principle of nationality.1041 In ignoring the desire for self-determination among peoples, 
the Vienna settlement was both an injustice and ineffective in securing its stated aim of 
order and stability. By 1862 the Saturday expressed the hope that the dismantling of the 
Vienna system out of respect for people's 'national and political affinities' had finally 
become 'more or less reasonable and probable'.1042 United Italy would be a better 
'guarantee for peace', the Saturday argued, than the Vienna settlement of the 
peninsula.1043 The Vienna settlement of Poland, too, needed to be dismissed and a new 
settlement reached which respected the Polish sentiment of nationality, their 'right of 
national existence'.1044 Even Austria's instability and travails in the mid-1860s were the 
result, the Saturday argued, of the way it was revived at the Congress of Vienna, which 
had placed it fundamentally at odds with the sentiment of nationality.1045 Not 
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coincidentally, the Saturday also complained of British conservatives, who, much like the 
Vienna system, still did not recognise the moral and practical salience of the notion of 
nationality and who persisted in their support for the Vienna settlement.1046 
 
The sentiment and principle of nationality 
In British debates on the divisive international questions of the time, the Saturday 
regularly argued for the resolution of these issues through the application of the 
principle of nationality. It prescribed this solution as desirable both from a sense of 
justice and from a concern for the order and stability of Europe. 'The ideal map of the 
world', the Saturday declared, 'would exhibit just as many independent Governments as 
there are [nationalities]'.1047 That was the theory. In practice, however, 'the modern 
theory of nationality … consistently applied … would break up almost every 
considerable European state'.1048 The Saturday consequently proposed that the principle 
of nationality not be implemented stringently as the ordering principle of Europe. 
However, where there was instability and disorder already, the principle might as well be 
applied to put affairs on a just and stable footing. The Saturday also valued constitutional 
liberty, but consistently subsumed this cause in its commitment to the sentiment of 
nationality.1049 
 While the Saturday expressed sympathy for any people's sentiment of nationality, 
it only envisioned a minor role for Britain in the realisation of the principle. This was in 
contrast to those liberal and radical commentators who ascribed leadership of the cause 
to Britain, if generally in ideas and advocacy rather than action. In that latter distinction 
lay the rub. The Saturday assumed the primacy of force in international relations and 
consequently argued that ideas, morality, and enlightened opinion had little agency by 
themselves. The support of the powerful was needed to realise moral ends, as evident in 
the unifications of Italy and Germany, and if sufficient force was arranged against the 
sentiment of nationality, as happened to Poland, it would fail to triumph.1050 If Britain 
wanted to influence the fortunes of national movements, it would have to threaten and 
possibly go to war to do so – which the Saturday generally argued against in all the 
following debates.  
 The Saturday advocated that the Italian Question be resolved through the 
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unification of Italy along the principle of nationality. It treated Italy as one national 
entity, presented Piedmont as representing the Italian nation, and located the foreign-
domestic divide, in the perennial discussions on foreign intervention, as lying between 
the Italian peninsula and those countries outside.1051 Conservative commentators, in 
contrast, saw the relevant boundaries as between the actual states, did not recognise an 
Italian national movement, and perceived Piedmont as a brazen aggressor. The Saturday 
explicitly criticised this conservative myopia, in which 'the nation were put out of sight, 
as having no concern in the change' and which 'could only perceive in the constitution 
of an Italian Kingdom the lawless aggrandisement of the Piedmontese dynasty'.1052  
 The Saturday endorsed the realisation of the principle of nationality for the 
Italian people as the most morally expedient solution to the Italian question, repeatedly 
characterising the Italian national cause as the cause of 'justice'.1053 The Saturday also 
argued that unification was politically expedient, best for the order and stability of 
Europe. Firstly, as long as the 'spirit of Italian nationality' was not appeased, any 
settlement would 'be simply a temporary arrangement, pregnant with future 
confusion'.1054 Secondly, an Italy fragmented in a set of small, weak states all but invited 
foreign intervention. Only when unified into one national kingdom would Italy be 
powerful enough to ward off foreign interference and ‘steady the balance of power’.1055 
National unification was not only the just resolution of the Italian question, it was also 
the best choice from the lens of great power politics and the values of European order 
and stability. 
 The Saturday also recognised the value of constitutional liberty, but this 
commitment was subsumed normatively and causally in its concern for the national 
movement. Writing about Lombardy, Venables argued that its specific grievances 
related to misgovernment 'are but consequential evils dependent on the master 
grievance of a foreign occupation'.1056 Where conservative commentators were only 
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willing to consider maladministration as a legitimate complaint, rejecting any sentiment 
of nationality, the Saturday considered the thwarted sentiment of nationality as the 
grievance subsuming all others. Furthermore, the Saturday assumed that the realisation 
of national unification, under the auspices of Piedmont, would bring the realisation of 
constitutional liberty.1057 
 While the Saturday expressed respect for both the sentiment and the principle of 
nationality, it still argued that unification would only be realised if it were backed by 
sufficient force, rather than mere moral right. Piedmont would first need help from 
Britain or France to remove Austria from the peninsula, and could then only hope to 
unify Italy absent further intervention from France.1058 The primacy of interests further 
constrained the cause. Britain was not to use force unless significant interests were 
under threat, and the realisation of a national movement, the Saturday generally opined, 
did not qualify.1059 Reflecting on the unification afterwards, though, the Saturday ascribed 
success to the absence of foreign intervention – implying that force could have stopped 
unification – and ascribed the lack of intervention to great power politics, not the power 
of ideas, a shared sense of justice, or British moral exhortation.1060 
 In commenting on the Polish Question, the Saturday argued that the most just 
resolution of the unrest in Poland would be an independent Polish state, formed along 
the lines of the principle of nationality. It expressed support for the Polish cause and 
claimed to be 'anxious for the emancipation of the Poles' while condemning Russian 
policy as 'sins against Polish nationality and against natural justice'.1061 Conservatives 
criticised Polish separatists because their subversive behaviour made it impossible for 
Russia to grant any liberties. The Saturday did not much mind this effect; it affirmed that 
pursuit of the cause of national independence trumped retaining the possibility of mere 
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238); (1863, Sep 19: 376-7); (1864, Feb 6: 155); (1864, Sep 3: 286). 
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constitutional liberty under foreign domination.1062  
 Poland had as strong a moral case for independence and for foreign assistance 
in this endeavour as any nation could have: 'if wars were waged for the disinterested 
maintenance of right, no cause would more indisputably justify a European crusade 
against the oppressor'.1063 This consideration, however, could not trump the primacy of 
force and state self-interest in international affairs: 'Nevertheless', the Saturday 
continued, 'still stronger considerations require a nation, in almost all cases, to abstain 
from arms except in defence of its own interests or independence'.1064 The national 
cause's only chance, the Saturday thought, lay in forceful intervention by France and 
Britain.1065 It immediately argued, though, that Britain ought not to intervene – no 
interest compelled intervention, and likely French territorial aggrandisement into 
Germany as part of a European war was a compelling reason for Britain to oppose any 
foreign involvement.1066 Poland lacked the lucky confluence of political circumstances 
which had allowed Italy to unify unhindered.  
 In discussing the rise of Prussia and unification of Germany, the Saturday placed 
the principle of nationality front and centre in its analysis. Commenting on the Danish 
Duchies affair, the Saturday noted that the existing mess of treaties and transnational 
obligations had made the question into 'a puzzling complication', and argued that 
instability and disorder would fester until the knot was cut by implementing the 
principle of nationality — which had the added attraction of being the morally 
prescribed solution, considering the 'justice of the case'.1067 The Saturday also argued for 
the moral and political expediency of the unification of Germany in general. On the 
moral side, the realisation of the German people's sentiment of nationality was 'a truly 
wonderful event' and 'a gain to civilisation'.1068 On the political side, unification also 
meant the creation of a major great power in the centre of Europe, where it was aptly 
placed to check the expansion of both France and Russia. United Germany, the Saturday 
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argued, would be the stabilising influence in the centre of the continent which Austria 
had never managed to be.1069 
 The Saturday again subsumed the cause of constitutional liberty in its 
consideration of the sentiment of nationality, assuming that the realisation of national 
sentiment would go hand in hand with the advance of constitutional liberty. Prussia 
might be somewhat illiberal in its domestic government, the Saturday conceded, but the 
magazine expressed optimism that Bismarck and Prussia would have to adopt a 
programme of constitutional liberty in order to maintain Prussia, first as the leader of 
the German national movement, and later as the focal point of the unified German 
state.1070 
 The Saturday also again accorded a primary role to force and interest. Unification 
could only be 'attained', it argued, 'not by the progress of ideas, but by the rude Prussian 
method of blood and iron'.1071 The forceful aggrandisement of Prussia was 'the 
indispensable condition of German unity', mere moral imperative would not do.1072 
Unification's main impediment, meanwhile, was a France which would look askance at 
the creation of a powerful neighbouring state and might decide to use force to pre-empt 
the possibility.1073 Being committed to the unification of Germany, the Saturday 
consequently excused Prussian ambition and forceful aggrandisement, as in the wars of 
1866 and 1870-1, exactly because it considered these necessary for Germany's national 
unification.1074 
 When considering the complications surrounding Italy, Poland, and Germany, 
the Saturday extolled the implementation of the principle of nationality as the perfect 
marriage between morality and expediency, promising, if force and interests would 
allow, a just and stable resolution to these perennial flashpoints in international affairs. 
When it came, however, to the most enduring thorn in the side of European order and 
stability, the Eastern Question and the restive European provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire, the Saturday rejected the suitability of applying the principle of nationality. 
 During the Crimean War, the Saturday had flirted with the idea of inciting 
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nationalist rebellions inside Russia if such were necessary in order to compel Russian 
acquiescence to British peace terms.1075 From 1876 to 1878, however, as Russia and 
Turkey waged war and the fate of the Ottoman Empire's European provinces was hotly 
debated in Britain, the Saturday argued against attempting to resolve the issue by use of 
the principle of nationality. In this case, it argued, implementation of the principle 
would bring neither justice nor stability to the area. Not only were the Slav, Turkic, and 
Greek races intermingled, but, more importantly, all territories contained mixed 
populations of Christians and Muslims. Any attempt to apply the principle of 
nationality, the Saturday argued, would result in a series of local civil wars between the 
Muslim and Christian populations, and a more harmful result it could not imagine.1076 
The best solution the Saturday perceived was rule by an empire, which could 'by means 
of military power, enforce on both parties [Christians and Muslims] order and peace'.1077 
 Conservatives thought of the principle of nationality as a cause of aggression 
and fount of disorder. They considered empire as an excellent source of stability and 
did not think an empire's subjects had any intrinsic cause for complaint, assuming an 
adequate quality of administration. The Saturday also valued stability, but took order 
anywhere it could be found. As long as stability was maintained, no country needed to 
be broken up in order to satisfy an abstract principle. The moment disorder had taken 
hold, however, it favoured a resolution of the issue through the principle of nationality, 
as providing both the most stable and most just result. The Saturday happily endorsed 
the unification of Italy and Germany along these lines, and lamented that Russia's 
overwhelming force precluded the principle's realisation for Poland. Only when this 
solution was impracticable, as it argued was the case for the Eastern Question, did the 
Saturday again envision a role for the old standby of empire.  
 
The Saturday Review, Prussia, and the unification of Germany 
The Saturday's position on Prussia and Germany – a support verging on the 
unconditional – was remarkable, a distinctive element of its perspective on international 
affairs. The Saturday consistently took the position that German unification was both 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1074 Saturday (1865, Aug 5: 164); (1866, Mar 31: 368); (1866, Jul 21: 64); (1867, Aug 17: 224). 
1075 Saturday (1855, Dec 29: 146); Venables (1855, Dec 1: 73-4); (1855, Dec 8: 89-90); (1855, Dec 15: 106); 
(1855, Dec 22: 130); (1856, Jan 26: 223-4). 
1076 Saturday (1876, Apr 8: 448); (1876, May 27: 665); (1876, Aug 26: 247-8); (1878, Mar 16: 321). 
1077 Saturday (1876, May 27: 666). See also (1876, Apr 8: 448); (1876, Dec 16: 757-9); (1878, Aug 31: 262). 
Unfortunately for the provinces, the Saturday also noted, the Turkish administration was incapable, 
Russian domination would prove repressive, and Austrian rule, the best alternative of a bad bunch, was 
unlikely due to a lack of enthusiasm for the responsibility in Austria. Saturday (1876, May 27: 666); (1876, 
221 
morally and politically expedient – both just and a boon to the stability of Europe. 
Unification would further justice in realising the German sentiment of nationality, and 
stability in creating 'a strong central Power between France and Russia', which would 
provide a permanent check on their aggrandising policy and promised a stable balance 
of power in Europe.1078 The Saturday was consequently a strong advocate of the Prussian 
position over the 1860s, from the Danish Duchies affair, via the Austro-Prussian war of 
1866, to even the onerous peace terms of the Franco-Prussian war. Already in 1860 the 
Saturday expressed its hope that Prussia would follow the example of Piedmont, take up 
leadership of the German national and liberal cause, and effect the unification of 
Germany.  
 In its coverage of the Danish Duchies question, the supposed Danish repression 
of the population's sense of German nationality had the Saturday from the first 
supporting Prussian intervention in the affair: 'The Prussians are not only justified in 
using force', observed the Saturday in early 1861, 'but … every friend of justice and 
humanity will be glad to see her act with vigour and promptitude'.1079 Subsequent 
Danish concessions tempered the Saturday's enthusiasm for war, but it reacted to the 
Austrian and Prussian invasion of Denmark with only muted complaints; while it 
considered the war a disproportionate measure, it also noted that this unjust action 
would lead to a desired and just result, in furthering the cause of German national 
unity.1080 
 In its commentary on the 1866 war between Austria and Prussia, the Saturday 
favoured Prussia, because the latter could possibly unify Germany, which Austria, not a 
purely German polity, could never do.1081 Throughout the 1860s conservatives were 
alarmed by Prussian ambition and aggression. The Saturday in contrast felt sanguine 
about Prussia's exploits, secure in the knowledge that Prussia worked to establish a 
unified national Germany and predicting that Prussia's ambition would wane once 
united Germany had become a major great power.1082  
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 The main blot on this happy picture was in fact France, with its unpleasant 
demeanour. The Saturday had reminded its readers of the French desire for territorial 
expansion throughout the 1860s: as a rationale for British inaction on the insurrection 
of Poland;1083 in the context of the American civil war;1084 in its discussion of the 
diplomacy surrounding the Danish Duchies affair;1085 and finally, around the Austro-
Prussian war of 1866, the Saturday feared that France, out of a sense of jealousy, would 
either attempt to conquer the German Rhine provinces or demand Prussian 
acquiescence in its annexation of Belgium.1086 True to this perspective the Saturday 
followed most British commentators – but notably not the conservative ones – in 
characterising the Franco-Prussian war as one of unilateral French aggression against an 
innocent Germany, the latter fighting to hold on to its territory and to keep alive the 
promise of national unification.1087 And whereas most liberal commentators turned their 
disapproval on Germany as it continued the war with the siege of Paris to compel the 
cession of Alsace and Lorraine, the Saturday, in contrast, staunchly defended the 
German cause throughout the conflict, to annexation and beyond. It consciously 
positioned itself as arguing for the German 'side of the case which … seems just now to 
be the less popular’.1088  
 The Saturday argued that Britain ought to stay neutral and merely ensure that 
neither side would invade Belgium, as being all which British interests dictated.1089 This 
attitude was however emphatically not an impartial neutrality. The Saturday characterised 
Prussia waging war at the head of a united Germany as 'a truly wonderful event'.1090 The 
war had been caused by French aggression and Germany was throughout the conflict 
defending itself against this aggression. The Saturday consequently presented the siege of 
Paris and the demand for the cession of Alsace and Lorraine as part of Germany's 
defensive policy.  
 The Saturday firstly argued that only an emphatic defeat could make the French 
abandon their desire for aggrandisement – the French press kept prophesying victory 
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over Germany, and only the cession of territory would drive home to the French their 
defeat, dispelling their delusions of annexing the Rhine provinces. Germany was 
consequently right, the Saturday asserted, to continue the war with the siege of Paris 
until France indeed adopted such a corrected perspective.1091 The Saturday furthermore 
argued that the territorial cessions were necessary to guarantee Germany’s military 
security. Only the German possession of several strategic fortresses in Alsace and 
Lorraine would provide a guarantee that France would not go to war with Germany in 
the future.1092 In contrast to the Saturday, both conservative and liberal commentators in 
Britain generally denied that the annexations were justified from military necessity.1093 
The Saturday finally asserted that the annexations, as they were eventually implemented, 
adhered to this logic of military security, combined with a German commitment to the 
principle of nationality. The German peace terms were consequently no wanton 
aggrandisement, the Saturday implied, but rather understandable demands based on 
Germany's reasonable concern for its military security and commitment to the principle 
of a unified German nationality.1094 
 The moral aspect of the issue was, however, a problematic one for the Saturday. 
Even if the population was German-speaking, and considered by Germans as part of 
their nationality, the population itself was instead attached to its connection with 
France. The Saturday conceded that the annexations went against 'the right of the people 
to choose their own government'.1095 It countered that the safety of Germany, even 
Europe, were in the balance. It also tried to salve the wound by opining that the 
Germans would do their best to make the populations a part of Germany – there would 
be little oppression, and likely effective assimilation in a generation or so.1096 
Nevertheless, the Saturday writers clearly had trouble themselves with their line of 
reasoning, and only their commitment to the 'wonderful event' of German unification 
seemed to sustain their advocacy for the German course of action. 
 Conservatives were worried at this point in time about the state of Europe. 
They saw the collapse of France, the unification of a powerful Germany, with unknown 
motives and a worrying alliance with France, and argued that Britain ought to take 
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preventative measures and organise a tacit coalition against a possible German bid for 
continental hegemony, thereby re-establishing a balance of power. The Saturday 
explicitly denied the need for such a policy.1097 It too cared about the balance of power 
and recognised that France would be weakened for a while, but it thought that newly 
united Germany would ably fill the gap left behind by France, and form a check on 
Russia.1098 It was wholly sanguine about the rise of Germany and in fact advocated a 
partnership between Britain and Germany: 'the true enduring interests of Germany and 
England are so very much the same that we cannot well avoid acting together'.1099 Even 
the German-Russian partnership, which came to light early in 1871, did not concern the 
Saturday. It argued that the interests of Russia and Germany were too divergent for their 
momentary cooperation to persist and threaten British interests; Germany would, for 
instance, never allow Russia to conquer south-eastern Europe, or set in motion a pan-
Slavonic programme.1100 
 The Saturday consequently contrasted markedly with both conservative 
commentators and with Reeve on how it perceived the state of European international 
relations by the early 1870s. Whereas Reeve saw the dawn of an age ruled by force and 
conflict rather than law and right, and whereas conservative commentators worried over 
the imbalance of power in Europe with the collapse of France and the rise of a 
powerful and possibly aggressive Germany, and over the diminished stature of Britain 
after its concession on the neutrality of the Black Sea, the Saturday predicted a period of 
peace and tranquillity. It argued that Germany, Austria, and Italy would all pursue a 
pacific policy, and that Russia, too, was for now focused on its internal development: 
'Thus all Europe, from one cause or another, appears to want a space for breathing and 
an opportunity of working out in repose new problems or new ideas'.1101 It seemed that, 
with Germany finally unified, the states of Europe were happily looking to domestic 
progress for national glory, all adopting a moderate, peaceful attitude in their 
international relations.  
 
Conclusion 
The international political thought which informed the reflections on European affairs 
of contributors to the Saturday and of conservative commentators was similar on many 
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basic points. The conservatives' understanding of the fundamental dynamics of 
international relations as determined by great power politics, the primacy of force and 
interests, and the concerns of stability and peace, was a conceptual scheme which they 
shared with the “hard-headed liberals” writing for the Saturday. Important distinctions 
between the positions and opinions of these two sets of commentators existed, 
however, and lay in two basic differences.  
 Firstly, the Saturday's contributors were more pragmatic: they saw little use for 
international law as an effective constraint on states, so they all but ignored it; they did 
not perceive British honour as being threatened by any particular adverse development 
in these decades' diplomacy, so they rejected calls by conservatives for Britain to 
forcefully assert itself for the sake of British honour; and they felt sanguine in 
advocating the application of the principle of nationality as a source of stability for 
Europe.  
 Conservative commentators disagreed with these assessments. While they had 
instrumental arguments for each of these positions, it is tempting also to suppose a 
different disposition. Their marked sensitivity to any slights on Britain's honour 
suggests that they were strongly invested in the prestige of Britain, and that they located 
this prestige in a general respect among the other states of Europe for the opinions and 
interests of Britain. For conservatives Britain's honour was caught up in its role as a 
European great power – not, say, in recognition of its prosperity and civilisation or of 
its role in the spread of liberal values.  
 Conservatives' invocations of international law were generally half-hearted, but 
still distinct from the Saturday's silence. At the same time, their understanding of the 
workings of international law was similar. Conservatives might not have considered 
international law, apart from the Vienna settlement, to be a whole lot more useful in 
constraining states than the Saturday did, but they still valued the system of law as a part 
of the established international order. Public law was an established institution of the 
international realm and conservatives consequently involved it in their analyses of 
international affairs.  
 Conservatives and the writers of the Saturday were most distinct on the notion 
of nationality. The Saturday expressed approval not only from a pragmatic sense that the 
principle of nationality would foster stability in Europe, but also from a normative 
commitment to the justice of the realisation of any sentiment of nationality existing 
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among a people.1102 Conservatives rejected nationality on both counts; it would 
overthrow the existing order of Europe to address a grievance which they considered 
chimerical and unreasonable in the first place.  
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Conservatives were generally galvanised to contribute to the various British debates on 
foreign policy discussed in this thesis by threats which they perceived either to Britain’s 
interests or honour, or to the order and stability of Europe. They also worried about the 
increasing popular influence on foreign policy across Europe, especially when this took 
the form of a strident sentiment of nationality. Conservatives consequently emphasised 
the importance of a public being properly deferential to the judgement of its statesmen 
and warned of the dangers of politicians pandering to the passions of the people. In 
Britain in particular, they routinely decried the effects of liberal ideology on government 
policy, resulting most particularly in a perceived lack of funding for a military ill-
prepared for war. What conservative commentators argued for, what their arguments 
promised, was not progress of some sort, but stability and order in Europe, with Britain 
at peace, its interests secure, while it was respected as one of the great powers of 
Europe. 
 Conservatives’ focus on great power politics and statesmen rather than on 
nations and general populations, combined with their assumption that military force and 
countries' self-interest were the two phenomena central to understanding international 
affairs, strongly constrained what was normatively and causally significant for them. 
Small states, the subject populations of empires, and the domestic situations and 
configurations of states all held little interest, except when and where these influenced 
great power politics and the actions of statesmen. More generally, conservatives 
employed a normative narrative focused on stability and order, rather than on progress, 
with events significant in their buttressing or undermining this stability, rather than in 
furthering or retarding the advance of civilisation. These two fundamentally different 
lenses underlay much of the mutual frustration and incomprehension which liberal and 
conservative commentators displayed towards each other.  
 The main conceptual shift which conservatives had to deal with in these decades 
was occasioned by the demise of the Treaty of Vienna. This development initially 
alarmed many conservative commentators, who feared an international relations of 
unfettered force. However, their commitment to the notion of the balance of power 
allowed them to eventually envisage an orderly and stable Europe which rested no 
longer on one grand settlement, but on treaties codifying the settlements of individual 
disputes — treaties whose purchase was in the end buttressed by a balance of power in 
Europe. The main threat to the European order was now not a king desiring universal 
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dominion, but the transformative and normative force of the sentiment and the 
principle of nationality. 
 Conservative commentators could not cope very well with the burgeoning 
national sentiment across Europe. Some ignored it, others pointed to its dangers, but 
they could neither offer a similarly emotive alternative (merely an institutional 
patriotism and order and stability), nor seemingly quite comprehend the traction which 
the sentiment found among many populations. All they could do, in the end, was 
suggest ways in which to limit the adverse effects of such projects of nationality on the 
stability of Europe, through statesmen privileging and strongly asserting the balance of 
power as the fundamental ordering principle of European politics. 
 Conservatives are sometimes made out to be a throwback, isolated in the 
intellectual landscape, attached to the phenomena of yesterday, and with no intellectual 
connection to the more ‘vital’ strands of thought and opinion. More often, 
conservatives are implicitly assumed not to be representative of their time, as evinced by 
their being neglected in or even absent from putatively general accounts of the era’s 
thought. The direction of debate in Victorian Britain can indeed give this impression; in 
their writings the many varieties of liberals rarely directly engaged with conservative 
commentators, giving higher priority to establishing their variant as dominant within the 
sphere of liberal thought and politics. This thesis proves, however, that in its substance 
conservative international thought was in places interwoven with other contemporary 
strands of thought and opinion. 
In the mid-Victorian intellectual landscape, as it pertained to debates on 
international affairs, the positions occupied by Henry Reeve and by the Saturday Review 
were relatively close to those of conservative commentators – they were often united in 
their disparagement of liberal and radical commentators such as Gladstone, Mill, 
Cobden, or Bright. Conservative thought was nevertheless distinct from even these 
close neighbours. The difference lay, however, in particular areas. Conservative 
commentators shared with Reeve a concern to preserve the Treaty of Vienna, if for 
different reasons, and a disapproval of the principle of nationality. The Saturday, in 
contrast, rejected international law in favour of the moral and political expediency of 
the principle of nationality. Conservatives and the Saturday shared a similar assumption 
regarding the primacy of force and interests. Reeve, in contrast, had a vision of progress 
for the international sphere where this dynamic would be supplanted by the rule of law 
and an enlightened attitude among states.  
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While having affinities to Whig and hard-headed liberal positions, the 
conservative body of thought formed a distinct part of the intellectual landscape. 
Conservatives had two particularly characteristic elements in their international thought. 
Their condemnation of the sentiment and principle of nationality as a mere fancy to be 
ignored and as a cause of conflict to be deplored distinguished them from other 
commentators in mid-Victorian Britain, who ranged from plain enthusiasm to Reeve's 
wary indifference. Their defence of British honour and prestige, too, set them apart, 
both in terms of where they understood this honour to lie and in how sensitive they 
were to any imagined slight. Conservatives’ aversion to notions of progress, whether 
located in the establishment of the rule of international law or of the principle of 
nationality, and their particular understanding and valuation of British honour, meant 
that Whig and ‘hard-headed’ liberal positions, even while showing significant affinities, 
were not to be mistaken for conservative positions on international relations.  
Conservative thought was also characteristic in its particular combination of 
elements more widely present in Victorian international thought. Broadly put, 
conservatives married a ‘realist’ conception of international politics, as being about great 
powers, force, interests, and order and stability, to a conservative sensibility, in a 
preference for the established institutions of the international sphere, the Vienna 
settlement, a treaty system resting on a balance of power, a Europe consisting of 
empires rather than nation-states, and a foreign policy set and conducted by statesmen 
rather than parliament or the people.  
This was mostly a happy marriage – for example, statesmen and the balance of 
power had pride of place on both sides of the ledger – but as the Saturday showed, a 
mostly ‘realist’ understanding of the workings (if not the ends) of international relations 
could easily be part of a pragmatic perspective which would happily abandon certain 
established institutions which conservatives cherished. And conversely, Reeve showed 
that certain conservative impulses could exist together with a basic understanding of 
international relations which was highly ‘idealist’, focused on progress.  
Conservative international thought in mid-Victorian Britain was consequently 
distinguished by its combination of a ‘realist’ understanding of the workings of 
international relations with a conservative attachment to its existing institutions and 
rejection of both new schemes of ordering international politics and new values by 
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